War on the Body: Dramatising the Space of the Unknown

LAURA GUILLAUME

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Department of International Politics

Aberystwyth University

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Summary

This thesis explores the politics of knowing the body at war. It argues that the exclusion of the body from certain political discourses actually involves the assumption of a great deal of knowledge about the body, and correspondingly, a series of decisions about what the body is. I argue that these judgements about what the body is are entailed in much strategic studies literature, which seeks to emphasise the instrumental utility of war, a project which stands at risk of being undermined by the intrusion of the body. I also argue that the exclusion of the body cannot be remedied by a simple act of inclusion, because this fails to deal with the attendant practices of regulation and control which render the body an excludable/includable component of a system of thought.

The thesis uses the body at war as a catalyst for the development of a particular way of thinking about the body which refuses the distinction between the material and the discursive, or the biological and the political. Rather, it uses the work of Deleuze and Guattari to develop an understanding of the body which is immediately social and political. In the context of shell shock in the First World War, it traces the way in which the disordered body is constructed as such, and the practices which occlude the extent to which the body is political, seeking instead to return it to realm of the personal. Contrary to this tendency, it adumbrates the ways in which the body has the capacity to destabilise social systems and regimes of knowledge. Because it remains ultimately unknown, the body undermines generalising systems of thought and offers a less totalising way of thinking about war and International Relations.

Table of Contents

Introduction

War touches on the most basic questions about who 'we' are and how we organise ourselves. Military discipline aims to construct a soldier for whom there is no doubt as to what his identity is and where his allegiance lies. On the other hand, the horror of war may seem to imperil our very sense of what it is to be human. In one respect, then, war seems to solidify questions of identity, and in another to imperil and complicate them. War seems to be directly concerned with the body, but how we are to make sense of this concern in a productive way is not immediately clear, especially if we are to avoid essentialising or objectifying the body, as I will suggest we need to do. This thesis aims to address this constellation of issues, though it does not to aim to reconcile or resolve these competing and contradictory impulses, or to come up with a definitive model for understanding war and the body. Rather, I seek to dramatise the very impossibility of such a conception by emphasising the fugitive, fragmentary and contingent nature of our understandings of war. I aim to do so by deploying the figure of the body, which, as I will try to show, always frustrates and evades our desire for categorical knowledge, exceeding the categories which we prepare for it, and thus presenting both a challenge to and an opportunity for thought.

In my introduction, I discuss the concepts of identity and war, and some versions of the relationship between them. I choose 'identity' as a starting point for analysis due to its currency in political thought, and due to the extent to which its frailty and contestability creates the space for a consideration of 'the body' as a productive focus for thinking about war. I argue that the body has both been *under*-theorised, in the sense that it has been neglected in certain categories of political thought and at the same time *over*-theorised, in the sense that we tend to assume we know everything about it, or that we could know everything about it, given sufficient time and scientific sophistication. Similarly, it is possible to suggest that 'there are no theories of war or—depending on what you are willing to accept as a "theory"—there are far too many of them'.[1] Treading a path through these approaches, I aim to re-animate the body as a new perspective on war and politics.

[1] Barbara Ehrenreich Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War London: Virago 1997 p. 1

I begin by outlining some of the issues associated with thinking about identity. I do so in part to provide some context for my interest in the body. 'Identity' is a central political concept, but one which I will try to show is also intensely problematic. An uncritical acceptance of the predicates of identity requires an elision of the political work needed to construct identities and to regulate conformity with them. So 'identity' cannot be understood as being pre-social, or as the foundation for society, but rather is fabricated by a set of social norms the political provenance of which should be subject to enquiry. I then move to a discussion of the ways in which the body has tended to be excluded from political theory. The body has been conceived as the silent other to politically significant identity. Where identities signal difference, the body is presented by Hannah Arendt, for example, as being a repository for material uniformity. I suggest that there is more to the politics of the body than a simple question of inclusion or exclusion, and that suggest that the facile distinction between the material and discursive may not hold up to scrutiny, and that there may be more to a politics of the body than first appears.

From here I move to a consideration of war, security and biopolitics considered first from the perspective of identity. I suggest that the Clausewitzian understanding of war presents war and identity as being formally independent, whereby war is pursued in the service of goals established with respect to a given entity with a given identity (a state). I challenge this image with reference to the work of David Campbell, and through the security paradigm of 'biopolitics'. In this way I try to show that one may understand war and identity as having a far more intimate relationship than is presented by the notion of war as instrumental. Rather, war and security may be understood as being intimately concerned with governing the conditions of emergence of certain forms of identity. Biopolitics is of particular interest here because of the way in which it presents itself as being 'post-identarian', concerned with life itself rather than with bodies of any particular identity. As a mode of governance, biopolitics is concerned with emergent life, meaning that it does not seek to fix and secure identities but rather to trace the patterns of transformation that they undertake. The object of security is life itself, and what this means is that rather than trying to impose a kind of stability on any identity, or to reinforce the borders of any particular body (of the individual or of the state), biopolitics is concerned to calculate the degrees of contingency, which is to say uncertainty, rather than to eradicate them.

I dwell on biopolitics because of the way in which it dramatises a particular tension which I aim to raise in the introduction. The majority of ways of conceiving of the body present it as an object which can be known. In other words, the body has fixed and determinate properties upon which we can bring a range of scientific techniques to bear and thereby *know* the body. Even those frameworks for political theory which take no account of the body, or expressly exclude it, do so convinced that it cannot enlighten or transform political life in any meaningful way—they purport to *know* the limitations of the body. I argue in the thesis that these formulations of the body are partial, and insist that one cannot fully know the body, and further, that it is ethically significant that we cannot. From this perspective, biopolitics is significant because it describes a system of security which takes the unknown, or contingency, as its core concern and as an object of calculation, providing a 'technological' understanding rather than an ethical one. I discuss these issues briefly in the introduction: I return to them in the conclusion having expanded further on the notion of the body as unknown in the thesis.

Politics and identity

The idea of 'identity' touches on our understanding of 'what it is to be a human agent, a person, or a self'.[2] In this sense it appears that 'identity' is a fundamental category for thinking about politics, one which is indispensible for considering the impulses behind human organisation and behaviour. 'Who are you? Who am I? Who are we? In answering these questions, we locate ourselves and others in social space... And in this way, we orient ourselves practically: we regularly decide what to do, and how to treat others, at least partly on the basis of who we take ourselves, and them, to be'.[3] Political Theory has often presented 'identity' as being a core organising concept which determines the framework for social interaction. Hannah Arendt argues that politics may be understood as the sphere in which individual identities are displayed and experienced. She says that '[i]n acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world... This disclosure of who in contradistinction to what somebody is—his qualities,

[2] Charles Taylor Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003 p.3
[3] Patchen Markell Bound by Recognition Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003 p. 1

gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide—is implicit in everything somebody says and does'.[4] The distinction made here between *who* and *what* we are posits a natural foundation for political being: we are all human bodies, and political difference begins from this basis.

This is problematic, however, not least because 'identity' is not only the cause of a certain pattern of social relations, but also their consequence. For example, speaking is taken by Arendt as being a way in which 'men' can display their identities. However, this framework instantly runs into difficulties. If I speak, I do so using words, and in accordance with conventions which existed before me, and these determine what I can say. Pierre Bourdieu says that '[t]he official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses'.[5] The point is that the language that we speak is not a neutral vehicle for self-expression, but rather is thoroughly infused with power, and therefore when we speak we do not express an identity as much as affirm a position which is not of our choosing. In this sense, we may understand identity not as something we have, but as something we must assume in order to be recognised and to function politically. This is because in order to speak out in politics in the way envisaged by Arendt, one must first have been authorised and sanctioned as one who is licensed to speak. This does not take place through some prior act of authorisation, but is immanent to (occurs at the same time as) the act of speaking itself. This makes it very questionable whether, for example, 'the law allows room for any voice that has not been woven into its fabric'.[6]

Speaking is but one example of the multiple ways in which identity is a double edged sword in the sense that it is both necessary for political action and a constraint on alternative modes of being which are not governed by the principle of identity. To expand on what might be meant by 'alternative modes of being', I want to explore the Platonic idea that 'identity' may be defined as a stable marriage between a name, or idea and a material entity. The idea allows some judgement as to the value of the specific thing relative to an ideal. For example Arendt says that '[t]he standard by

[4] Hannah Arendt (intro. Margaret Canovan) The Human Condition Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999 p. 179
[5] Pierre Bourdieu (trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson) Language and Symbolic Power Cambridge: Polity Press 1991 p 45
[6] Sandra Berns. To Speak as a Judge: Difference, Voice and Power Aldershot: Ashgate 1999 p 13

which a thing's excellence is judged is never mere usefulness, as though an ugly table will fulfil the same function as a handsome one, but the adequacy or inadequacy to which it should *look* like... its adequacy or inadequacy to... the mental image'.[7] In other words, if I take seriously the identity 'woman', then I am likely to feel inferior relative to the idea of what a woman *should* look and be like, and in this sense identity is part of a process of judgement whereby the value of things is measured. This already introduces an element of slippage into identity whereby it is possible for things to fail to measure up to, or to fully embody, their designated identity. Judith Butler suggests that this may provide the space for a critique of identity according to which one refuses to act out the prescribed or expected identity. Her example is men who wear drag, as they refuse to strive towards the ideal of 'man' and instead subvert this by performing the tropes of masculinity/femininity in alternative hybrid ways. In so doing, she suggests, they reveal the extent to which all identities are dependent on our rehearsal of them (the idea only exists insofar as we strive to achieve it[8]) and are porous, malleable and fragile.[9]

Identity begins to appear as something more repressive than emancipatory, and this creates certain dilemmas for thinking about politics. As Judith Butler puts it, 'the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation...an uncritical appeal to such a system for the emancipation of 'women' will be clearly self-defeating'.[10] But the extent of the problem has perhaps been concealed by the way in which I have presented it. I suggested above that I may feel that I fail to measure up to the ideal of womanhood, and may therefore choose either to struggle to more closely approximate it, or to act out other identities and thereby distance myself from the regulatory function of the identity 'woman'. This raises the question of who *I* might be, aside from the identity 'woman', and others like it. But this may be a false problem, or at least an erroneous formulation. I am capable of saying 'I', and through this act of enunciation I enact myself as an individual agent who takes on the name of I. Luce Irigaray says that 'Man seems to be able to attribute the signifier to himself, and become the master of his own identity, freed from dependence

[7] Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p.173
[8] Judith Butler Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity London: Routledge 1990 p. 96
[9] Ibid. p. 137
[10] Ibid. p. 2

on the word of the other'.[11] In other words, it may be the case that there is no stable being with a coherent identity which says 'I', but that the act of speaking thus is creative of this stable being. This leads to the possible conclusion that the individual subject is no less a consequence of linguistic and political fabrication than is an identity such as 'woman'.

This is not intended to create the impression that there exists a purer, more authentic form of being which is uncontaminated by power and politics. The very reverse. It is to draw attention to the politics which is inherent in every identity and every instance of subjectification. Jenny Edkins makes a distinction between 'politics' and 'the political', and while this distinction will not be rigorously adhered to in this thesis, it is interesting from the point of view of setting up its terms of engagement. Summarising a complex discussion, we might say that politics is the 'technologized' work of organising society according to certain rules. So, for example, elections, parties and the state apparatus belong to the domain of politics.[12] In terms of identity, politics in this sense would not include an investigation into the conditions of identity formation. But if one were concerned with, for example, the underrepresentation of women in parliament, then this would be a political question and one which it would be possible to raise and contest. The issue thus stated enquires into neither the legitimacy of the parliament and the state structures more broadly, nor into the integrity or value of the category 'women'. 'The political', on the other hand, is the work of constituting the domain of politics so that certain activities and concerns may be deemed to be non-political: it is active in creating and sustaining its own parameters.[13] And the former tends to conceal the latter so that all 'political' questions appear to be questions of procedure, and the conditions of possibility for the existence of the social order as such are not exposed or available for critique or review.

The idea of identity may be thought of as 'political' in this sense, if it is understood as standing for a moment of indeterminacy, in which the outcome is unclear. So, for example, the political origin of a community is concealed or naturalised by the politics of that community, as that 'origin' would reveal the extent to which it could have been

[11] Luce Irigaray (trans Gail M. Schwab) To Speak is Never Neutral London: Continuum 2002 p 16
[12] Jenny Edkins Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing The Political Back In Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999 pp. 1- 2
[13] Ibid. p. 2

otherwise, and therefore that society as it stands is not the necessary or proper outcome (of history or of human decision) but only the contingent one. Similarly, in the case of identity, operating at the level at which identities compete for supremacy in a social system (which may be organised according to patriarchal, racist, religious, or any number of other identity-based criteria) conceals the way in which these identities and societies are formed. Focusing on the political and contingent nature of identity, this allows the processes by which identities are formed to be brought into consideration and to consider different ways of organising life. We are not required to return to the origins of society in search of these different forms of life, but have only to look differently at the way in which politics is conceived, and how the political is being concealed by this conception.

Politics and the excluded body

I have suggested that in Platonic philosophy, one may consider the world to be split between material things and their 'ideas' which represent the eternal essence of the entity. Real knowledge is the knowledge of unchanging *kosmos* which is achieved through contemplation,[14] whereas material things are rooted into the world of change and activity and therefore serve only to complicate thinking and knowing. The most intimate and the most problematic such material thing is our own body. Elizabeth Spelman says that in Platonic philosophy, 'the body, with its deceptive senses, keeps us from real knowledge'.[15] The body is regarded as being a hindrance to real knowledge and understanding, in part because it is always changing: we feel dizzy, ill, jubilant, tired, and these feelings lead us to perceive the world differently. However, this changing perception does not speed us on the road to truth but leads us from it, as we are unduly influenced by the transience of bodily life which distracts us from the pursuit of immutable truth. Genevieve Lloyd says that the body 'wanders about blindly, and becomes confused and dizzy, like a drunken man, from dealing with things that are ever changing'.[16] Moreover, we are given the sense that the body just *is,* a necessary but potentially disruptive entity which grounds the philosopher in earthly life, but which

[14] Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p. 15
[15] Elizabeth V. Spelman 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views' pp. 109-131 in Feminist Studies Spring 1982 Vol. 8, No. 1 p. 111
[16] Genevieve Lloyd The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984 p. 6

should not be permitted to intrude into thought. Arendt points out that the 'time-honoured resentment of the philosopher against the human condition is not identical with the ancient contempt for the necessities of life'[17] because the Greeks could appreciate the body as an aesthetic ideal. This illustrates the way in which the idea of the body competed with the intrusive, problematic reality.

For Hannah Arendt, the philosophical denigration of the body can lead us directly to appreciate the reasons for the need to exclude it from politics also, because the body is not politically interesting. In one sense, the body is undifferentiated. We all have bodies, and all bodies have approximately the same needs in terms of nutrition, rest, and so on. The care of the body, therefore, is merely the work of reproducing life, and the 'burden of biological life, weighing down and consuming the specifically human life-span between birth and death'[18] must be alleviated as far as possible in order to create space for extra-biological activity such as is proper to politics (and philosophy). The political sphere is that in which people (men, in the Greek case) reveal themselves in all their uniqueness, and this would be undermined by a consideration of the body, which is something that we all share, and which is consumed by the natural rhythms of life.[19] In addition, politics is a profoundly public activity, for Arendt, and the body resides in the domain of the private, due to the radical incommunicability of its sensations: 'all bodily sensations, pleasure or pain, desires and satisfactions... are so "private" that they cannot even be adequately voiced'.[20] Finally, politics is founded upon a kind of formal equality, so that all participants have the right and ability to speak and be heard. In contrast, 'the household', which is the rightful place of the body, is a place of 'strictest inequality'[21] organised so that those at the bottom of the hierarchy are the most heavily burdened with duties pertaining to the body, while the person at the top (the senior male) is only a transient figure in the household who is free to leave it and enter the territory of politics.[22]

It is timely to turn to the 'political' underpinnings to this conception of politics. In Arendt's reading of Plato and Aristotle, it becomes possible (or necessary) to exclude

[17] Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p.16n
[18] Ibid. p. 119
[19] See Ibid. Ch. 5: Action
[20] Ibid. p. 141
[21] Ibid. p.32
[22] Ibid. p. 32

the body from the political sphere because of the way in which the body has been imagined. For her, the body does not contribute to the acquisition of knowledge, and nor does it form a component of the community of men engaged in politics. Arendt is fearful of the idea that the 'biological body' could be exploited by politics. She says that '[r]ecent political history is full of examples indicating that the term "human material" is no harmless metaphor'.[23] The body should simply exist in a different world to politics, neither intruding nor being exploited. But the problem is that this analysis actually assumes a great deal of knowledge about the body, albeit in the guise of 'common sense', and creates a number of problems for thinking about how we could know this body, and organise it politically (even if this involves placing it outside politics) in ways that are not themselves political. In other words, just as naming someone as 'a woman' is not a neutral descriptive gesture, but actually enables and constrains various possibilities of action and behaviour, so excluding the body from politics actually involves a series of political decisions which demarcate the body from what it is not, before concealing themselves in the technocratic work of 'politics'.

One way in which it is possible to demonstrate the erroneousness of the supposition that the body is a stable, nameable object, is by turning to the work of Judith Butler. Butler critiques the impression that the body is a stable object whose existence is not accounted for by politics, and she does this through an evaluation of the sex/gender distinction.[24] The sex/gender distinction suggests that sex is a biological fact, whereas gender is the social meaning of this fact. While the latter is variable and constructed, the former is grounded in material reality and therefore cannot be contested: it is somehow outside politics, providing a foundation upon which politics builds. The underlying schism is between materiality, which refers to the body, and discourse, which is the concern of politics. The problem arises when we focus on the boundary between these spheres, and the way in which this boundary comes into being. Butler says that '[t]he moderate critic might concede that *some part* of "sex" is constructed, but some other is certainly not, and then, of course, find him or herself not only under some obligation to draw the line between what is and what is not constructed, but to explain how "sex" comes in parts whose differentiation is not a matter of construction'.[25] The same goes

[23] Ibid. p. 188n
[24] See Judith Butler Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' London: Routledge 1993
[25] Ibid. p. 11

for the distinction between sex and gender: how does this distinction come into being if it is not constructed in discourse?

I would suggest that the same applies to the exclusion of body from politics and philosophy. Although this tends to be undertaken in such as way as to posit the body as an *a priori* entity to which one can unproblematically refer, I want to argue that the process of exclusion is actually intensely political, and moreover that it is active in constructing the body in a certain way. That is to say, the process is a circular one whereby the body is referred to as an immutable and unproblematic entity, and the very reference to its solid materiality as uncontested in this way reinforces the contention that it ought to be excluded from politics. Having constructed or imagined the body as something which ought to be excluded from politics, it is then excluded; the point being that the political moment in this move is being effaced by the apparent logic of the move itself. Judith Butler says that '[t]he body posited as prior to the sign, is always *posited* or *signified* as *prior*. This signification produces as an *effect* of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as that which *precedes* its own action'.[26] The need to consider the body and politics is reawakened by an awareness of the fragility of the boundaries of the body and the extent to which they are not themselves natural. The corollary of this may be the need to think the body as being more fluid and elusive than certain discursive conventions may lead us to suppose.

Security/War

Julian Reid says that '[w]ithin theories of International Relations we are still taught to think about issues of military organisation, strategy, and tactics as discreet enterprises that concern, specifically, the interests of the sovereign power of states in extracting efficient force from bodies of men for the deployment of organised violence toward rationally grounded and objectified political ends'.[27] It seems legitimate to suggest that the dominant form of thinking about war in International Relations scholarship adheres

[26] Ibid. p. 30
[27] Julian Reid The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life struggles, Liberal Modernity, and the Defence of Logistical Societies Manchester: Manchester University Press 2006 pp. 22-23

to the Clausewitzian notion that war is a continuation of politics with other means.[28] This orientates war with respect to politics and identity in certain ways. Firstly, it presupposes that war is a tool of politics—it is a means to a politically designated end. This in turn indicates that war is functionally independent from politics, and that 'war' and 'politics' do not contaminate each other to any significant degree. Finally, and on a related point, it tends to suggest that war is predominantly a matter for the conduct of international relations which takes place between states, and is authorised and legitimised by being conducted according to certain conventions (the use of uniforms, for example) upon which states agree. In other words, the formation of the state and its political space is analytically independent of, and prior to, war in the Clausewitzian sense.[29] Of course, within this framework it is possible to recognise that war may have a secondary effect on intra-state politics, as with 'rally round the flag syndrome'.[30] However, it is primarily understood as operating between entities which have a prior identity and organisation (states), and indeed it is this feature which distinguishes war from other types of 'violent conflict'.[31]

In the 'classical' account, war may be thought to organise power relations between pre-existing identities (states). While the identity of a state may conduce to, or require, a certain kind of stance in foreign policy and war, this identity is formally independent from, and prior to, the act of making war. In other words, identities exist apart from the policies (including war) which may be followed in their interest. The work of David Campbell re-conceives of the relationship between war, security and identity. He argues that one cannot think in terms of objective dangers which exist independently of those who perceive them. And ultimately, 'there need not be an action or event to provide the grounds for an interpretation of danger. The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat'.[32] In this sense, the naming of a risk or danger is at the same

[28] Carl von Clausewitz (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret) On War Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976 p. 605
[29] The Clausewitzian framework for understanding war is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 1.
[30] John Mueller War, Presidents and Public Opinion Lanham: University Press of America 1985. Note that this landmark study refers only to the American example.
[31] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999 p. 56
[32] David Campbell Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity Manchester: Manchester University Press 1992 (2nd ed) p. 3

time the enactment of the identity of those said to be under threat.[33] This follows from Campbell's commitment to Butler's conviction that identities do not exist independently from the behaviours which seem to follow from them: identity has '"no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality"'.[34]

It may appear that 'security [is] determined by the requirements of a pre-existing sovereign state and war conducted in its name as a response to an objective danger'.[35] However, Campbell suggests that identities are always in the process of being 'secured' through the articulation of dangers and risks. For example, invoking 'the people' in a certain context *creates* 'the people' as a unified group with an identity which may be perceived in contradistinction to that of the dangerous 'other'. In defending 'the people', one brings into being 'the people' who demand defence. Campbell cites the example of G.H.W. Bush's speech on sending troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990: '"In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe"'.[36] The perception of certain dangers and not others, and the use of military force to meet them is a way of performing and bringing into being these apparently immutable characteristics. The point is that the process is a reflexive one which does not involve pre-given identities but conceives of security (or securitisation) as the process through which identities come into being. The same may be said to apply to the identity of individuals within a state, which is formed through 'discipline and domination through multiple forms of subjugation':[37] identities are arranged hierarchically in relation to each other, and deviation is penalised through a variety of micro-deterrents from social opprobrium to state non-recognition or penalty.

An alternative way of thinking the relationship between war and politics is through the Foucauldian concept of 'biopolitics'[38] which refers to the regulation of populations rather than individuals. A population is a circulating, fluid mass of people that does not have any particular identity, but which has certain calculable properties.[39] The concept

[33] Ibid. p. 3
[34] Ibid. p. 9
[35] Ibid. p. 11
[36] Ibid. p. 3
[37] Ibid. p. 10
[38] Michel Foucault (ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979 London: Macmillan 2008 p. 317
[39] Michael Dillon 'Security, Race and War' pp. 166-196 in Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (eds) Foucault on Politics, Security and War London: Macmillan 2008 p. 182

of biopolitics has been seized upon as a mode of explaining the organisation of politics and war in late capitalist society, in which exchange and flow seem to be essential to the dynamics of life. Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller suggest that after Nazism, there was no other way for biopolitics to proceed except in accordance with, rather than in opposition to, the idea of freedom.[40] Rather than trying to secure identities, contemporary biopolitics must make its peace with change, movement and unpredictability. Because a population is not 'a people', '[t]he political regulation to which population may...be subject cannot...proceed through the pursuit and resolution of inter-subjective rivalries'.[41] Rather, it is regulated according to various technologies and sciences. 'Biopolitics was inextricably bound up with the rise of the life sciences, the human sciences, clinical medicine'.[42] This is understood to mark a change from the 'epistemologies of political subjectivity',[43] which are concerned to know (and inform) the preferences and behaviours of a group of subjects of given identity. Biopolitics is not 'immediately or directly to do with the politics of identity... [it is] not a politics of identity'.[44]

A shift in ideas about and technologies of security occurs at the same time as a refiguration of what the object of security is. 'Identity' or 'political subjectivity' are no longer the essential concerns of practices of war/politics/security, as 'biopolitics' is concerned with the regulation of life itself. Dillon suggests that 'life' is defined by its ability to change and adapt: 'contingency is constitutive of what it is to be a living thing, the referent object of biopolitics—life—cannot be secured against contingency'.[45] This suggests that our ideas about what constitutes 'life' are subject to change.[46] Although in the first instance it may be human life which is the object of regulation, new sciences may give rise to new forms of life which are 'post- and extra-human' as with, for example 'artificial and cybernetic, as well as animal and viral, beings'.[47] The second implication is that change, fluidity and inconsistency become internal to, and essential

[40] Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller Biopolitics Aldershot: Avebury 1994 pp. 21-22
[41] Michael Dillon 'Security, Race and War' p. 182
[42] Nikolas Rose 'The Politics of Life Itself' pp. 1-30 in Theory Culture Society 2001 Vol. 18, No. 6 p. 1.
[43] Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century' pp. 265-292 in Review of International Studies 2008 Vol. 34, No. 2 p. 267
[44] Ibid. p. 268
[45] Michael Dillon 'Underwriting Security' pp. 309-332 in Security Dialogue 2008 Vol. 39, No. 2-3 p. 310
[46] Michael Dillon 'Underwriting Security' p. 310; Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero 'The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-being' pp. 1-23 in Theory, Culture and Society 2009 Vol. 26, No. 1 p. 9
[47] Michael Dillon 'Underwriting Security' p. 314

to, the system itself. Rather than being regarded as threatening, contingency comes to be seen as being a necessary condition for life, and a potential occasion for profit. Therefore the point is not to limit or hinder change, but to develop sciences of profit and risk which enable contingency to be exploited. Dillon says that 'biopolitical security practices must somehow deliberately allow for the transformation and change—indeed cultivate the very capacity for adaptive emergence—that living contingently is said to require of all living things'.[48]

The idea of a security whose object is life itself seems to place war in a paradoxical position in contemporary society, in the sense that a war in defence of life appears to be an absurdity. One is faced with the task of explaining how and why liberal biopolitical governments continue to wage war, a particular quandary in the light of the generalised and amorphous state of war associated with the 'war on terror'. More broadly, however, liberal states continue to invest heavily in ever more sophisticated methods of killing despite their stated interest in human rights and freedoms. As Reid says, 'the increasing precision with which human life is targeted for killing in war, severely undermines the foundations of liberal modernity understood in terms of the pursuit of sustainable peace'.[49] However, war is legitimised and decided for on the grounds that some life may be inimical to life, which is to say that: 'not all life is helpful to the promotion of species existence'.[50] Biopolitics involves ongoing decisions about what forms of 'life' are compatible with the biopolitical imaginary itself. Dillon and Neal say that '[i]n many respects [biopolitics'] political rationalities and governing technologies are nothing but a vast ensemble of life-sorting and life adjudicating devices'.[51] In this sense, 'the modern way of war...[is waged] in the name of life itself'[52] against those forms of life hostile to life, as part of an ongoing process of organising 'life' into these categories.

The implication of this 'war in the name of life' is that war has a far closer relation to the organisation of politics and society than appears to be the case from the (neo-) Clausewitzian account, and greater even than that presented by Campbell. Not only is it the case that models of military organisation act as inspiration for the organisation of

[48] Ibid. p. 315
[49] Julian Reid The Biopolitics of the War on Terror p. 2
[50] Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal 'Introduction' pp. 1-18 in Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (eds.) Foucault on Politics, Security and War p. 7
[51] Ibid. p. 7
[52] Ibid. p. 10

society, in modern society and war, the relationship may be presented as being more intimate than this. War immanently organises the social field through "the multiplicity of force relations immanent to the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organisation".[53] This image challenges the utilitarian pretentions of modern war through emphasising the extent to which war is not a decision, but more a condition of everyday life. One consequence of this is that it becomes difficult or impossible to demarcate cleanly between 'war' and 'peace'. Indeed, rather than a continuation of politics with other means, the emphasis is on the reverse, that 'modern politics...emerges as the extension of war by other means'.[54] In this sense the end of military force is not so much in an externally designated goal but in 'the forms of order that are mapped out in the theorisation and implementation of military organisation itself'.[55] 'Security' emerges as the figure through which this organising function takes place: Dillon says that '*logos* of peace is systematically inscribed with the *logos* of war through discourses of security'.[56]

Biopolitics, Contingency and the Excluded Body

The biopolitical account of war contains a number of insights which are important for this thesis, including the critique of the utilitarian, state-centric account of war, and the insistence on an intimate relationship between the organisation of war, the organisation of politics, and the organisation of life. However, the thesis deviates from the biopolitical account in its approach, and it does so in order to furnish an independent perspective on war and politics which aims to flesh out some of the areas which are arguably left underdeveloped by the dominant biopolitical approaches to contemporary politics. One such focus for further exploration is the body. Foucault's thematic of power involved two modes of governance or control; the biopolitics of population, discussed above, and the 'anamato-politics of the human body'.[57] The latter entails, for example, the disciplinary process by which one has ''got rid of the peasant' and given

[53] Michel Foucault History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction New York: Vintage Books 1978 p. 92; Julian Reid 'Life Struggles: War, Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault' pp. 65-92 in Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (eds.) Foucault on Politics, Security and War p. 78
[54] Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal 'Introduction' p. 9
[55] Julian Reid 'Life Struggles: War, Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault' p. 68
[56] Michael Dillon 'Security, Race and War' p. 171
[57] Michel Foucault History of Sexuality Vol. 1: An Introduction New York: Vintage Books 1978 p. 139 (italics in original)

him 'the air of the soldier''.[58] As Reid suggests, this indicates a situation where there is 'a war that is being fought for political order...on the terrain of the human body'.[59] However, I would suggest that the biopolitical account has tended to dominate the anamato-political one, resulting in a degree of marginalisation of the body. Dillon quotes Foucault to the effect that biopower 'is centred not upon the body but upon life'.[60] This corresponds to the rise of technologies which do not take the body as their referent, but rather focus on data such as genetics, in accordance with 'new molecularized and digitized accounts of what it is to be a living thing'.[61]

I wish also to depart from the way in which contingency is accommodated within the biopolitical account of war and politics. As I suggested above, the biopolitical vision holds that contingency becomes internal to the system, and constitutive of life itself. The sciences of biopolitics dedicate themselves to the calculation of contingency, which is understood as a domain of risk, but one which cannot be expunged and can only be surveyed and managed.[62] One might also say life *is* contingency, which is not understood as pure chance, but is to some extent calculable within certain parameters.[63] This arguably represents a change from a conception of politics in which the primary aspiration was to 'tame nature'[64] and attain certainty about it, to one in which contingency can be managed and calculated, but not ultimately eradicated. Understandings of contingency have been enhanced by the emergence of probability science and complexity theory which seek to adumbrate the parameters of the calculable, and to provide a way of navigating uncertainty. In terms of war, this conduces towards pre-emptive and preventative action which strives to 'colonise the future',[65] as elucidated in the National Security Strategy 2002, what James Der Derian calls a 'global 'Minority Report'... for preventative interventions against evils yet to be

[58] Michel Foucault (trans. Allan Sheridan) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison London: Allen Lane 1977 p. 135
[59] Julian Reid 'Life Struggles: War, Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault' p. 68
[60] Michael Dillon 'Security, Race and War' pp. 166-196 in Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (eds.) Foucault on Politics, Security and War p. 175
[61] Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero 'The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-being' p. 9
[62] See Michael Dillon 'Underwriting Security' p. 315
[63] Ibid. p. 313
[64] Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller Biopolitics p. 7
[65] Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007 p. 38

born'.[66] But this is not a purely negative activity, concerned with the prevention of the emergence of certain forms of life. It is also positive, engaged in the promotion of alternative forms of life. As Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero argue, 'security becomes a set of mechanisms self-governing the very contingent properties of the freedom which biological entities are said to display'.[67] In other words, security and contingency are seen as being part of the same moment of emergence.

I argued above that 'knowing' the body is problematic in terms of 'drawing the line' between what is given by the body and what is given by knowledge. That is to say positing 'a body' independent of what we say and think about it becomes problematic when we look closely at the way in which this 'body' is constructed and addressed. This indicates that knowledge should be thought of not as the acquisition of data on a discreet object, but as a process of emergence through which this object comes to be apprehended. In the case of biopolitical life, for example, it is argued that new technologies of knowing and understanding 'life' are productive of new forms of life.[68] In this sense, there is a kind of agnosticism about the form that life can take and therefore a tacit acknowledgement that one cannot once and for all 'know' life. In this sense, it may be problematic to argue, as I have, that the body is excluded or bypassed in biopolitical accounts of life. This is not the case, not least because theoreticians of biopolitics themselves deliberately choose life rather than the body as the referent object of security. If we accept that 'the body' is itself the outcome of political organisation, as I have argued, then this seems to be missing a step in terms of analysing the relationship between war and politics. More simply, and perhaps more importantly, one gets the sense that the biopolitical world is a curiously depopulated one, devoid of imagination, emotion or bodily sensation. In this sense it becomes possible to suggest that the biopolitical critique is startlingly immanent to the technologies of security, war and governance that it diagnoses.

One could legitimately ask why the absence of the body matters. If science has moved beyond the body, then what is there to lament in this development, which after all is merely another form of control? I want to use this thesis to argue that there are

[66] James Der Derian (interviewed by Laura Guillaume) 'Revolutionising Virtual War' in Theory and Event (forthcoming)
[67] Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century' p. 291
[68] Michael Dillon 'Underwriting Security' p. 312; 314

important reasons why the body should be taken account of in thinking about war and politics. Here, I confine myself to some comments on the role of contingency in biopolitics, and suggest some reasons why this constitutes a limitation on its scope and critical power. I want to suggest that the consideration of the body in a particular way may have the capacity to broaden our thinking beyond the utilitarian. Contingency refers to the impossibility of certainty. Identity, as discussed above, is contingent in the sense that it does not necessarily take the form that it does, and it may not take this form for all time: we cannot tell. I am organised into a person who identifies with a certain name and articulates my body in a certain way, and therefore I may not often experience the contingency of my identity, as I am thoroughly habituated to it. But this does not mean it is not there. And occasionally, I do experience there being something more than (or less than) this organised subjectivity in moments of blankness or euphoria: what could be called in Lacanian or Žižekian terms an encounter with the Real.[69]

It is possible to consider this an encounter with contingency. But it is an encounter of a very particular kind. For example, it is awkward to say that *I* have such an encounter, when the whole point of this moment of slippage is that *I* am not really present. Contingency is not really a property of the coherent identity which can say 'I', indeed, this form of organisation is an attempt to ward off contingency. But the body is more problematic, or more promising. As I suggested above, attempts to demarcate a natural body from a constructed one are imperilled by the recognition that they will always be political and therefore in some sense *contingent.* We cannot know the body beyond these interventions, or beyond the range of our own experience and sensation. Although it might seem legitimate to say that we know our own bodies, this is not entirely the case. We do not know what they look like from all angles, or in motion,[70] and we do not know how our bodies will react to various encounters (with certain foods, or stimuli, for example). The point of this is that this impossibility of knowing is not a provisional problem associated with insufficiently advanced science, but an inherent one arising from the position from which we know, and think, that of a fictitious coherent identifiable subject.

[69] See Slavoj Žižek The Sublime Object of Ideology New York: Verso 1999 pp. 170-171
[70] See Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2002 pp. 4-5

In contrast, biopolitical governance seeks to technologise, or utilise contingency. This does not mean that it seeks to eradicate it, but that contingency becomes a part of the system itself, a calculable factor (to a degree) in its own right. For example, in terms of the state, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that state borders 'do not prophylactically secure the state by throwing up a barrier around it. Nor do they constitute an identity for it. Their task is to regulate the very productive powers of the intercourse transacted by, between and through populations'.[71] For example, air travel brings commerce and business as well as potentially terrorism and disease.[72] The appropriate response is not to restrict air travel, but to calculate the degree of danger. In this way, contingency becomes politically neutralised because its power to unsettle established forms of social organisation is limited. We are already given the tools to think about it (in the language of risk, for example) and therefore it cannot challenge the way in which we think to a significant degree. This is an important reason for retaining and exploring the implications of the body in thinking about war. I argue that there is something unknown about the body which endures bombardment with an arsenal of insights from biological science. This is because systems of knowledge are context specific. We can say that global politics is characterised by late capitalism, flows of finance, goods and people; malleable identity and the porosity of state borders. In this case we can devise modes of knowledge for thinking about this system. But these ways of thinking are always predicated on the endurance of the image of the global system. If we are denied an image of systemic organisation, then it becomes very difficult to anchor knowledge.

I want to suggest that the body is a figure which can incite a different way of thinking, which is itself contingent and does not claim any universal validity. The idea of organisation is at the heart of this, because on the one hand the idea of the body reflects a certain mode of social organisation. There are culture- and time-specific expectations about the way in which the body should be presented and articulated. However, I aim to show that the body is not exhausted by these modes of organisation and always retains an element of the unknown. In relation to the literature on biopolitics, this thesis aims to revivify the idea of the unknown (in contrast to the calculable contingent) as a politically important one which can provoke potentially new ways of thinking in the face of war. Rather than knowing the unknown analytically, as a problem to be

[71] Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century' p. 269
[72] Ibid. p. 269

overcome, I intend to present it as something which has a positive transformative potential which may change the conditions of thinking itself. The implications of the bodily approach may be that one can no longer make generalisations about war and politics: one must not only think systematically but also singularly.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis begins in chapter one by exploring the ways in which various discourses on war approach the body. I begin by considering writing about war which I describe as being 'technological'; by which I mean writing which highlights the utility of war and strives to emphasise its instrumental properties. I suggest that this mode of writing about war tends either to exclude the body or to present it as being a cipher for political will which is not considered in itself. This exploration proceeds according to the aspiration to create the space within this technological way of writing for 'the body' to emerge, while at the same time being committed to the idea that various ways of writing about war and the body are not merely descriptive but are active in the creation of a body as a certain kind of entity. That is to say: they create the object that they propose to know, and they imply knowledge of the object they purport to exclude. My intention is to expose these logics of exclusion and instrumentalisation in such a way as to create the space for the spectral image of an alternative body to appear.

The work of making space for the body within instrumental discourses of war begs the question of what is at stake in this work: why does it *matter* whether or not the body is taken into account? Perry Anderson refers to a 'sudden zest, a new appetite, for the concrete'.[73] But what is the impetus behind this zest, and what does it mean? David Harvey argues that 'the extraordinary efflorescence of interest in 'the body' as a grounding for all sorts of theoretical enquiries over the last two decades or so'[74] may be explained by 'a contemporary loss of confidence in previously established categories [which has] provoked a return to the body as the irreducible basis for understanding'.[75] In terms of discourses about war, the erasure of the body may be held to have a de-

[73] Perry Anderson in Elaine Scarry 'Introduction' pp. vii - xxvii in Elaine Scarry (ed.) Literature and the Body: Essays on Populations and Persons Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1988 p. vii
[74] David Harvey Spaces of Hope Berkeley: University of California Press 2000 p. 97
[75] Ibid. p. 97

realising impact on our ideas about war[76] as well as having the morally unfortunate effect of concealing the extent to which war wreaks destruction on bodies. In this sense it is tempting to conclude that the body somehow provides the truth or the reality of war, and that, if reintroduced, the body has the capability to interrupt these. That is to say, one might begin from 'the simplest fact about the body, whether it is present or absent, and the verbal form in which this is most habitually registered, the act of counting'.[77]

In the second chapter of the thesis I turn to body counts in war as a way of exploring this problem. It swiftly becomes apparent that counting the body is a problematic activity. For example, Margot Norris suggests that counting is unable to convey the material weight of the dead bodies which lie behind the numbers.[78] This concern is founded on a supposed juxtaposition between language and the material body, or one might say, between the body and discourse. The problem is then one of representation: how are we to bring the body to bear on discourses of war? If counting won't do, maybe photography will. As Susan Sontag says '[i]n modern society, images made by cameras are the principal access to realities of which we have no direct experience',[79] so that '[a] photograph passes for incontrovertible proof that a given thing has happened'.[80] However, I argue that this contrast between the solid, foundational body and slippery, unreliable discourse is untenable, for the reasons I have already indicated. That is to say, posing a body outside politics is itself political. Moreover, I argue that the determination of what 'counts' as a body is thoroughly political and is not given by the materiality of the body but by processes of political decision and fabrication.

I have so far focused on the ways in which the body has been organised and outlined through political practices and representations, emphasising the extent to which these do not only convey the body in a certain way, they also construct it (which is to say, organise it) in certain ways. This work is necessary to unsettle what might seem like self evident or common-sensical knowledge about what the body is, and therefore what

[76] See Margot Norris 'Only the Guns Have Eyes: Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War' Chapter 9 in Margot Norris Writing War in the Twentieth Century Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia 2000
[77] Elaine Scarry 'Introduction' p. vii
[78] Margot Norris Writing War p. 3
[79] Susan Sontag 'Witnessing' pp. 16-18 in Don McCullin (Intro. Harold Evans, Essay: Susan Sontag) London: Jonathan Cape 2003 p. 16
[80] Susan Sontag On Photography London: Penguin 1977 p. 5

it is not. It is aimed to open out a space within which it might be possible to flesh out a fuller understanding of the body. However, the body I aim to sketch is not merely the passive consequence of the play of political forces. If this were the case, the provenance of these political influences would be left uncertain. Nor is it my intention to take a position on the structure/agency debate and to give everything away to structures of language and society in determining the organisation of the body. Brian Massumi asks '[i]s the body as linked to a particular subject position anything more than a local embodiment *of* ideology? Where has the potential for change gone?'[81] I want to argue that the body is more than a residue of political organisation, and I do so in the third chapter through the relationship between the body and technologies of war.

Virilio suggests that the increasing sophistication of military technology bodes ill for the future of politics and the body, which stand at risk of being condemned to obsolescence. An alternative prognosis is that the increasing influence of technology on war may render war amenable to being made ever more rational, and easier to subordinate to political aims than before. I argue that both these visions of technological war are underpinned by the assumption that technology and the body are functionally independent, operate according to different logics, and may replace or supersede each other. Contrary to this, I argue that there is a greater degree of interdependence between the body and technology. I explore this intimate relationship through the work of the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which is committed to engineering a closer relationship between body and technology so that the functioning of both are improved. This 'symbiotic' vision of the relationship between body and technology may seem to be a progressive one, in the sense that it does not incorporate an essentialist view of what the body is and what its capabilities are: it sees the body as a work in progress. However, I suggest that this reading is still limited as it takes the body as being an object upon which the scientific will, and technology, works. In response, I seek to advance a reading of the body which presents it as being active in determining the conditions of its own emergence, development and expression.

I use the work of Klaus Theweleit and others to indicate that technology may be thought of as existing in a certain relation to the body, as being 'technological' by virtue

[81] Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual p. 3

of this relation rather than by some *a priori* design or purpose. Technology is invested by the body and this is what enables it to operate in certain ways. But more than this, one must consider the body itself as being potentially operable as a technology, not by virtue of some exterior force, but as a consequence of the body's own investments of its own boundary. For example, Theweleit's Freudian approach suggests that Freikorps soldiers imagined themselves as hard, metallic and unyielding bodies who rejected any association with inconstant flow-like substances, the ides of 'flow' being associated with both women and Communism. Only in battle was the member of the Freikorps permitted to have his own encounter with flow, becoming one with weaponry and the pyrotechnics of conflict.[82] The question is: how could anyone firmly demarcate the parameters of the Freikorps soldier's body? Or say what his relationship to technology was? It is the desire, or libidinal investment of the soldier which animates technology, and which is constitutive of the boundary of the body itself.[83] Therefore, 'technology' cannot be considered to arrive as a divine ('hylomorphic') intervention into the body, but must be considered an active component of the becoming-technological of the body itself.

Up to this point in the thesis my aim has been to engage critically with existing literatures on the body and war in order to allude to potential alternative understandings of the body which are excluded or crowded out by the image at play at any given time. Rather than accept the parameters of the body and politics as they are given by any particular approach, it is my intention throughout to be vigilantly aware of the hidden political decisions which compose discourses of war and the body, before concealing themselves within them. However, I do not do this in order to create the space for my own reading of the body and war which can answer to these others by being more truthful, authentic or powerful. Rather, my project involves the continual questioning of social realities which purport to self-evidence or 'naturalness'. To this end, I turn in chapter four to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. It is worth reiterating that I do not do so out of the conviction that their work can offer the 'solution' to the problems and uncertainties that I have hitherto highlighted. Instead, I hope to use Deleuze and Guattari to advance an understanding of these quandaries in such a way as

[82] Klaus Theweleit (trans. Chris Turner et al.) Male Fantasies Vol. 2: Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror Cambridge: Polity Press 1989 p. 192; 206
[83] See Ibid. p. 179

to present them not as problems or hindrances to thought, but as positive catalysts for a different way of thinking.

There is insufficient space here to summarise the ways in which I mobilise Deleuze and Guattari to enable a particular reading of the body. However, it is perhaps useful to plot out a few aspects of their work which I believe have the potential to prove productive in thinking about the body and war. For Deleuze and Guattari, the body is the consequence of a certain regime of social and political organisation. The realities of bodily life to which we have become sufficiently habituated to regard as 'natural' are for Deleuze and Guattari the works of purest artifice. For example, the fact that our organs exist in relation to each other and to the world in a certain way is the consequence of discipline, not of nature.[84] Any attempt to express the body differently is likely to attract 'censorship and repression',[85] but the insistence that the organised body is not 'natural' but immediately a political product alters the way in which we think about deviations from this mode of organisation. Deleuze and Guattari ask '[i]s it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain... Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin...?'[86]

This insistence on the constructed and provisional nature of the organised body makes it difficult to have confidence in any definition of what the body is. All such definitions become transitory and superficial, able only to express what this body seems to be at this time, for different forms of social organisation will produce different bodies. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is precisely what is interesting about the body. Following Spinoza, they argue that our inability to know what a body can do is precisely what gives it its ethical and philosophical significance.[87] Deleuze and Guattari say that 'in the same way that we avoided defining a body by its organs and functions, we will avoid defining it by its Species or Genus characteristics'.[88] In other words, we will be unable to say what a body is, once and for all. Rather than this being a failing or an inadequacy

[84] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. and foreword Brian Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 pp. 176-178
[85] Ibid. p. 166
[86] Ibid. p. 167
[87] Ibid. p. 284; Gilles Deleuze (trans Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta) Cinema 2: The Time Image London: The Athlone Press 1989 p. 189
[88] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 283

of thought, this should prompt us into reconsidering our expectations of what 'thinking' can provide. Taking the body seriously as a perspective on the world, rather than as an object for thought, should allow us to be sensitive to those feelings, sensations and impressions which elude classification and which do not seem to conform to any given identity. Remaining agnostic about what the body ought to look like, be, and do should make us more alive to the political influences which lie behind every bodily expression. The insistence that the body remains unknown in the face of all attempts at organisation introduces, for Deleuze and Guattari, an inherently *ethical* facet of the body which I aim to mobilise for thinking about war.[89]

In the final chapter I use these insights to talk about the body of the shell shocked soldier in the First World War. My aim is to trace the way in which the body of the shell shocked soldier deviated from the 'normal' mode of organisation through paralysis, psychosis and neurosis. I approach the clinical and social responses to these deviations as active interventions into body politics which prescribe and reinforce a certain mode of bodily organisation. In this way, I aim to trace the vectors of disorganisation and reorganisation (in Deleuze and Guattari's language, 'deterritorialisation' and 'reterritorialisation') which the body follows in relation to war and society. Attempts to understand and treat the shell shocked body grounded and conceived of this body in various ways and according to various paradigms of knowledge, according to whether the approach in question was psychoanalytic, disciplinary or 'physicalist'. In other words, they were events in the politics of organisation. As well as taking seriously these attempts at organisation and regulation, I aim to draw out some of the productive ways in which we can understand the 'deviant' and 'disordered' body as a productive political force rather than a subjective problem. If we dispense with the image of the body as objective, foundational, or non-political, then it becomes easier to apprehend the social and political significance of 'bodily disorders'.

I suggest that thinking positively about the shell shocked body produces a change in the way that war, politics and the body are conceived in relation to each other. Rather than

[89] Michel Foucault writes that '*Anti-Oedipus* ... is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France for quite a long time' in Michel Foucault 'Preface' pp. xiii-xxvii in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p. xv. I want to try to locate this ethics with Deleuze and Guattari's thinking about the body.

being discreet analytic categories, I argue that war and the body are better considered to be in a relationship of dynamic co-becoming. By this, I mean that neither of them have fixed properties or character, and the relationship between them may be productive of a multiplicity of different ways of being. These are coded in certain ways by the dominant social framework for interpretation, so that bodies which are not organised according to its prescriptions are branded 'deviant'. However, from a perspective critical of this view it becomes possible to approach the 'abnormal' body as enacting a powerful social and political critique. For if the 'normal' body is organised and constructed by social and political forces, then its evasion of these is an immediately revolutionary act. This in consequence indicates that it is not possible to clearly distinguish between what is of political significance and what is not. The actions of the soldier on the battlefield might reasonably seem to be of interest to the Historian or the International Relations scholar (though they may not, in the light of the tendency towards distain for the body), but his dreams and nightmares should be equally so.

I suggest that it becomes difficult to think war and politics *apart from* their rehearsals through the body. Every image or model of war, no matter how arid and utilitarian, is animated by the desire of those who imagined and sustained it. But this also means that it is difficult or impossible to arrive at a *general* theory of war and the body. Seeing war as expressed through the changing body, and denied any categorical understanding of what 'the body' is, the coherence of these forms is degraded. The elusive nature of the categories that we are left with may seem to call the utility of this mode of thought into question. However, my aspiration is not to develop a new theory of the body and war which is able to stand alone and to better those that have gone before. Rather, my perspective is intended to exist alongside multiple others as an ongoing critique of the way in which 'self evident truths' and 'natural facts' are constructed and sustained. Rather than to advance any particular political end in this way, my aim instead is to create the space for the political moment itself. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, this is an ethical project because it is designed to allow the emergence of previously unknown bodies, which, rather than being apprehended as problems or deviations to be subject to reorganisation and restraint, are approached positively as having the potential to change the landscape of politics itself.

Chapter 1

The Dream of War without Bodies

Thinking about war suffers from a 'body problem'. That is to say, certain prisms through which the object of 'war' is considered sideline the body in order to be able to think more clearly and coherently about war. As a way of writing about war, strategy rests on certain presuppositions about what the body and war are; suppositions which may either be explicitly elucidated or tacitly implied. It is these underlying conceptions of what it means to write the body and war with which I am concerned in this chapter, rather than any particular iteration of the strategic vision. I do not intend to make any extravagant claims about the field of 'war studies', broadly defined, as this would involve an undesirable and un-illuminating degree of generalisation. Nor do I advance overall claims about the preoccupations and structure of strategic thinking per se. However, in mapping the terrain as I do, I make a more circumscribed claim about certain aspects of strategic thought. The tendency I am concerned with tends to tacitly endorse the notion that war and the body are analytically distinct and functionally separable entities. Therefore, I am concerned with strategy as a discourse containing certain enabling features and silences which form part of its condition of possibility.

Technology has a number of points of resonance with strategy as a prism through which to analyse war. In many cases, I will suggest that it converges with strategy insofar as it is motivated by the possibility of making war a more effective instrument of politics which is brought ever more closely under the control of reason. To clarify slightly, this appears to be the case with the mode of thinking about war and technology which is influential in contemporary (especially Anglo-American) defence departments, and which intersects and interacts most frequently and directly with the 'strategic studies' thinking. There is a vociferous debate within the disciplines of 'strategic studies' or 'military science' as to the extent of transformation that technological innovations are able to effect in the way in which war is waged. Broadly speaking, the debate is formed between those who emphasise the revolutionary possibilities of new technologies in fundamentally changing the way in which war is prosecuted, and those who draw upon the elements of continuity in military history to refute the possibility of any such

change.[1] My intention here is not to try to determine which of these arguments is the most convincing, but rather to attend to the terms which the participants deploy and the assumptions and implications that underpin them. It is worth pointing out that there are ways of writing about war and technology which are guided by different motivations and suppositions, and which are not ultimately concerned with deploying technologies more effectively to make war more useful.[2] There are non-technological ways of writing about technology. These are not addressed in this chapter because my concern is with the kind of technological writing about war which is common to both 'strategic thinking' and 'technology'.

In order to clarify what is intended by the term 'technological writing', I refer to Heidegger's discussion of what 'everyone knows' about what technology is.[3] He says that 'to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, and the means and ends that they serve, all belong to what technology is. The whole complex of these contrivances is technology. Technology itself is a contrivance—in Latin, an *instrumentum*'.[4] Technology is the positing of means and ends, their manufacture and pursuit. By 'technological writing' I mean a way of writing about these activities which in some senses accepts the existence of the means and ends which have been put in place. In other words, it is instrumental writing, or writing which is at least uncritical of the goal and activity of instrumentalisation. The writing about strategy and technology with which I am concerned, although it may contain significant disputes, has in common an unquestioned fidelity to the possibility of means-ends activity. Within this framework, not only do considerations such as 'efficiency'[5] become possible, but they start to appear as self-evident 'goals', as the idea of having goals, or ends, itself becomes naturalised within the system. Just as the

[1] For example, see David J. Lonsdale The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future London: Frank Cass. 2004; Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2005 for continuity and Alvin and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War: Making Sense of Today's Global Chaos London: Warner Books 1993 for change.
[2] For example, Daniel Pick War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age London: Yale University Press 1993
[3] This is then distinguished from Heidegger's conception of what the essence of technology actually is.
[4] Martin Heidegger 'The Question Concerning Technology' pp. 311-341 in Martin Heidegger (ed. David Farrell Krell) Basic Writings London: Routledge 2004 p. 312
[5] Henryk Smolimowski argues that efficiency is in some sense the key characteristic of technological thinking. See Henryk Smolimowski 'The Structure of Thinking in Technology' pp. 42-49 in Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackay (eds) Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Technology New York: The Free Press 1983

essence of technology is not technological in Heideggerian terms,[6] technological writing does not have to be 'about' technology, in the sense of addressing itself to machines, engineering projects, and so on. And writing about technology does not have to be technological. But it is the technological mode of writing and thinking about war with which I am primarily concerned here.

Technological writing about war has been subject to criticism on the grounds of its relation to ethics. Edward N. Luttwak alleges that ethical concerns have intruded excessively into thinking about war and have interfered with the ability of strategists to think technologically. His imputation is that rather than being free to consider means and ends from a purely utilitarian perspective, military planning has become thoroughly saturated with ethical considerations which demand that the protection of human lives (especially those of Western soldiers) is prioritised above all. He argues that this has been detrimental to effective military action, as evidenced in Serbia and Somalia, where 'aggressive small powers... [and] even mere armed bands... [are permitted to] rampage or impose their victories at will'[7] due to American 'squeamishness'. In other words, his suggestion is that there is a clash between utility and ethics, and ethics is prevailing.[8] A contrasting criticism comes from Martin Shaw. His concern is that 'strategy', or technological writing about war blinds us to the ruinous effect that it necessarily has on participants and bystanders, and that we have no evidence that this can be 'engineered out'. That war causes death should be sufficient to invalidate it as a tool of policy. Shaw's argument seeks to interpose itself into the 'technological writing' of the strategic thinkers[9] by indicating (without elaboration) that the body is an end in itself and therefore cannot legitimately be employed as a means to an external end. This is also the position that Elaine Scarry adopts when she deconstructs the logic of war legitimisation which says that ''war (injury) is the cost of freedom''.[10] She contends that it is not that the death of soldiers or civilians is a necessary step on the road to whatever political goal has been decreed, but that death/injury is the central goal of war-making and is itself the end of all military endeavour. She says that 'while the

[6] Martin Heidegger 'The Question Concerning Technology' p. 328
[7] Edward N. Luttwak 'Toward a Post-Heroic Warfare' pp. 109-122 in Foreign Affairs May 1995 Vol. 74, No. 3 p. 116
[8] See also Edward N. Luttwak 'Give War a Chance' pp. 36-44 in Foreign Affairs 1999 Vol. 78, No. 4
[9] Martin Shaw 'Strategy and Slaughter' pp. 269-277 in Review of International Studies 2003 Vol. 29 No. 2
[10] Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985 p.76

central activity of war is injuring... the fact of injuring tends to be absent from strategic and political descriptions of war'.[11]

I will argue that technical modes of knowledge such as strategy strive towards a degree of scientific certainty. Strategy is concerned with generalisation, and this is the case both synchronically and diachronically. That is to say, strategy seeks to attain an overview of a specific war without getting caught up in the complexity and confusion which might limit its utility as a tool of policy. By maintaining a vision of the war as a whole, strategy seeks to link it effectively to the political end for which it is waged. In this sense, technological writing about war seeks to move from the complexity of the battlefield up to the general progress and direction of the war and the way in which it intersects with politics. But strategy also seeks to attain knowledge about *war* in general, and to propose rules, maxims and codes for understanding that transcend specific instances of war and apply to *war* rather than wars. I will try to show that the aspiration to this form of knowledge is not compatible with a full consideration of the body, which is associated with a different mode of knowledge: more fragmentary, singular, and non-generalisable; one which has the potential to present a challenge to the systematic view of war to which strategic and technological thinking strive. In this chapter, therefore, it is my goal to present strategic and other forms of technological writing about war as making certain kinds of claims concerning the knowledge that they can have of war, claims which demand a certain kind of body with a certain kind of [in-]visibility.

In the first two sections I take strategy and technology in turn and seek to indicate that the body is sidelined in these ways of writing due, at least in part, to their commitment to the instrumental possibilities of war. In the third section I address Martin Shaw's attempt to overturn this by highlighting the centrality of the body in war, and pointing to the impossibility of excluding it through technological innovation: 'surgical strikes' and precision bombs still kill people. In other words, he attempts to deploy the body to overturn the instrumental logic which informs the writing on strategy and technology. Concluding, I offer some preliminary thoughts as to why Shaw's intervention might be inadequate as a reconsideration of the body at war. It is not my concern to argue that the exclusion of the body is a 'bad [unethical] thing' as such, but to start to give expression

[11] Ibid. p. 12

to the way in which the excluded body is being (negatively) constructed as being the sort of entity that one can easily exclude. Contrary to this, I introduce some of the ways in which systematic claims to knowledge of the sort made by technological writing about war may be reconfigured through a consideration of the body as a perspective from which to view war.

Strategic Thinking: Generalisation and Instrumentalisation

By 'strategic thought', I understand a mode of technological thinking and writing about war which is underpinned by Clausewitz's maxim that war is a continuation of policy with other means. Strategy tends to purport to be purely pragmatic: Seabury and Codevilla say that '[s]trategy is a fancy word for a road map for getting from here to there, from the situation at hand to the situation one wishes to attain. Strategy is the very opposite of abstract thinking'.[12] Put simply, '[s]trategy is about how to win wars'.[13] However, I will try to show in this section that strategy must (re-) produce the concepts with which it is concerned (war, politics, strategy) in order to sustain the coherence of this commitment to 'pragmatics'. There are strategists who argue that 'war cannot be studied as an accurate or scientific discipline… it is an art and not a science'.[14] However, I will suggest below that, in order to be able to analyse 'war' as such, rather than historical wars in particular, strategic thought must engage in a degree of generalisation. Quincy Wright suggests that '[s]cience strives for generalizations which accord not only with the observations upon which they were based but also with all future and past observations at the time the generalization was made'.[15] Strategic thinking addresses itself not only to individual wars, but to *War*, and therefore is concerned with a strong degree of generalisation, making it quasi-scientific according to Wright's definition. In so doing, however, it must construct war as an abstract form for knowledge, and I will try to show that this entails the exclusion or instrumentalisation of the body. In other words, the discussion below represents a disagreement with the claim that strategy is 'purely pragmatic', not concerned with abstract thinking, and interested predominantly in 'reality'.[16] Instead, I try to show that in the process of

[12] Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla War: Ends and Means New York: Basic Books 1990 p. 97
[13] Thomas G. Mahnken 'Strategic Theory' pp. 66-81 in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen (eds) Strategy in the Contemporary World Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007 p. 68
[14] Michael I Handel War, Strategy and Intelligence London: Frank Cass. 1989 p. 3
[15] Quincy Wright A Study of War Vol. II Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1959 p. 681
[16] Peter Paret 'Introduction' pp. 3-8 in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994 p. 7

sustaining a 'technological writing' about war, strategy creates a particular image of 'reality'. At the same time, the commitment to pragmatics may be used by strategists to jettison unwanted 'ethical' or ideational baggage which threatens to inhibit strategy's instrumental purpose.[17]

This section addresses the way in which strategy's commitment to the instrumentality of war has implications for the body with respect to politics, science, and ethics. It represents an exploration of the suspicion that, just as one must delineate an abstract concept of 'war' in order to understand it, one must first conceive of the body in order to exclude it. That is to say that strategy must construct the body as something which may be excluded or ignored, although this construction is rarely explicit. Contrary to the suggestion that it is self-evident what 'a body' is I will be operating throughout from the position that the 'self-evident' body is the *consequence* of a certain way of writing or thinking, rather than something which exists independently of it. Just as strategy is not strictly 'pragmatic' with respect to war, but must also define and constrain what is meant by war, I will try to suggest that strategic writing, together with writing about technology and human rights, enacts certain assumptions about what 'the body' *is*. This is done in order to situate it with respect to the other terms with which it is concerned, or to disregard it altogether. Colin Gray cautions his readers that '[w]hen, as in this book, an author is sweeping over the strategic history of a whole century and employs collective concepts such as landpower, seapower, airpower, spacepower, and cyberpower, it is not difficult to forget that real people must and do execute strategy'.[18] He chastens 'scholars of a theoretical bent' for allowing 'the human dimension' to elude them.[19] But if the 'human dimension' entails only the extent to which humans 'execute' strategy, then it becomes hard to see why scholars, theoretical or otherwise, should include them as they may just as well be replaced with automata.

Politics

Colin Gray deploys the image of strategy as a bridge between war and politics: '[s]trategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither military power *per se* nor political purpose'.[20] And elsewhere he reaffirms that

[17] Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 334(italics added)
[18] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999 p. 26
[19] Ibid. p. 26
[20] Ibid. p. 17

'[s]trategy is the bridge between military power and political purpose... Moreover, although it is a bridge that must allow two-way traffic between tasking from policy and military feasibility, it is the former that must dominate'.[21] He laments that '[p]eople have no difficulty in comprehending either policy or fighting, regarded separately, but to connect the two in a purposeful way, and to keep them connected, is often a mental step too far... I would go so far as to claim that on the evidence of performance, strategy tends to be a bridge too far for many policymakers and military professionals'.[22] The idea of strategy as a 'bridge' is significant in as much as it constructs the impression of war and politics as independently existing entities between which communication must be maintained through strategy. It is misleading, however, insofar as it implies that war and policy are phenomena which exist on equal levels in different domains, requiring only a line of communication between them. Instead, as Gray emphasises, there is a hierarchy of relations between war and politics which must be maintained if war is to be the effective servant of policy, rather than competing with it for influence. 'When policy fails to command it finds itself the servant of warfare, the reverse of the only legitimate terms of the relationship'.[23] In the discussion below, I analyse the relationship between war and politics as written and mediated by strategic thinking and draw out the implications that this has for thinking about war. I will suggest below that the emphasis that strategic thinking places on the instrumental function of war means that it is presented as being populated almost exclusively by mere ciphers of political will.

The image of strategy as a bridge creates the impression that war and policy pre-exist, and must merely be placed into communication with each other. However, strategic thought holds that politics is a necessary condition for war to be defined as such. Gray states that '[i]f....force is not applied for political purposes, then it is not war. It may be sport, or crime, or banditry of a kind integral to local culture, but it is not war. War, its threat and its actuality, is an instrument of policy'.[24] So it is possible for fighting to take place for reasons which are not political, but one could not classify this fighting as 'war' without the added dimension of political interest. In the absence of political

[21] Colin S. Gray 'Introduction: Holding the Strategy Bridge' 1-14 in Colin S. Gray (ed.) Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice London: Routledge 2006 p. 1
[22] Ibid. p. 4
[23] Ibid. p. 1
[24] Colin S. Gray 'What is War? A View from Strategic Studies' pp. 185- 189 in Colin S. Gray (ed.) Strategy and History p. 185

purposes, 'war' degenerates into atavistic bloodshed, because the significant thing about war is that it 'is *not only* an eruption of primordial violence'.[25] War has some exterior purpose which turns it *from* primordial violence *into* war, and this exterior purpose is political and is provided by strategy. Of course, on one level, the primordial violence is still there, but in war it is not all there is, for the additional political element gives violence a purpose. The role of strategy in this is 'translating military effects into political results... It is the essential link between political objectives and military force, between ends and means'.[26] The implication is that without strategy or policy, war would reside in the domain of pure means and would therefore be 'irrational'. Gray affirms 'the importance of political purpose for defence preparation and the use of force in war. Armed forces and their use cannot produce their own justification'.[27] War is being presented here as being a purely purposive instrument of policy. In the absence of this policy, it can no longer be defined as war, so essential is this instrumental element to defining the nature of war. Moreover, one can infer that war does not itself have any internal 'political' significance because war and politics are somehow different orders of discourse or activity, and must be 'translated' for the comprehension of the other by strategy.

Colin Gray affirms that '[m]odern strategy ultimately derives its significance from the realm of politics. If this is not true, what else was the strategic history of the twentieth century about? Although war and its strategic conduct is an economic activity, engages our moral judgement, and consists at its brutal core of combat of various kinds, war is not 'about' economics, morality, or fighting. Instead, it is about politics.'[28] What this indicates is that, although war may be a multidimensional phenomenon, the only really distinctive thing about it as opposed to other forms of violence is the fact that it is 'about' politics, and it can only be made to be 'about' politics through strategy, because war and politics are such separate domains of expertise. This conception seems to be predicated on a very specific understanding of what 'politics' is, in order to facilitate its straightforward disaggregation from war and strategy. I will expand on this suggestion in the section below.

[25] Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 362 (italics added)
[26] Thomas G. Mahnken 'Strategic Theory' p. 68
[27] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy p. 30
[28] Ibid. p. 55

Clausewitz's expression of the war/politics relation famously held that ''war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means''.[29] Potentially problematic for strategists is the impression that 'the concept of politics lends itself to sundry interpretations',[30] but this receives a two-fold dismissal by Gray. The first is on the grounds of 'common sense', which means that although intellectual game-playing might induce us to call 'politics' into question, 'really', we know what it is.[31] The second is founded on certain assumptions about the international system which depend upon a strict division between foreign and domestic policy and the rigor of the boundary between them. Milan Vego argues that 'policy' and 'politics' are often used (in the strategic literature) as though they are interchangeable, but they are not, quite. Whereas 'policy' is the use of power to achieve a certain goal, 'politics' is the distribution of power.[32] So, '[p]olicy... *decides* whether to enter a war... it is the task of policy to *determine and articulate* a... desired end state... Policy also *determines and defines* the... limitations on the combat employment of one's military forces'.[33] Politics determines the distribution of power within a system, and thereby judges who is empowered to make decisions. The decisions that the relevant bodies/individuals make (with respect to war/foreign policy) are policy decisions. 'Politics produces policy, which may require the services of strategy'.[34] In any case, Gray suggests that there is no need to be pedantic on this point, and 'it is wise to be relaxed about, and empathetic to, the exact meaning of 'political' over the centuries'.[35]

I would suggest, however, that strategic thought tends to be anything but relaxed as to what policy/politics entails and encompasses. For in order to sustain the 'trinity' between war, strategy and politics discussed above, it is necessary to keep them separate and hierarchically organised, and this seems both to empower and to curtail 'politics'. Gray says that '[a]lthough some individuals enjoy fighting, some institutions anticipate benefit from hostilities, and the community at whole finds the condition of

[29] Carl von Clausewitz (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret) On War Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976 p. 605
[30] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy p. 55
[31] Ibid. p. 55
[32] Milan Vego 'Policy, Strategy, and Operations' pp. 119-136 in Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling (eds) Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel London: Frank Cass 2003 p. 120
[33] Ibid. p. 120 (italics added).
[34] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy p. 55
[35] Ibid p. 55

war to be pleasurably thrilling, the decision to fight will be political'.[36] The fact that 'some individuals, groups, or institutions anticipate benefit of a non-political kind from a condition of belligerency' is not relevant to the claim that what is essential about war is its political dimension. Politics is empowered insofar as that it is given a central position in determining the ends of war, but it is limited because of all the things that it *is not*. As indicated above, politics is not economics or profit or pleasure or fear. We are not provided with a clear indication of what politics is, in this context, other than the decision to go to war, and could therefore legitimately conclude that, from the perspective of strategic thought, politics is the act of decision.

It might be legitimate to enquire at this point exactly what is at stake in this discussion of the parameters of 'the political'. After all, strategic thought it not concerned with a discussion of politics as such. Bernard Brodie says that '[s]trategic thinking, or "theory", if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a "how to do it" study, a guide to the accomplishment of something and doing it efficiently'.[37] So in this sense we might conclude that it is not for strategy to speculate on what politics might be, or what other iterations it might have, because its job is simply to interact with politics at the point of policymaking—to ask for a deeper engagement would be to misunderstand what strategy is 'for'. But this would be disingenuous. It is clear from the above discussion on how we define 'war' that strategy avows its own capacity to change the conceptual parameters of that with which it comes into contact. The tendency within strategic thinking to insist upon a narrow definition of politics as an act of decision which is in hierarchical relation to strategy and war is necessary in order that 'war' be apprehended as instrumental. The commitment of strategic thinking to the notion that war can be of use to politics depends upon the radical separation of the two, otherwise the means-ends logic upon which the entire edifice is constructed will collapse along the lines elucidated by Elaine Scarry. Scarry exposes the fallacies underlying justifications for military action which take the form of 'x is the cost of y'. These are fallacious because they suppose that 'war' and the political end state which war helps to achieve are two distinct spaces populated by distinct groups of people, neither of these spaces is fully embodied, since death and injury are not 'the end'. This commitment to technological writing about war effaces the fact that the body cannot be thus

[36] Ibid. p. 56
[37] Bernard Brodie War and Politics New York: Macmillan 1973 p. 452

technologised and its death is not a step on the road toward 'freedom', but the end of the road. Instead of war for liberation or glory or freedom, Scarry suggests that war should be coupled only with the death and suffering that are its inevitable companions.[38]

Aspects of war which do not fall under this strict definition of 'politics' are discussed only on the condition that they are acknowledged as being parenthetic to the serious business of making strategy. Gray acknowledges that '[m]uch of the potential cannon-fodder in conflicts from Afghanistan to Liberia fights for motives no more strategic than food, self-respect, greed, lust, ambition, and boredom'.[39] In terms of his own position, he says that 'this text can hide from the face of battle, the tactical doing of strategy, behind its high level of analysis…Nonetheless, I admit to some discomfort with an analysis which blanks out people and is obliged to treat them as cipher-like combatants in the engagements that strategy must use for the political object of war'.[40] I would suggest that strategy is predicated upon the possibility of thinking of people as conduits for political will, which is why Gray 'is obliged' to do it, although it causes him some discomfort. Not only is 'war' positioned outside the political community of ends, it is further removed from policy by strategy, which purports not to be political. I would suggest that this expresses strategy's commitment to appear as a technological writing which is determined to prove its pragmatic utility. 'Bodies' only appear as channels through which strategy can fulfil the political will, and as such they are more akin to units of capability or force than to anything we would recognise as human. One might argue that it is forgivable and even necessary for strategy to exclude the inessential, and indeed the point is not so much to condemn strategic thought, but to suggest that in order to exclude the 'non-political' thus, it must first organise the world to make this possible.

I have sought to suggest in this section that strategy is instrumental in placing politics in a certain relation to war, one which relies on a putative separation between the two. It is this hierarchical separation which makes it possible for war to appear as an instrument of policy. Insisting on this instrumental character of war with respect to politics suggests that war has no dynamic potential of its own. Gray acknowledges that 'war has

[38] Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain p. 77
[39] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy p. 277
[40] Ibid. p. 360

a grammar of its own, aside from the political logic of policy... Nonetheless, war is an instrument of policy and by and large is controlled by it'.[41] Caveats about the dynamic of war do not disrupt the core claim that war is instrumental, and in any case this dynamic is not political. Therefore, insofar as that the body is considered by strategy, it is as a pure instrument of political will. Characteristics extraneous to this expression of will are disregarded as 'non-strategic' and 'non-political'. This analytic framework is founded upon a strict distinction between the rational and the irrational, and hence both war and politics are understood in restricted and highly instrumentalised forms. One might counter that 'bodies' are clearly assumed to exist by strategy, but I would suggest that what is assumed is the existence of entities capable of expressing political will, and there is no particular reason why these should be human bodies, although historically they generally have been.

Science

As discussed above, strategy is involved with defining war and politics in order to interpose itself between them as a branch of knowledge and a way of thinking capable of providing guidance as to the 'proper' ways of war. It seeks to develop and convey principles for the 'better' and more effective conduct of war, and so therefore aims to encompass both theories about historical wars and prescriptions for the conduct of future ones. If military planners are not to commit the cardinal error and "prepare for the last war",[42] then strategic thought must furnish some general rules for the conduct of war which are independent from specific moments of conflict. One may define science in this context as that which 'strives for generalizations which accord not only with the observations upon which they were based but also with all future and past observations unknown at the time the generalization was made'.[43] Bernard Brodie lamented after the Second World War that 'strategy is not receiving the scientific treatment it deserves... [and that] our failure to train our military leaders in the scientific study of strategy has been costly in war'.[44] Although it would be false to claim that all strategic writing assumes the status of a 'science', nonetheless strategic thought tends to emphasise abstraction and generality, and to highlight the generic features of war over the specific details of particular wars. In this section I will discuss various iterations of

[41] Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 363
[42] Bernard Brodie 'Strategy as a Science' pp. 467-488 in World Politics 1949 Vol. 1, No. 4 p. 474
[43] Quincy Wright A Study of War Vol. II p. 681
[44] Bernard Brodie 'Strategy as a Science' p. 468

the tendency of strategic thinking to concern itself with the regular, general and predictable over the specific, contingent, and mutable, before suggesting some possible implications for the capacity of strategy to take account of the body. I focus first on what I take to be a 'scientific' ambition in strategic thinking, associated with the work of Baron de Jomini.

Jomini belonged to a tradition which 'saw war as the application of the principles of a military science: to follow these principles was virtually to ensure victory: to neglect them was to make defeat a certainty'.[45] While Clausewitz emphasised the importance of factors outside the regulatory scope of 'scientific' strategy, such as friction, fog, genius, chance, and so on, Baron de Jomini and his theoretical descendents tend to imply that these factors are the inconvenient consequence of ineffective strategic reasoning: In other words, that they are extraneous and inessential elements of war, rather than being integral to it.[46] All strategists must claim for themselves some general expertise which transcends particular wars and is not bogged down in historical detail and 'must clearly distinguish between the unique and the representative'.[47] However, some go further and make strong claims about the capacity of strategic thought to offer certainty, as with the Soviet conviction that '[m]ilitary strategy is a system of scientific knowledge dealing with the laws of war as an armed conflict'.[48] Jomini may be thought of as the 'climactic figure of the rationalist strategic tradition'.[49] It has been suggested that Jomini, not Clausewitz, was the dominant inspiration for strategists in the American Civil War,[50] and that his thought continues to resonate with American military institutions.[51]

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[45] Bernard Semmel 'Introduction: *Marxism and the Science of War: Theory and Practice'* pp. 1-44 in Bernard Semmel (ed.) Marxism and the Science of War Oxford: Oxford University Press 1981 p. 4

[46] John Shy suggests that Jomini was obsessed with '*"le sentiment des principles"*—the Platonic faith that reality lies beneath the superficial chaos of the historical moment in enduring and invariable principles, like those of gravitation and probability'. See John Shy 'Jomini' pp. 143-185 in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age p. 148

[47] Bernard Brodie 'Strategy as a Science' p. 474

[48] Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky in Harriet Fast Scott (ed.) Soviet Military Strategy New York: Crane Russak 1975 p. 11

[49] Daniel Moran 'Strategic Theory and the History of War' at http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Bibl/Moran-StrategicTheory.pdf Accessed 07/08/08 p. 5

[50] See Donald W. Hamilton The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group 1998; Bernard Semmel 'Introduction: *Marxism and the Science of War*' p. 5

[51] And was also influential in the Soviet system which sought to apply Marxist views about the scientific features of history and society to war. See Bernard Semmel (ed.) Marxism and the Science of War Oxford: Oxford University Press 1981

Commentators have remarked that 'the continuing adherence of the US Army to [Jomini's] ideas is at once interesting and troubling'.[52]

The extent to which Jomini's ideas continue to influence American military instruction and thinking is reflected in Lieutenant Colonel Saulnier's view that 'after nine months of instruction [at the US Army Command and General Staff College], the author found it difficult to escape the conclusion that Jomini walks the college halls and is, in fact, regularly attending class'.[53] Jomini insisted that 'there is one great principle underlying all the operations of war,—a principle which must be followed in all good combinations'.[54] He saw his role in systematising the laws of war in a scientific manner, excluding 'unnecessary' details and personal accounts. Jomini insisted that *'the art of war has existed in all time*, and strategy especially was the same under Caesar as under Napoleon'.[55] He sought a 'small number of timeless principles'[56] which 'reduced war to a geometric calculus',[57] thus producing a science or mathematics of warfare. Therefore, it may be suggested that Jomini's 'art' was more akin to a science.

Striving to become 'scientific', strategy must deal delicately with the question of the significance of context. In one sense, one cannot understand war in a vacuum, and context is an important accompaniment to the 'scientific' tendency in strategic thought. One must keep an eye on context if 'strategy' is to remain securely moored between 'military force' and 'policy', otherwise it risks abstracting itself into obsolescence. It is therefore recognised as being 'necessary to think of warfare as having political, socio-cultural-technological, historical, and strategic contexts which give it meaning and character'.[58] 'War', taken as a coherent unit of analysis, must be situated within a wider framework of analysis. As well as being political, warfare is an 'expression of culture',[59] and although strategic thought posits some essential characteristics of 'war',

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[52] Stephen Saulnier 'War as Science: Jomini and American Doctrine' The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 2002 at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-2966856_ITM Accessed 18/10/08
[53] Ibid.
[54] Baron de Jomini (trans Capt G.H. Mendall and Lieut W. P. Craighill) The Art of War Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers 1971 p. 70
[55] Baron de Jomini 'Introductory Material to the Summary of the Art of War' US Command and General Staff College: Combined Arms Research Library at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/jomini/jomini.asp Accessed 10/08/08 p. 1 (italics in original)
[56] Daniel Moran 'Strategic Theory and the History of War' p. 5
[57] Philip K. Lawrence 'Enlightenment, Modernity and War' pp. 3-25 in History of the Human Sciences 1999 Vol. 12, No. 1 p. 13
[58] Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 56
[59] Ibid. p. 58

no one would seriously suggest that this view is not enriched by putting some contextual meat on the conceptual bones. This said, affording too much constructive power to context degrades the possibility of referring to some 'essential' aspect of war which exists alongside the contingent. This is incompatible with the idea of strategic thought as being something which has general form and content which exists through time. I would suggest that strategic thought, whether of a 'scientific' bent or not, must somehow construct 'war' as a general object for analysis which has common features throughout all specific manifestations of war. Discussing the relationship between strategy and history, Gray says that 'strategic theorists tend to be unduly interested in the general at the potential expense of the particular... [but] historians are overly prone to retreat into the rich singularity of detail at the possible expense of a general wisdom'.[60] It is implied in strategic thought that statements about war may to some extent be valid across the ages. Therefore, in part the duty of the strategist is to 'look for the hidden jokers in a situation, the vagaries of circumstance which profoundly affected the outcome... he must engage in a refined analytical operation... [which] requires a mind trained for analysis and the rigorous scrutiny of evidence'.[61] I want to suggest that the fact that strategic thinking emphasises the generalisable makes it necessary for it to exclude the body.

For example, it is possible to argue, from a constructivist perspective, that weapons do not have 'real' effects that are separable from their social effects. They are thoroughly social, which is to say, thoroughly determined by context. From this point of view, '[t]he technological object—the bullet—only exists as part of prior social constructions and contemporary social actions'.[62] It seems relatively uncontentious—even conservative—to insist upon the importance of social context in situating technologies; on the intrinsic sociality of the technical.[63] However, attributing constructive power to context seriously imperils strategic thought. As far as strategic thought is concerned, the 'constructivist approach' 'suffers the limitations of microinterpretivist approaches in

[60] Colin S. Gray 'History for Strategists: British Sea Power as a Relevant Past' pp. 54-73 Colin S. Gray (ed.) Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice pp. 55-56
[61] Bernard Brodie 'Strategy as a Science' p. 474
[62] Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar 'Computers, Guns, and Roses: What's Social about Being Shot?' pp. 366-380 in Science, Technology, and Human Values 1992 Vol. 17, No. 3 p. 373
[63] Stefan Fritsch points out that constructivism assumes a 'dependent independence' between technology and society. He argues that society is itself a technology. See Stefan Fritsch 'Technology as a Source of Global Turbulence?' pp. 98-112 in Edward Halpin et al (eds.) Cyberwar, Netwar, and the Revolution in Military Affairs London: Macmillan 2006

understanding large-scale social patterns'.[64] This is because the constructivist approach here outlined suggests that one cannot understand 'social phenomena' on the macro-scale, so one must take account of the body. This would mean that war is inappropriate as a unit for analysis, because it already assumes too much about the bodies that occupy it. It would also mean that strategic thought is somehow defective as an epistemology. Stone points out that '[t]he strategist's tendency... to reify technology—to abstract out from the unique and contingent properties of sociotechnical systems... is a necessary consequence of efforts to derive generalized insights for strategic theory'.[65]

I have tried to show that whether or not it claims a scientific status for itself, at the very least strategy must construct 'war' as a general phenomenon in order to make enduring claims about its nature. It must therefore be highly selective about those aspects of actually existing wars that it takes account of, and those which are designated as non-repeatable. I would contend, then, that this makes strategy ill-equipped to take account of the body as anything other than a generalisable unit for the application of strategic design. It is possible to suggest that this is in part because the particular capabilities of certain bodies defy inclusion into a more widely applicable schema.[66] In addition, the constructive specificity of a particular conflation of forces on bodies in any specific circumstance can also not be accommodated because, as discussed above, this hinders the development of enduring principles. Committed to furnishing prescriptions for the prosecution of future wars, strategic thought cannot be concerned with the dense phenomenological experience which might inhere in any particular war, as this is unlikely to be precisely repeated in future. The strategist must travel 'beyond history—*i.e.* beyond experience—to explore the feebly lit realm of "what might have been"'.[67] Not only is experience a problem for strategic thought, it is also potentially an irrelevance, unless it conduces directly to an understanding of how certain outcomes eventuate. Because of its self-affirmed status as a quasi-scientific discourse, strategic

[64] Rob Kling 'When Gunfire Shatters Bone: Reducing Sociotechnical Systems to Social Relationships' pp. 381-385 in Science, Technology, and Human Values 1992 Vol. 17, No. 3 p. 384
[65] J. Stone 'Technology and War: A Trinitarian Analysis' pp. 27-40 in Defense and Security Analysis 2007 Vol. 23, No. 1 p. 28
[66] This is perhaps not the case the respect to Clausewitz's theory of genius, which is his way of taking account of the unquantifiable attributes and capabilities of individual commanders: Genius cannot be legislated for.
[67] Bernard Brodie 'Strategy as a Science' p. 474

thinking does not accommodate the unrepeatable aspects of the body at war, which would in any case be irrelevant to the goal of 'winning the war'.[68]

Ethics

Finally, I would suggest that strategic thought is in some senses ethically blind, and that this blindness derives at least in part from its stance with respect to the body. Of course, it would be misleading to suggest that ethics and war are wholly unrelated, as Just War theory is concerned precisely with the rules of ethical conduct in war. Historically, appeal to 'military necessity' has legitimised deviation from the norms of Just War, and even the Nuremburg Principles insert a caveat into the definition of war crimes, which are understood as being acts '*not justified by military necessity*'.[69] Indeed, Martin Shaw is critical of the Just War tradition on the grounds that it gives too much away to 'military necessity', and therefore makes ethics insufficiently binding even in principle.[70] Moreover, it is subject to conjecture among strategists that the intrusion of ethical qualms into strategic planning may diminish the utility of war and ultimately do harm.[71] Edward Luttwak argues that the United Nations should be censured for its consistent reluctance to allow wars to follow their natural course. In imposing a premature conclusion to hostilities, he suggests, the UN obstructs the achievement of a lasting peace. For example, in Bosnia, '[u]ninterrupted war would certainly have caused further suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it would have also led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly begin'.[72] This implies that it is only after war has done its work that ethics can flourish: war and ethics are temporally and analytically in different worlds. Gray says that 'ethics follow culture, which follows strategic context'.[73]

To construct a framework in which war appears as a policy option potentially equivalent to any other, strategic thought must efface the degree to which war causes

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[68] Bernard Brodie War and Politics p. 4
[69] In Paul Christopher The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues New Jersey: Pearson 2004 p. 149 (italics in original).
[70] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq Cambridge: Polity Press 2006 pp. 136-137
[71] David Lonsdale says that 'we must resist the temptation to sideline strategic studies in response to military failures or moral objections to the study of war as an instrument of policy'. This indicates that strategy should be doubly protected from criticism on the grounds of pragmatic failure *and* on the grounds of moral undesirability. See David Lonsdale 'Strategy' pp. 16-63 in David Jordan et al (eds) Understanding Modern Warfare Cambridge University Press 2008 p. 22.
[72] Edward N. Luttwak 'Give War a Chance' pp. 37-38
[73] Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 352

suffering and death. Luttwak laments that the rush to peace is driven in part by 'frivolous motives, such as television audiences' revulsion at harrowing scenes of war'.[74] He argues that US foreign policy is being emasculated by 'political constraints [that] greatly restrict [ground forces'] availability'.[75] To preserve the idea of war as pragmatic, strategic thought must resist the temptation to become derailed by considerations of death and suffering since these are the necessary cost of the projection of power in the world. In this sense, the body tends to be marginalised because it tends to confuse the overall goal of the use of military force, and to introduce ethical objections which are inimical to the pursuit of long term strategic objectives. Luttwak argues that it may be possible to see war now for stable peace in the future as the better choice than an unstable peace now. Such a war has a rational basis. It also has an ethical basis, if it signifies the path towards the creation of the conditions of flourishing for ethics. Seeing the 'big picture', it becomes feasible for strategists to align war with rationality and to elide any conflict it has with 'ethics'. Gray argues that a 'strategist worthy of the name is a person who sees... all dimensions of the 'big picture' of the evolving conditions of war'.[76] For Shaw, '[w]ar is both the rational, purposive activity that strategic thought guides *and* the necessarily unpredictable, uncontrollable, irrationally destructive clash of opposing wills that combatants and victims experience'.[77] However, strategy tends only to be concerned with the former and must suppress the latter for fear that it proves obstructive to the achievement of ultimate goals. For strategic thought, '[i]t might be said that ethics is akin to the dog that did not bark in the night'.[78] This is partially because politics is taken to be the domain in which all the ethical 'working out' takes place, and strategy has positioned itself outside politics: 'the ethical dimension to statecraft and strategy is already integral to the human and bureaucratic instruments that decide upon strategic issues'.[79] Moreover, if there is a danger that 'revulsion at harrowing scenes of war' undermines long-term policy planning including the use of war, then it seems likely that it follows that strategy should not give undue attention to the aspects of war which are common to all wars, i.e., death and killing.

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[74] Edward N. Luttwak 'Give War a Chance' p. 37
[75] Edward N. Luttwak 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy' pp. 33-44 in Foreign Affairs 1996 Vol. 75, No. 4 p. 38
[76] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy p. 52
[77] Martin Shaw 'Strategy and Slaughter' p. 271
[78] Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy p. 70
[79] Ibid. p. 74

Brodie points out that '[w]riters on strategy, and certainly its practitioners, have almost always rejected from their conscious concern those characteristics of war that to ordinary folk are its most conspicuous ones. In the treatises on strategy, battlefields rarely have the smell of death'.[80] This is not only because strategists are focused on a milieu above that of the battlefield, but also because their commitment to the instrumental utility of both war and of writing strategy militates against the inclusion of those factors which are not useful, but are merely 'in themselves' tragic or painful. Moreover, as with Luttwak's comments, there is the imputation that the inclusion of these factors may turn us away from war when it is in fact the necessary and correct course: as Brodie says; 'the decision to go to war has not always in retrospect appeared wrong, the alternative in some instances being submission to unmitigated lawlessness, tyranny, and other evils. Those to whom Hitler is a live memory cannot be in doubt about that'.[81] More than this, strategic thought does not really give us the tools with which to decide whether war is 'wrong' or not, except from a means-ends point of view.[82] 'Ethics' is generally placed with 'politics' as something with which strategic thought is not directly concerned. In addition, because strategy must be committed to the possibility that war is potentially an appropriate instrument of policy, it is of no benefit to give too much attention to the inevitable death and suffering that it causes. From an instrumental perspective, it seems, the generative effects of the experience of war are not of concern, especially because the conception of war here considered tends to be abstract rather than visceral.

Strategic thought, through the desire to produce generalised conclusions and maxims about warfare, demonstrates a tendency toward abstraction by excluding 'unique and contingent properties of sociotechnical systems'. Therefore, any embodied approach which insists upon the contingent and the 'irrational' tends to appear inimical to strategic thought, and is tolerated only as an excluded component of warfare which is of anecdotal and personal interest only. John Keegan suggests that where bodies do appear, they are shorn of the features that would make them conceivable as multi-

[80] Bernard Brodie War and Politics p. 7
[81] Ibid. p 3
[82] Gray has some difficulty in deciding whether Hitler's wars were the irrational product of a warped political system, or simply unreasonable, and concludes that 'although there is an awareness of the means-ends nexus, there is certainly no semblance of prudent calculation of the realm of the practicable' Colin S. Gray (ed.) Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice p. 192 note 40. What matters is whether Hitler was able to plan to achieve his goals in a realistic rational manner. It is not for strategists to determine whether these goals, or the means used to achieve them, were barbaric or morally abhorrent.

dimensional political entities. He says that '[t]he warrior in Clausewitz was a sort of cipher—a being subject to fear and fatigue and capable of bravery—but faceless, unindividualistic and asocial, for all that Clausewitz had to say about the enthusiasm of popular armies… He was a being without family or friends, without a future or past, without values, good or bad, except for the incidental flash of courage or self-sacrifice'.[83] Since one of the key functions of strategy is to link violent conflict to political ends, all aspects of combat that cannot be thus instrumentalised must be excluded. In his famous elucidation of friction, Clausewitz takes the reader into battle with an inexperienced soldier. He writes '[l]et us accompany the novice to the battle-field. As we approach, the thunder of the cannon becoming plainer and plainer is soon followed by the howling of shot, which attracts the attention of the inexperienced. Balls begin to strike the ground close to us, before and behind... we begin to feel that we are no longer perfectly at ease and collected; even the bravest is at least to some degree confused... The young soldier cannot reach any of these different strata of danger without feeling that the light of reason does not move here in the same medium'.[84] But the thrust of strategic thought has tended to travel in the opposite direction: away from the heat of battle, and towards the light of reason.

Technology and the Utility of War

In the last section I tried to suggest that strategic thought is committed to a kind of technological writing which invests both the writing and its object, war, with the appearance of instrumental purpose. The overall effect with respect to the body tends to be a combination of concealment, simplification and inattention. In this section I will try to show that this aspect of strategic thinking resonates with a certain way of thinking about war and technology. In the first instance, this is because they share a core commitment to the ideas of utility and efficiency as lying at the heart of the project of thinking about war. In addition, there is the underlying assumption that it may be possible to wage better war, whatever criteria are used to define 'better'. Lastly, there is a sense in which they share certain generally unstated assumptions about the body. For as discussed above, for strategists the body is largely considered only as a cipher, or a device through which the strategic design may be implemented. Factors extraneous

[83] John Keegan 'Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation' pp. 3-12 in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.) Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939-1945 London: Pimlico 1997 pp.4-5

[84] Carl von Clausewitz On War p. 113

from this function are largely excluded from strategic consideration. For strategic thought, then, the body fulfils a purely technical function. However, there are many things that the human body is poorly adapted to do. In the context of the lethality of modern weapons systems, survivability on the battlefield may be extremely low. In addition, human bodies are prone to fatigue, disobedience, over-exuberance, and multiple other kinds of deviation from perfect functionality.

So in strategic thought, the body tends to be regarded as something which is the agent of strategic design and political will, but in a potentially problematic and limited way. Within this frame of thought, the task for technological writers focused on technology is to engineer in a substitute to the human body which is not subject to the same limitations. Technology is sometimes regarded as holding out the possibility of making war an ever more perfect tool of politics. Michael Ignatieff suggests that '[t]he technologies put to use in Kosovo are the result of a revolution in military affairs... whose purpose was to return war in the West to its position as the continuation of politics by other means'.[85] The story goes that the total wars of the twentieth century threatened the coherence of the idea of the 'utility of war' by unleashing a maelstrom of mass destruction which seriously imperilled the polities that war had been intended to protect. The distinction between war, politics, culture and ethics became increasingly muddied. Christopher Coker suggests that '[s]omething was lost in the mayhem [of the Second World War]—that inner belief in war... modern warfare reached a dead-end: not so much an endgame as a point beyond which it was impossible to play the game by the old rules any longer'.[86] It is conducive to the security of the politics/war hierarchy if technology replaces the human body at war, as this enhances the appearance of war as purely instrumental. Through the use of so-called *surgical* strikes and precision weaponry, technology seems to provide redemption to war and to bring it closer to realising the strategic dream in which reason dominates the conduct of war.

Of course, here too, care is needed as to the extent of convergence and complicity between the technological writing about war of strategy, and the technological writing about the potentially redemptive or transformational impact of technology on war. Indeed, there is a tension between them insofar as that strategic thought emphasises the enduring features of war and is hostile to the notion that it can be transformed. In

[85] Michael Ignatieff Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond London: Vintage 2001 p. 164
[86] Christopher Coker Humane Warfare London: Routledge 2001 p. 2

addition, strategic thinkers tend to place strategy at or close to the top of the hierarchy of importance when thinking about war. So, 'the engines of war can perform no better than the people who must direct them',[87] in other words, the strategists. But the disagreements between technophiles and technophobes[88] do not really need to concern us here, because as with the discussion about strategic thinking, the arguments made matter less than the *way* that the arguments are made. Technology may be a panacea, or its effective use may require that the 'strategic bridge' be maintained. But the important thing is the way in which war and technology are written about technologically, which is sustained by embedded assumptions about the rationality of war, and the status of the body. If both strategists and technologists adhere to the notion that war is instrumental, then the instruments engaged in waging war may be human bodies, or they may be robotic technologies. Moreover, many of those writing about technology and war are driven implicitly or explicitly by the desire to remove the body from the battlefield. Strategists and technologists may disagree about each others' relative importance, but I would suggest that they are to some extent speaking the same language.

The impact of new technologies on the way that war is apprehended, experienced and waged is dramatised by the evolution of air power as a strategic tool. Air power was embraced as offering the potential for war fighters to stand above the confusion of the battlefield and to survey the scene untroubled by the melee of battle. It promised to offer the capacity for pilots to view the battle as strategists viewed the war: with an appraising, rational eye standing apart from the confusion of combat. The air power theorist and enthusiast Giulio Douhet stated that '[a]s long as man remained tied to the surface of the earth, his activities had to be adapted to the conditions imposed by that surface… The uneven configuration of the land surface presents all kinds of obstacles which hinder movement of solid bodies over it…Thus the surface of the earth gradually became covered with lines of easy transit intersecting at various points, at others separated by zones less easy of access, sometimes impassable'.[89] Douhet and the air power optimists hoped that it was possible to take to the sky and enjoy perfect

[87] Colin S. Gray Another Bloody Century p. 102
[88] See Ibid. pp. 98-105
[89] Giulio Douhet (foreword Air Marshal Brijesh Dhar Jayal) The Command of the Air New Delhi: Natraj 2003 pp. 12-13

manoeuvrability.[90] Air power seemed to promise a 'third dimension'[91] overcoming the 'natural' limitations of the embodied perspective. In terms of sight, then, air power was taken as being a technology able to overcome the limitations of the partial, situated view and to provide something approaching omniscience. Advantageous too was the fact that air power removed the pilot from the scene of battle and therefore from its potentially upsetting or confusing features.

The rise of air power signified the rise of killing at a distance, and killing at a distance is widely regarded as being psychologically easier than killing in hand-to-hand combat: 'The combatants in modern warfare pitch bombs from 20,000 feet in the morning, causing untold suffering to civilian populations, and then eat hamburgers for dinner thousands of miles away from the drop zone'.[92] Air power was increasingly exploited for the fact that it could shield killers from the fact of killing: those who kill and those who die to occupy different moral and geopolitical universes. For the former, the implication is that the act of killing barely need intrude on the quotidian pattern of their lives. Dave Grossman speculates that if the bomber crew members on Operation Gomorrah 'had had to turn a flamethrower on each one of those seventy thousand women and children... the awfulness and trauma inherent in the act would have been of such a magnitude that it simply would not have happened'.[93] This might seem melodramatic, but it merely serves to illustrate the point that, thanks to air power, killing becomes easier because confrontation with death is deferred. Grossman suggests that the majority of soldiers have an aversion to killing: 'the average soldier will not kill unless coerced and conditioned and provided with mechanical and mental leverage'.[94] His thesis is that 'the history of warfare can be seen as a history of increasingly more effective mechanisms for enabling and conditioning men to overcome their innate resistance to killing their fellow human beings'.[95] So as air power enabled pilots to think and see more clearly, raised above the confusion of battle, at the same time it ensured that they saw less clearly in terms of the death and destruction that their technologies wrought.

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[90] It has been argued that Douhet exaggerated the freedom of the air because he failed to predict radar. See David MacIsaac 'Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists' pp. 624-647 in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age p. 630

[91] Giulio Douhet The Command of the Air p. 14

[92] Dave Grossman On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society New York: Little, Brown 1996 p. 99

[93] Ibid. pp. 100-101

[94] Ibid. p. 31 Atrocities are a complicating factor for this thesis.

[95] Ibid p. 13

The rise of air power seemed to signal a growing gulf between aerial combatants and civilians. Randall Jarrell's WWII poem about bomber crewmen contains the lines:

> our bodies lay among
>
> The people we had killed and never seen[96]

And the Canadian bomber pilot J. Douglas Harvey visiting Berlin in the 1960s recounted that "I could not visualize the horrible deaths my bombs... had caused here. I had no feeling of guilt. I had no feeling of accomplishment'.[97] Although air power might seem to present the possibility for the realisation of a Cartesian dream of rational warfare, it is important to note the disjuncture between the optimistic claims of the air power enthusiasts and the different view that a shift in perspective proffers. While the technological view of war addresses the use of air power from the perspective of the utility of war, 'on the ground' matters appear very different, irrational and hellish.[98] Jörg Friedrich details a catalogue of visceral horrors which were evident in Wuppertal, the bombing of which in May 1943 'was regarded in England as the most successful mission'.[99] Statisticians and chemists attempted to bring scientific rigour to bear on area bombing between 1943-1945, in the hope of compensating for the fact that 'pilots could not be programmed as perfectly as the chemical mixtures of the bombs'.[100] Friedrich suggests that the 'fire raids' on Germany were unique because 'never... [before] had the history of a weapon been guided totally by scientists'.[101] However, the 'scientific' origins of the bombing war did not result in the exercise of pure reason in practice, and the extent to which bomber crewmen were insulated from the stress of their job by virtue of their aerial position was limited, suggests Friedrich. 'The boyish candidates who went on their thirty sorties ... soon had incredible horror stamped into their features'.[102] This was more the consequence of their helplessness in the face of air defence than the mass deaths they caused.[103] However, it is enough to suggest that the

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[96] In Paul Fussell Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989 p. 14
[97] In Ibid. p. 144
[98] See Marione Ingram 'Operation Gomorrah' 80-94 in Granta 2006 No. 96; Gwynne Dyer War London: Guild Publishing 1985
[99] Jörg Friedrich (trans Allison Brown) The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940-1944 New York: Columbia University Press 2006 p. 8
[100] Ibid. p.15
[101] Ibid. p.15
[102] Ibid. p.44
[103] Ibid. p.44

apparent strategic rationality of any particular action is likely to degrade in practice, and that the fact that there is a gulf between the horror of those on the ground caught up in bombing and the experience of those in the air, this does not necessarily connote detachment and disinterest on the side of the latter.

This notwithstanding, faith in the redemptive potential of air power appears to remain potent in western militaries. Arguably, the United States, in its continued search for Jominian precision, has been particularly optimistic about the possibilities of air power. Daryl G. Press said that '[f]or US foreign policy, the Gulf War seems to show—and the 1999 Kosovo conflict appears to confirm—that air power is now so lethal, and American air power so dominant, that the United States can win nearly cost-free military victories against its foes'.[104] This has produced 'what seemed a callous assumption among airmen that the kind of future war of which they spoke could somehow provide quick, clean, mechanical, and impersonal solutions to problems with which others had struggled for centuries'.[105] 'Clean' and 'impersonal', presumably, because with air power, killing need no longer be visceral and therefore potentially morally compromising. For example, trying to make sense of My Lai, Tim O'Brien says that '[a]fter fire fights, after friends died, there was... a great deal of anger—black, fierce, hurting anger—the kind you want to take out on whatever presents itself... I know the boil that precedes butchery'.[106] Despite the best efforts of the US government, My Lai endured as a silent critique of the idea of a good war nobly fought by incorruptible heroes.[107] Visceral engagement with war is unpredictable and morally unstable, potentially producing outcomes which undermine the idea of the war as a purposive and rational venture. Air power appears to allow pilots to apprehend battle as the strategist apprehends war: with oversight, guided by reason. Faith in the utility of air power seems to survive despite historical failures or inadequacies,[108] partially because it

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[104] Daryl G. Press 'The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare' pp. 5-44 in International Security 2001 Vol. 26, No. 2 p. 6
[105] David MacIsaac 'Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists' p. 626
[106] Tim O'Brien 'The Vietnam in Me' The New York Times 2 October 1994 at http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/09/20/specials/obrien-vietnam.html?_r=1 Accessed 07/08/08 p. 8
[107] See for example, Robert D. Schulzinger A Time for Peace: The Legacy of the Vietnam War Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006 pp. 137-138
[108] See for example the use of air power in Afghanistan: Richard B. Andres, Craig Willis and Thomas E. Griffith 'Winning with Allies: the Strategic Value of the Afghan Model' pp. 124-160 in International Security 2005 Vol. 30 No. 3 (an enthusiastic view); Stephen Biddle 'Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare' pp. 31-46 in Foreign Affairs March/April 2003 Vol. 82, No. 2(a sceptical view); Alastair Finlan 'Warfare by Other Means: Special Forces, Terrorism and Grand Strategy' pp. 92-108 Small Wars and Insurgencies 2003 Vol. 14, No. 1 (a balanced view).

is underpinned by the technological view of war that sees it as an improvable project. This, together with the comparative safety enjoyed by the pilot in modern warfare, produces what Ignatieff calls 'virtual war'.[109] He says that '[t]echnological mastery removed death from our experience of war. But war without death—to our side—is war that ceases to be fully real to us: virtual war'.[110]

In the discussion of strategic thought I suggested that death in war had the potential power to interrupt the technical means-ends logic which informs strategic thought. Unless concealed or converted into some system of explanatory power, the dead body threatens to undermine the utility of war because the permanence of death seems incompatible with the notion that war can be *for* something. Technology offers a potential way around this by providing substitutes to the human body in war in the form of remotely operated or robotic systems.[111] But it is not only in its potential to die that the human body is potentially subversive of the utility of war, but also in its potential to feel rage, compassion, confusion, and a plethora of other unpredictable emotional responses. Technology also promises to help here. Distancing the soldier from the heat of battle may enhance the extent to which it is viewed rationally, rather than emotionally, and as killing becomes less visceral it becomes correspondingly easier to bear. J.F.C. Fuller suggests that in the technological epoch of war, heralded with the first use of gunpowder, 'the hidden impulse... is the elimination of the human element both physically and morally, intellect alone remaining'.[112] Replacing the body with technology at war seems to offer the potential to fulfil the strategic dream of agents of war functioning as ciphers of political will. Although strategic thinking strives to construct soldiers as conduits for political decision, there is always the potential that this unstable situation will be disrupted by the unpredictable actions of men at war, or by the responses of domestic publics to the spectacle of death. Technology seems to be

[109] See also James Der Derian Virtuous War : Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network Boulder: Westview Press 2001
[110] Michael Ignatieff Virtual War p. 5
[111] For contemporary research and development into robotics, see David Hambling 'Swarms of Robots Join the Army' The Guardian 21 August 2008 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/aug/21/robots.researchanddevelopment/print Accessed 21/08/08; Robert Frampton 'UAV autonomy' in Codex Journal Summer 2008, Issue 1 at ; http://www.science.mod.uk/codex/Issue1/Journals/documents/Issue1_2Journals_UAV_autonomy.pdf Accessed 02/09/09; Michael Lopez-Calderon 'A Soldier-Free Battlefield?' in Technology, Commerce, Society 8 February 2006 at http://www.tcsdaily.com/printArticle.aspx?ID=020806D Accessed 22/02/07; National Defense Authorization Fiscal Year 2001 at: http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/2001NDAA.pdf Accessed 06/03/07
[112] J.F.C. Fuller Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War London: Eyre and Spottiswoode 1946 p. 83

motivated by the desire to distance 'our' soldiers from the battlefield, and this has a variety of advantages. With air power and remote technologies, the death and destruction which results from their use is in many ways invisible to the operator. Therefore, any resistance to killing is weakened because it barely seems as though killing is taking place. In this sense, perspectives on war are radically divergent, not least because air power has historically been seen to involve high levels of civilian casualties,[113] but also because killing and dying seem to take place in different registers. In addition, the hope is that the use of air power and remote technologies reduces the risk that 'our' soldiers will be put in harm's way, so therefore the potentially inhibiting effect of 'body bag syndrome' is overcome, and war is revived as a thinkable policy option.

'Human rights': Interventions in the Instrumental Logic of War

I have suggested that strategy and technology have tended to exclude the body. This is in both cases motivated by the need to think war as something which one can have a general and close-to complete knowledge of, with an instrumental function. This leads to a kind of technological writing which sees all components of war only in terms of their contribution to its overall utility. There are nuances in the way in which this agenda is expressed in different iterations of these modes of thought, and indeed, in many cases the body is not so much excluded but presented as being the transparent servant of political will. Where in strategic thought the body appears, it is as a cipher for politics, and is therefore less 'a body' as we would recognise in the human sense, and more a unit of force application, or a conduit for an strategic design. Technological thought seems to proceed from the tacit recognition that this body is imperfectly realisable in practice, and then proceeds to attempt to engineer in the more obedient, more resilient, more deadly body. This may be an augmented human body, or it may be an autonomous robotic system. Machines can come to take over from people as the heroes of war: For example, in the Second World War; 'in the popular imagination the planes were anthropomorphized. Indeed, the Spitfire so captured the British imagination... that it became the icon of the battle, the equivalent of Achilles's armour

[113] See Patricia Owens 'Accidents Don't Just Happen: The Liberal Politics of High-Technology "Humanitarian" War' pp. 595-616 in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 2003 Vol. 32, No. 3; Nicholas J. Wheeler 'Dying for "Enduring Freedom": Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in the War against Terrorism' pp. 205-225 International Relations 2002 Vol. 16, No. 2

and Arthur's sword'.[114] The theorisation of war has often involved the production of the chimerical war without bodies, as in the ways outlined above.

Of course, it is problematic to speak of 'the body' and war, without specifying *whose* body we are concerned with. I have suggested that the 'thick' political conception of personhood is absent from war because strategic thought insists upon the distinction between war and politics.[115] However, there is a difference between the body of the allied soldier, which may be present as a cipher or agent, and the body of the enemy soldier or civilian non-combatant, which is rarely present at all, especially in the case of the latter. In this sense, the body of the enemy or civilian is subject to a kind of double concealment, whereby the already ephemeral body is further effaced and the fact that war is about killing is decentred. This is underlined by the 'morally problematic human habit of saying, "I am going off to die for my country" rather than acknowledging that "I am going off to kill for my country"',[116] which tends to conceal the body of the enemy. Emphasising the technical importance of war tends to gloss the fact that the purpose of this techno-strategic mastery is to learn to kill people more effectively. The invisibility of enemy dead therefore facilitates the translation of the military victory to political victory without it becoming contaminated or ossified in the bodies of enemy dead. The noble purpose of military activity can all too often crumble in the face of the death it causes. Scarry opines that war is concerned with 'the reciprocal infliction of massive injury and the essential disowning of the injury so that its attributes can be transferred elsewhere, as they cannot if they are permitted to cling to the original site of the wound, the human body'.[117]

As is suggested throughout, however, the extent to which war is an apolitical realm of pure technology is limited in practice. The normative lens through which war is viewed is a product of the ethico-political climate of the times. Philip Bobbitt has suggested that, taking a long view, we can see that the way in which states view success and failure in war changes as a consequence of the evolutionary relationship between the

[114] Christopher Coker The Future of War: the Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century Oxford: Blackwell 2004 p. 83
[115] The impact of gender is a live question upon which there is a vast literature. See for example, Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (eds) The Women and War Reader New York: New York University Press 1998. It has also been argued that the technological army of the 21st Century makes gender a decreasingly significant factor. See for example Barbara Ehrenreich Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War London: Virago 1997 p. 229
[116] Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain p. 81
[117] Ibid. p. 64

state and its citizens, and the obligations that are acknowledged to pertain on both sides. For example, he argues that twenty first century western states may be classified as 'states of consent'. These are juxtaposed to what he calls 'states of terror' which use coercion rather than consent as the organising principle of society. The chief war aims of a state of consent are 'the protection of civilian lives and the preservation of the rule of law'.[118] Therefore, the idea of 'victory' in a war between a state of consent and a state of terror is asymmetrical: 'States of consent don't need to win; they simply need not to lose. Indeed, for such states, not losing amounts to winning'.[119] In distinction from the twenty-first century 'states of consent', the industrial nation states of the twentieth century were founded on the 'improvement of the material well-being of... [their] people to confirm... [their] legitimacy'[120] and were more concerned with common interests and identities, and a strong relationship of dependence and influence between people and state. Types of war and expectations of what was acceptable in war were correspondingly different.

It has been subject to conjecture that the late twentieth/early twenty-first century has seen a decline in the willingness of Western states to see their soldiers die in battle. Michael Mandelbaum suggests that, in the late twentieth century Western states, '[m]ost people are more interested in becoming wealthy than in risking their lives in war':[121] 'Americans... [do] not want to die'.[122] Michael Walzer suggests that the basis of the rules of war has been that, '"Soldiers are made to be killed... that is why war is hell"... [but] *no one else is made to be killed*'.[123] But it has been subject to conjecture that, in the contemporary West, there is intense resistance to the idea that *anyone* is made to be killed, and that one of the key drivers behind the adoption of unmanned and autonomous technologies is the need to reduce the risk of Western soldiers dying. For example, Herfried Münkler states that '[t]he western democracies are simply unable to wage Mao Tse-tung's "long war of endurance". As they are programmed for interchange rather than sacrifice... they will do their utmost to avoid or minimize their

[118] Philip Bobbitt Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century London: Allen Lane 2008 p. 220
[119] Ibid. p. 183
[120] Ibid. p. 43
[121] In Colin McInnes 'Spectator Sport Warfare' pp. 142-165 in Contemporary Security Policy 1999 Vol. 20, No. 3 pp. 146-147
[122] Harvey M Sapolsky and Sharon K. Weiner 'War without Killing' pp. 1-5 in Breakthroughs Winter 1992/93 Vol. II No. 2p. 1
[123] Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations New York: Basic Books 1977 p. 136

own losses in combat'.[124] This 'post-heroic'[125] warfare is concerned with the projection of power together with the protection of western life, where the success of the former is inextricably linked with that of the latter.

What follows is a brief introduction to Martin Shaw and his place in this chapter. Martin Shaw is concerned to expose the concealment which is being enacted under the guise of what he diagnoses as a 'new western way' of warfare. This way of war purports to be an improvement in humane terms on what went before, but Shaw suggests that this is only (and even then imperfectly) the case with respect to Western soldiers: war is as hellish as ever for enemy soldiers and non-combatants. In other words, he is concerned to trace asymmetries of importance with respect to Western soldiers and civilian non-combatants who are caught up in war. The de-prioritisation of the latter represents a violation of Just War principles and an object lesson in why 'humanitarian war' can never be. Shaw speaks of 'massacres' and 'blood baths',[126] and, discussing the wars of the Former Yugoslavia, the 'perception that all the individual lives mattered'.[127] However, the body is only a shadowy outline in his analysis: more important is the norm of the value of human rights. His concern is ultimately to condemn the West on the grounds of hypocrisy, in the sense that if we *say* that we think that all individual human lives are valuable, then we must act in such a way so as to support this claim, rather than behaving hypocritically. Below I outline Shaw's arguments in more detail, before outlining why I think that his approach does not go far enough in [re-]situating the body as a prism through which to view war.[128]

Shaw's starts from the position that was outlined above with respect to strategic and technological views of war: that 'modern strategic thought is based on the belief that armed force can be an effective instrument of political policy'.[129] In his account, this position has been challenged in recent history in two ways. The first relates to nuclear weapons: the prospect of almost instant total devastation that mutually assured

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[124] Herfried Münkler 'The Wars of the 21st Century' pp. 7-22 in International Review of the Red Cross March 2003 Vol. 85, No. 849 p. 10
[125] See Edward N. Luttwak 'Toward a Post-Heroic Warfare'; Edward N. Luttwak 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy'
[126] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War p. 111
[127] Ibid. p. 138
[128] It is important to note that this is not a project that Shaw claims to undertake, therefore his shortcomings from the point of view of this thesis should not be understood as a general degradation of his status as a critic of war.
[129] Martin Shaw Dialectics of War: An Essay in the Social History of Total War and Peace London: Pluto Press 1988 p. 3

destruction seemed to threaten strained the credibility of the idea of war as useful. For the consequences of nuclear war would so surpass any possible political ends, resulting (most likely) in the destruction of the decision-making polity/institution itself, that it is difficult to see what possible 'use' could be maintained. In his view, therefore, with nuclear war, 'war...negates itself. If there are no longer any internal constraints, and war becomes absolute destruction, it becomes invalid as a means of policy'.[130] The second challenge originated with Vietnam and concerned the political unacceptability of American losses of life. 'Vietnam was a watershed in the history of Western warfare, a moment when publics stood back from the kind of war that they had tolerated, and elites realized that war could not go on in the same way'.[131] Vietnam signified that 'limited war' was as untenable as 'total war'. The apparent futility of American deaths incurred the wrath of the American public, and the wrath of the American public indicated to political leaders that military activities should be carefully managed so as not to threaten the stability or popularity of western governments. After Vietnam, Shaw suggests that the west has aspired to organise itself so that it can 'fight wars at little *human* cost to itself. And since the risk of human lives, pictured on television, has been since Vietnam the major political risk of war, this also means that the West is able to fight wars with a great reduction to the *political* costs'.[132] In other words, Vietnam taught the west that, if war is to be conceivable as a political asset, it has to be seen to minimise losses to western lives. Otherwise, it is a political liability.

The imperfect solution to these crises in the legitimacy of war comes in the form of what Shaw terms the 'new western way' of war: a way of war being a 'general pattern in the actual practice of warfighting'.[133] In short, the western way of war is constituted by the protection of the lives of western soldiers as a primary interest, the protection of civilian non-combatants as a secondary interest, and the management of the global media such that events are not permitted to become politically damaging to those in the west who decided on war.[134] In practice, what this means is that western soldiers are protected *at the expense of* civilian non-combatants, in direct contravention of the

[130] Ibid. p. 17
[131] Ibid. p. 6
[132] Martin Shaw 'Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres, and the Historic Legitimacy of War' pp. 343-359 in International Relations 2002 Vol. 16, No. 3 p. 348 (italics in original)
[133] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War p. 29
[134] See Ibid. pp. 71-95 for a more detailed, and nuanced, exposition of this.

demands of 'Just War'.[135] This is because western soldiers are protected by high-technology and the reliance on air power which transfers some of the risk of death to enemy soldiers and civilian non-combatants: Shaw calls this 'risk transfer war'. When civilians are killed in air strikes it is presented as being a regrettable accident. But this is not sufficient, says Shaw. The fact that these deaths were not intended does not relieve western militaries of the obligation to take active steps to reduce the likelihood of civilian deaths, and these steps must be taken even if at the expense of soldiers' lives.[136] Ultimately, this demand is unrealistic. Western soldiers must be protected because the west itself is informed by 'tight norms against killing [which] are being extended into the realm of legitimate organized killing itself'.[137] But in order to adhere to the norm against killing in a non-hypocritical way, it is necessary to follow it to its conclusion, 'to accept the full logic of the value that Western society places on human life, and to seek alternatives to war'.[138] For Shaw, war does not work as an instrument of policy, and to try to make it viable as such is to miss the point; we actually need to reject war altogether.

Shaw's opposition to the techno-strategic vision of war is clear. What sustains it is the West's self-affirmed commitment to human life, which means that it struggles to come up with a positive justification for war and can only sustain it on the grounds that deaths do not occur: an obvious impossibility. But for a variety of reasons, I suggest that Shaw misses the mark when it comes to thinking differently about the body and war. These objections are alluded to here, but are developed more thoroughly throughout the thesis. As I suggested above, Shaw is less interested in the body than in ideas about the value of human life. What he is concerned with is catching Western governments on a lie, failing to practice what they preach in terms of human rights and civilian protection, and ultimately in demonstrating the necessary bankruptcy of all wars when held against these criteria. Because human rights are universal, Shaw rejects the prioritisation of some lives over others, and to this end uses body counts as an equalising tool, which makes all deaths appear to have the same value: '[b]ody-counting is *an intervention in the risk-economy of war*, to make the risk-experience of civilians... as 'valuable' as the exposure of Western soldiers, and to make it significant for politicians, so that they

[135] Ibid pp. 133-135
[136] Ibid. p 135
[137] Ibid. p. 137
[138] Ibid. p. 141

won't risk more wars of this kind'.[139] It might seem that the body is centrally present as a mobilising factor in this critique of war, but actually it is possible to suggest that the body is not contributing anything to the way in which 'war' is understood or imagined. The 'war' with which Shaw is concerned is largely identical to the war outlined by the techno-strategists he so reviles,[140] insofar as that it is an instrument of policy which can be apprehended as a coherent entity. Holding war up against the values the West purports to hold dear, he reveals that it cannot be an instrument of policy because polities do not accept death, and that in any case we are conspicuously failing to win in Iraq.[141] What have changed are the parameters of the acceptable with respect to war, but Shaw does not go much beyond a strictly rationalist account of what war might be 'for'. Nor does he use the 'rediscovered' body to look at war from a different perspective: it remains the instrument of policy, albeit under changed circumstances.

The points under discussion here do not really constitute a criticism of Shaw, because what he aspires to is a critique of the idea of war as an instrument of policy. His arguments are therefore made with techno-strategists in mind, and he is not interested in producing a rereading of war, but only in hastening its obsolescence. The point of this discussion, however, is to indicate that the appropriate response to the claim that bodies have been excluded from consideration in talking about war is not merely to reintroduce them. On its own, this does not change our perspective on war, and leaves untouched the notion that 'the body' stands for an object of political will, or strategy's plaything. The terms which have been current in this chapter: war, politics, strategy, body; may be shuffled and brought into contact with each other without necessarily changing the way that each term is understood. From this point of view, arguing as Shaw does for the obsolescence of war from the point of view of human rights may be said to reproduce the Archimedean arrogance which characterises the strategic and technical visions. Standing outside the mêlée of war, Shaw concurs with the strategic assumption that one *decides* for war, or not, on the basis of certain ostensibly 'rational' criteria. Of course, Iraqi civilians presumably did not decide for the war, so this idea of 'war as decision' is a profoundly asymmetric one. The decisions are all on the side of the West, creating the impression that Iraqi civilians engage with war on a bodily level (or it engages with them) but 'we' in the West make 'rational' decisions about their bodies, and the bodies

[139] Ibid. p. 119
[140] See Martin Shaw 'Strategy and Slaughter'
[141] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War p. 123

of our soldiers. The point is that bodies are still being presented as being the passive objects for political decision. Shaw is unconvinced by numbers as a way of expressing dead or injured bodies,[142] but actually I would suggest that counting bodies is in perfect conformity with the strategic notion, which he does nothing to dispel, that the body is the passive object of political calculation.

Conclusion: Writing/Rewriting War, Bodies, Politics.

I have tried to show that strategy entails a 'technological writing' about war which is committed to defending and enhancing the utility of war. This way of writing is shared by many forms of writing about war and technology, whether or not they share the same presuppositions about the unchanging nature of war. In other words, what are significant for my purposes are not so much the arguments being made, but the terms in which they are made. I have suggested that the way of writing which characterises much strategic and technological thinking tends to exclude the body. In the case of strategy, the body is either absent altogether, or it is present in a simplified form, such that it is only a device through which the strategic design is executed. In some cases, it may be present as a negative term, as a source of confusion or error. This vision of the body is tacitly shared by the pragmatics and poetics of technologists who describe an ever greater role for technology in warfare as it increasingly takes over functions from the human body and thereby seems to facilitate a realisation of the strategic desire to make war ever more effective as an instrument of policy. In some cases, techno-optimists go much further than strategists would be comfortable with in projecting a utopian future of perfect utility for war. Nonetheless, the core contention is that 'technology has steadily increased our ability to generate force from passion by overcoming the performance limits associated with the human body'.[143]

Focusing on Martin Shaw, I tried to suggest that those who are opposed to the idea that war is an acceptable instrument of policy may reproduce some of the same exclusionary or marginalising moves with respect to the body. Emphasising that death in war is incompatible with the West's commitment to human rights, Shaw says that '[w]e have a choice: we can continue with war as a means, progressively abandoning the pretence that we are using armed force in new ways… Or we can follow the logic of our

[142] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War p. 119
[143] J. Stone 'Technology and War' p. 35

commitments to global institutions, democracy and human rights, and renew our determination to avoid war'.[144] But in focusing on the *decision* for war, Shaw is uninterested in significantly altering the way that war is understood. Indeed, I have tried to suggest that he reproduces many strategic assumptions about war in order to demonstrate that they are not appropriate to the ethico-political climate of the twenty-first century West. I have tried to show that technological writing about war makes implicit claims to a particular kind of knowledge within which certain decisions and judgements are possible. What is elided to a greater or lesser extent in this way of writing is the work necessary to construct the terrain upon which these judgements are made. That is to say, a number of decisions are involved in constructing 'war' as the type of event about which systematic and general knowledge can be held, but these decisions are frequently concealed in the application of the knowledge.

Although Shaw is concerned to refute the instrumental logic of strategic thinking, and to expose the extent to which it is inimical to the principle of human rights, I have suggested that he shares in common with strategic thinking the tendency to present war as something about which one can have general knowledge, in which the body is subordinated to thought and is presented as being its object. I want to suggest that this subordination or evacuation of the body is a condition of possibility for the possession of a general knowledge about war which can assume a constant viewpoint unchanged by interacting with it. In my concluding remarks I would like to suggest some possibilities for writing about war which do not present the body as being a hindrance to understanding. Indeed, it is possible to suggest from certain perspectives that the body is the only route through which it might be possible to make sense of war. Via a brief discussion of ways of thinking and writing war which take the body seriously, it should be possible to indicate how the body can be replaced at the centre of the analysis as a productive way of making sense of war, and therefore to prepare the ground for thinking about the body as a dynamic and creative agent in war.

In the context of the challenge to writing presented by his experience in Vietnam, Tim O'Brien suggests that '[a] true war story is never moral. It does not instruct, nor encourage virtue, nor suggest models of proper human behaviour, nor restrain men from doing the things they have always done... As a first rule of thumb... you can tell a true

[144] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War p. 3

war story by its absolute and uncompromising allegiance to obscenity and evil'.[145] He is sceptical of 'war stories' which have coherent morals, or which seem to 'make sense' in the context of the expectations of the reader. According to O'Brien, one cannot extract 'lessons' from a true war story, at least not as conventionally understood: 'In a true war story, if there's a moral at all, it's like the thread that makes the cloth. You can't tease it out. You can't extract the meaning without unravelling the deeper meaning... True war stories do not generalize. They do not indulge in abstraction or analysis... It comes down to gut instinct. A true war story, if truly told, makes the stomach believe'.[146] The hallmark of 'truth' for a war story is not so much the question of whether the details of the story line up against some external 'facts'. The test of veracity lies in the stomach of the listener/reader. If a war story tells us anything about war 'in general', it tells of the impossibility of apprehending 'war' as such, because the distinction between observer and surroundings degrades so that there is no stable point from which the war can be surveyed. War is always altering the subject who surveys it. 'In any war story, but especially a true one, it's difficult to separate what happened from what seemed to happen. What seems to happen becomes its own happening and has to be told that way. The angles of vision are skewed'.[147]

It is possible to suggest that writing about war in a way which focuses upon its instrumental use—'technological writing'—has a disciplinary function on what we envisage by 'the body', and what powers and potentialities we ascribe to it. It assumes a great deal of knowledge about the body which legitimises the move by which the body is used and/or excluded. From an instrumental point of view, the body is only the agent of external will. In this sense it is of limited potential and interest because it is not the originator of its own activity. Instrumental writing often displays a reluctant awareness of the possibility that this image is not stable; that bodies of soldiers always have the potential to behave unpredictably through fear or exhilaration. Nonetheless, I have tried to show that technological writing is characterised by a tacit unwillingness to grant to the body any dynamic creative potential of its own: any potential assigned is on the side of negative 'friction'. However, what O'Brien calls for is a different way of writing about war, in which stomachs can believe and bodies can drift and hallucinate and

[145] Tim O'Brien 'How to Tell a True War Story' at http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/pdocs/obrien_story.pdf Accessed 08/10/08 p. 1
[146] Ibid. p. 6
[147] Ibid. p. 2

deceive, and things are un-tethered from the illusory powers of identity and reason. In other words, the regulatory vision of what a body is and what it is capable of is unsettled by writing about war which seeks to emphasise not conformity to the norm but deviation from it. Ultimately in O'Brien's writing, stable categories of identity, place and time are degraded by the hallucinatory effects of the war environment. Visiting Vietnam years after the wars end, O'Brien finds himself 'back in history, snagged in brothers and bones'.[148] Back in the States, he reflects that '[y]ou don't have to be in Nam to be in Nam'.[149] There is no stable position from which to view the war, because there are no clear boundaries between past present and future, here and there, even between the body and the world. Making sense of the war can then only take place through an endless bodily process, expedited by sleeping pills and cigarettes.[150]

De-centring ideas of what the body *should* be opens up a conceptual space for unpredictable responses to be recorded. War has the capacity to unsettle established ideas about how one should behave, and what one is capable of doing and enduring. This creates the possibility for thinking about the body in a way which is attentive to the possibilities of its responses and capabilities, and does not have a predetermined idea of what a body is and what its attributes are. In discussing the lived experience of the fire-bombing of Germany, Jörg Friedrich indicates that reactions could appear perverse in the context of mass death and suffering: '[a]fter the raid [in Aachen] everyone talked about it... "The whole thing was like being inebriated"',[151] just as during the plague in 1374 they had 'danced unceasingly, with passion and rapture'.[152] Joy in the context of horror, and also composure in the face of terror. Friedrich adumbrates the way in which survivors were somehow 'outside themselves': 'I do what needed to be done, outside my self. The sensory skin, however, was numbed'.[153] He asks '[w]ho did experience the air war?'[154] He suggested that, as a coping mechanism in the face of horror and relentless stress, survivors 'shut down' with the 'senses blacked out'[155]: 'emotional paralysis warded off the air war'.[156] Enduring such unimaginable trauma, it might be thought that mental collapse would be inevitable, but Friedrich suggests that this was

[148] Tim O'Brien 'The Vietnam in Me' p. 12
[149] Ibid. p. 12
[150] Ibid p. 2; p. 4; p. 9
[151] Jörg Friedrich The Fire p. 438
[152] Ibid. 438
[153] Ibid. p. 446
[154] Ibid. p. 447
[155] Ibid. p. 446
[156] Ibid. p. 448

not the case.[157] Responses to war may illuminate the potentialities of the human body and the multiplicity of ways in which it can be experienced, if not constrained by a predetermined orthodoxy concerning the possible parameters of the body.

Strategy may be understood as a framework for making sense of war. In this case, sense-making takes the form of 'use-making', as strategy aspires to embody general truths about war, so that the 'war' understood by it tends to be instrumental and general. I have suggested that the way in which strategy makes sense of war takes place at the expense of the body, which is sidelined or simplified as an undesirable complicating factor which is in any case inessential to a functional understanding. However, it is possible to suggest that the body may in fact be central to the work of making sense of war. John Limon argues that '[w]e should not imagine war to be the frustration or the demise of communication, or the consequence of failed communication: it communicates'.[158] But it does not communicate in a vacuum: it is not 'war' as such which communicates. Rather, that which is communicated by war is embodied and enacted by those present; *performed.* 'We make war in much the same way that we make policy, make cities, make works of art, make love, and make believe'.[159] When thinking about making sense of war, it is necessary to attend to the meanings of both *making* and *sense*.

Tim O'Brien asks:

> 'How do you generalize?
>
> War is hell, but that's not the half of it, because war is also mystery and terror and adventure and courage and discovery and holiness and pity and despair and longing and love. War is nasty; war is fun. War is thrilling; war is drudgery. War makes you a man; war makes you dead'.[160]

In his account, war has multiple meanings for participants at different moments, and is also somehow constituted by contradiction: for example, it is when you are closest to

[157] Ibid. p. 445
[158] John Limon Writing After War: American War Fiction from Realism to Postmodernism Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994 p. 13
[159] Milton J. Bates The Wars We Took to Vietnam: Cultural Conflict and Storytelling London: University of California Press 1996 p. 1
[160] Tim O'Brien 'How to Tell a True War Story' p. 7

death that you feel most alive.[161] If war, in all its contradictory confusion, is constituted by the fabric of the experience of those living through it, then this suggests that only those who 'were there' are authorised to speak about war. Milton J. Bates imagines an 'authority pyramid' which determines who is entitled to speak about the Vietnam War. Asserting their managerial knowledge, 'those who managed the war, and who were as a rule physically remote from it proceeded on the assumption that their knowledge was the most complete'.[162] Or, there were those who make the converse claim: that only those 'on the ground' could really speak with authority on the texture of life in Vietnam: that '[t]he man who has not understood with his flesh cannot talk to you about it'.[163] Ultimately, one could argue that 'only the dead can tell complete war stories from firsthand experience'.[164]

This is problematic, because of the multiple perspectives on war which cannot be trumped by any single one. There is no single truth on what the sense of a war was: all wars are 'not one war but many'.[165] But more significantly, the multiple perspectives on war are themselves multiple, in the sense that every position on war is fluid, evolutionary and unstable. For example, O'Brien says that '[w]hen a booby trap explodes, you close your eyes and duck and float outside yourself… The pictures get jumbled; you tend to miss a lot… there is always that surreal seemingness'.[166] Presence does not guarantee anything, due to the seemingly infinite number of ways in which bodies can respond to and make sense of the numberless events which go to make up the experience called 'war'. So what then is 'the truth'? Even the dead cannot embody the sense of war, since a dead body no more has stable meaning than a living one. It is possible to suggest, then, that *the process of making sense of war is the sense of war.* In *The Things They Carried*, O'Brien's soldiers carry stories linking 'the past to the future'[167] stories that can 'make the dead talk',[168] stories that 'never seem… to end'.[169] And this never-ending quality is arguably characteristic of the work of making sense of war. Limon says that 'I have denied that war is beautiful, which is primarily to deny…

[161] Ibid. p. 8
[162] Milton J. Bates The Wars We Took to Vietnam p. 219
[163] Samuel Hynes The Soldier's Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War London: Pimlico 1998 p. 27
[164] Milton J. Bates The Wars We Took to Vietnam p. 217
[165] Ibid. p. 5
[166] Tim O'Brien 'How to Tell a True War Story' pp. 1-2
[167] Tim O'Brien The Things They Carried: A Work of Fiction London: Flamingo 1991 p. 40
[168] Ibid. p. 261
[169] Ibid. p. 83

that it is beautifully *resolved*'.[170] Writing the sense of war as stable and finalised is misleading, I suggest, because the sense of war is always embodied and contested. The body is not a stable referent to which the meaning or sense of war can be tethered. Rather, the body is the site of a painful political [re-]enactment of war which is itself the sense of war.

Philip Beidler suggests that the best writing about Vietnam has 'a commitment on one hand to an unstinting concreteness—a feel for the way that experience actually seizes upon us... and on the other [hand] a distinct awareness of engagement as a primary process in sense-making'.[171] The caesura between sensation and sense can never be *resolved* but must always be somehow embodied, even if that which is being embodied makes only partial sense, or no sense at all. The point is that making sense of sensation is the only way in which sense can be made of war, and the fact that this process must always wrestle with contradiction and the impossibility of completion does not mean that one can bypass the body, because the body is the route through which sense is made. Technological writing about war seeks somehow to establish the sense of war in order to safeguard its utility. Strategy presupposes that 'lessons' can be extracted from history, and operationalisable morals can he drawn from experience. Writing from a pacifist position, Martin Shaw also contends that the meaning/sense of war is clear and unambiguously comprehensible within a moral framework which demands its obsolescence. I have suggested that this way of writing about war excludes the body, possibly of necessity, because the body brings with it an unwelcome ambiguity and unpredictability. Taking the body seriously, however, I suggest that the sense of war may be envisaged as being embodied in this ambiguity and enacted through the visceral responses to war, and the unending process of coming to terms. Rather than being a hindrance to apprehending the sense of war, the body is possibly better understood as the medium through which sense is made.

[170] John Limon Writing After War p. 227(italics in original)
[171] Philip D. Beidler American Literature and the Experience of Vietnam Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press 1982 p. xiii

Chapter 2

The Political Economy of Death: Counting Bodies at War

'if it isn't human, it doesn't matter much if it's dead'[1]

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the ways in which the body is implicated in understandings of war through the device of body counts. This investigation begins from the premise that body counts, as a way of thinking the body at war, posit 'the body' as being a stable object which can then be counted. Even where the body counts themselves are contested on the grounds of accuracy or appropriateness, I suggest that it tends to be the case that the body itself is understood to be a self-evident referent. The way of counting may be problematic, but what is counted is not. Contrary to this interpretation of the body in war, I aim to demonstrate that the body is always the consequence of a work of creativity. To this end, I examine the broader relationships between the body and the politics of the state in order to try to show the mutability and contestability of what we call 'the body'. My purpose is to address the politics of the body in order to try to show that the body cannot be satisfactorily thought of purely as an *object* for knowledge, but rather that it is important to take account of the politics of the emergence of the body *as* a body, a process which is dynamic and contested even where the body in question is dead. Rather than accept the notion that taking account of the body at war is a pragmatic or scientific exercise such as could be encapsulated by counting, or other ways of accumulating knowledge about the body at war, I want to resituate the politics at the heart of understandings of the body.

The body at war is subject to continuous change, both in life and in death, as a consequence of the extreme hostility of the environment to which it is exposed. In the case of the efforts to recover bodies from Vietnam, Thomas Hawley points out that '[a]fter the crash of a fighter jet at five hundred miles per hour followed by thirty years during which the remains are lying in tropical acidic soil, there is simply not much of the body to bring back, for identification purposes or for anything else. Quite often, all that remains of the body fits in an envelope or perhaps a shoe box'.[2] Even where less time has elapsed, the violence to which the body is subject may make it unrecognisable

[1] Tim O'Brien The Things They Carried: A Work of Fiction London: Flamingo 1991 p. 231
[2] Thomas Hawley The Remains of War: Bodies, Politics, and the Search for American Soldiers Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2005 p. 82

and unfamiliar as something which was formerly a living human being. More than this, however, I try to suggest that, whatever condition it is in, the body is always subject to a complicated matrix of determination whether it can count as a valuable human body, and that, in this sense, the body cannot be anything other than political and imaginary.

The chapter begins with a brief history of body counts from Vietnam to the Iraq War. I suggest that body counts were central to military strategy in Vietnam, but that the failures of that conflict, and the complexities of body counting as a component of it, resulted in reluctance on the part of the US military to count the bodies of enemy dead. In this sense, '[s]hedding the Vietnam syndrome has always meant achieving a double power: the ability to win an absolute and "clean" military victory by full use of American technological superiority, and the ability to win an absolute and "clean" moral victory by full use of the Pentagon's virtually absolute control over martial necrology'.[3] Therefore, in the 'virtual' Gulf War and in Afghanistan and Iraq, body counts of enemy soldiers have not been systematically used by the US military (although they have been reintroduced on the operational level[4]). However, body counts have been a part of the discourse concerning the legitimacy of the war itself. Therefore, body counts may provide strategists with an insight into the progress of the war, but they may simultaneously undermine the legitimacy of the war when used as evidence of the moral bankruptcy of the prosecuting nation, as with Iraq.

However, the problems with body counts are not merely about agreeing numbers, which is in any case by no means unproblematic. I suggest that those critical of particular wars, or of wars in general, find body counts defective as a way of taking account of the war dead, because they are too heartlessly mathematical, too abstract and too 'immaterial' to really give a sense of the impact of the loss behind the numbers. Margot Norris situates this problem in the context of a general crisis of representation produced by the barbarism of the twentieth century and the awesome destructive power that modern weapons systems now have. The dead of the many wars of the twentieth century 'resist meaningful figuration or representation',[5] she says. Norris acknowledges

[3] Margot Norris 'Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War' pp. 233- 245 in Cultural Critique 1991 No. 19 p. 237
[4]Ian Fischer 'Attacks on Basra Extend Violence to a Calm Region' 21 April 2004 in New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/21/international/middleeast/21CND-IRAQ.html?8bl Accessed 04/08/09
[5] Margot Norris Writing War in the Twentieth Century Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia 2000 p. 3

an important debt to Elaine Scarry,[6] and through Scarry I outline the ways in which the body may be presented as being 'the truth' of war. My motivation is to show that what is being elided in this discussion concerning the difficulty of representing the body at war is the question of what 'the body' *is,* and what is perceived to be at stake in this struggle to expose it as operating at the centre of war. For Scarry, the body is in some sense the origin of certainty and reality, and these properties are exploited by political agents who desire those properties for themselves.

Contrary to this position, I try to show that it is not coherent to talk about the dead body 'outside politics', because it is always being politically constructed and contested, and it is this which determines what is thought of as a dead (human) body. In other words, I try to suggest that the dead body is not the foundation for the significance of war, but is itself the outcome or expression of a political process which determines what is considered 'a dead body' and what is not. Through a discussion of the taking of bodily souvenirs from Japanese soldiers in the Pacific War, I seek to demonstrate that material artefacts of dead bodies are not sufficient to determine their inclusion in the world of persons, now deceased. Ernst Jünger reports from the Western Front of the First World War that 'we were so accustomed to the horrible that if we came on a dead body anywhere on a fire step or in a ditch we gave it no more than a passing thought and recognized it as we would a stone or tree'.[7] The material dead body does not determine our reaction to it in the absence of the political context which permits it to be seen as a dead human body rather than as an object analogous to a stone or tree.

It is in the context of this claim that I discuss the state's relationship to the war dead, which may be iterated through memorialisation; or, in the case of the US in Vietnam, a decades-long search for all remains, irrespective of the likelihood of finding them.[8] The contestations inherent in this relationship relate to the authority to speak for, and account for the dead, but also to the willingness (or otherwise) to be transformed by death. In a sense, the dead body is always a fabrication, but the event of death is something that one can be transformed by, or not. This is developed through a discussion of Judith Butler's work on mourning, a discussion which allows me to argue

[6] Ibid. p. 15
[7] In Samuel Hynes The Soldier's Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War London: Pimlico 1998 pp. 68-69
[8] See Thomas Hawley The Remains of War; Thomas Hawley 'The Ethics of Accounting: The Search for American Soldiers Missing in Vietnam' pp. 271-295 in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 2002 Vol. 31, No. 2

that body counts are problematic not because they fail to adequately represent the materiality of the dead body, but rather because they cannot interrogate the conditions of their own possibility. In other words, I suggest that the possibility of counting is predicated on a set of prior judgements about what counts as a body, and what kinds of bodies are worth counting in different categories. Insisting that the body is not an unproblematic entity and that bodies are always brought into being as bodies of certain kinds as they are being counted potentially creates the opportunity for thinking the body at war in a non-technological way.

Body counts in Vietnam, the Gulf, and Iraq.

Tim O'Brien wrote of Vietnam that '[i]f land is not won and if hearts are at best left indifferent... the only obvious criterion of military success is body count'.[9] Scott Sigmund Gartner and Marissa Edson Myers argue that the US emphasis on number of enemy dead as a signifier of military success originated in Korea in the winter of 1951, when there was 'a shift in performance indicator from terrain to number of enemy dead',[10] and that this was carried over to Vietnam, as both were 'non-linear' and non-territorial wars.[11] That is: '[i]n both Korea and Vietnam... there was no territorial objective [for the United States] other than to defend the status quo ante; thus it was not possible to demonstrate or assess progress in terms of territory gained and held'.[12] Enemy bodies were considered to be the most valuable materiel of war and were therefore the main element of success on the part of the US, particularly when 'success' seemed to be stubbornly elusive. The Vietcong have subsequently been regarded as highly atypical with respect to the extent to which they were prepared to tolerate extremely high losses without capitulating.[13]

Making body counts a decisive measure of success in the war in Vietnam proved problematic, however, not least because of confusion and obfuscation about which bodies counted. Bruce Palmer suggests that one element of the problem lay in the differing values ascribed to life, so that 'one must be careful not to judge... [casualties']

[9] Tim O'Brien If I Die In A Combat Zone London: Harper Perennial 2006 p. 130
[10] Scott Sigmund Gartner and Marissa Edson Myers 'Body Counts and "Success" in the Vietnam and Korean Wars' pp. 377-395 in Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1995 Vol. 25, No. 3 p. 378
[11] Ibid. p. 378
[12] General Bruce Palmer, Jr. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky 1984 p. 164
[13] See John Mueller 'The Search for the "Breaking Point" in Vietnam: The Statistics of a Deadly Quarrel' pp. 497-519 International Studies Quarterly, 1980 Vol. 24 No. 4

psychological effect on the enemy on the basis of occidental values... [it is important to be mindful of] differing oriental values with respect to human life'.[14] Moreover, he points out that, in an unorthodox field of battle such as Vietnam, it was unclear '[w]hich categories [of dead] had sufficient military capability to be counted as enemy soldiers?'[15] Philip Caputo said that '[i]f its dead and Vietnamese, its VC, was the rule of thumb in the bush'.[16] And the decision to place preeminent importance on body counts inevitably conduced to exaggeration and incautious risk-taking in the field in an effort to promote the 'successfulness' of operations. Douglas Herring says that '[t]hroughout the chain of command there was heavy pressure to produce favorable figures, and padding occurred at each level until by the time the numbers reached Washington they bore little resemblance to reality'.[17] It is possible to suggest that, at the very least, the use of body counts to measure success was seriously undermined by the experience of Vietnam. For not only did it become apparent that numbers of dead do not, in themselves, mean anything in terms of the fighting capability or resolve of the enemy, but body counts of US dead fatally imperilled the war effort when deployed by anti-war movements.

In the Gulf War, the US military did not count the enemy dead, and it took measures to prevent anyone else doing so. Margot Norris argues that the Pentagon imposed 'pre-censorship' on journalists in the Gulf, so that not only were they not permitted to disclose information to the public, they were not allowed to obtain it in the first place.[18] She suggests that this policy created an 'originary silence'[19] which made it impossible to 'know the dead',[20] and this in her account applies both to Iraqi soldiers and civilians, and to US soldiers, whose injury and death was kept out of the news as far as possible.[21] Combined with the spectacular technological imagery which was the focus of media coverage of the war, the consequence of the refusal to count the dead in the Gulf was the 'confounding [of] the nature of what is "real" in war'[22] resulting in 'a philosophical aporia that obliges the discourse of war to live in a kind of untruth, and to

[14] General Bruce Palmer, Jr. The 25-Year War p. 165
[15] Ibid. p. 79
[16] George C. Herring America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 New York: McGraw Hill 1986 (2nd ed.) p. 153
[17] Ibid. pp. 153-154
[18] Margot Norris 'Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War' p. 224
[19] Ibid. p. 225
[20] Ibid. p. 224
[21] Ibid. p. 230
[22] Ibid. p. 233

conceal or concede the simultaneous necessity of killing and the irrelevancy of the dead'.[23] Baudrillard suggests that the failure to count the dead in the Gulf War, together with the minimal coalition losses, made the war appear as 'the prefiguration of an experimental, blank war, or a war even more inhuman because it is without human losses... [Iraqi dead were] held in utter contempt by their chief without even the collective glory of number (we do not know how many there are)'.[24]

Norris seems to suggest that the refusal to count the dead, or allow them to be counted, brings about an important shift in the ontology of war. Moreover, it is taken to signify a degree of moral irresponsibility on the part of the US, which appears to refuse to take account of the war dead and has lost 'the willingness to reckon the meaning and significance of such vast numbers of the killed in an accounting of the purpose, necessity, effect, and human cost of their violent destruction'.[25] In Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has expressed a reluctance to take responsibility for counting the enemy dead.[26] Carl Conetta suggests that this may be at least in part because the US legitimises its 'high-tech' military on the grounds that it allows the military to avoid 'excess deaths' through the use of precision weapons. He says that '[a]lthough Operation Iraqi Freedom was supposed to exemplify the new warfare, it provides no unambiguous support for the hypothesis regarding civilian casualties'.[27] Contestation over numbers and the 'irresponsibility' of refusing to count also characterised the 2003 Iraq war. Ira Chernus claims that '[i]n Iraq, it is as if the killing never happened. When a human being's death is erased from history, so is their life. Life and death together vanish without a trace'.[28] However, body counts were undertaken in Iraq by a variety of agencies and with controversial results. One such agency was the US military itself, which quickly reintroduced body counts in Iraq on an operational level in the absence of any other clear way of making sense of the conflict.[29] Even so, an expert

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[23] Ibid. p. 235
[24] Jean Baudrillard (trans. and intro. Paul Patton) The Gulf War Did Not Take Place Sydney: Power Publications 2004 p. 73
[25] Margot Norris 'Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War' p. 238
[26] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq Cambridge: Polity Press 2006 p. 115
[27] Carl Conetta 'The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Casualties in the 2003 Conflict' Project on Defense Alternatives at http://www.comw.org/pda/0310rm8.html Accessed 05/03/07
[28] Ira Chernus 'Bring Back the Body Count' Alternet 3 April 2003 at http://www.alternet.org/story/15545/ Accessed 07/03/07
[29] Bradley Graham 'Enemy Body Counts Revived: US is Citing Tolls to Show Success in Iraq' The Washington Post 24 October 2005 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/23/AR2005102301273.html Accessed 05/06/08

commentator reported that '[t]here still are problems in identifying who is who, just as there were in Vietnam'.[30]

Body counts and the mathematics of death were important to the process of establishing and contesting the legitimacy of the war in Iraq from the start. In the face of opposition to the war, Tony Blair said of Stop the War Coalition's 2003 London protest that '[i]f there are 500,000 on that march, that is still less than the number of people whose deaths Saddam has been responsible for. If there are one million that is still less than the number who died in the wars he started'.[31] The Iraq Body Count (IBC) was set up in January 2003 to collate media reports of civilian deaths in Iraq. It does not distinguish between deaths caused by US/occupying forces or by insurgent groups, and because of its dependence on 'confirmed' media reports, insists that the figures it gives are not estimates.[32] At the time of writing, the number of killed is placed between 92,898 and 101,388.[33] In 2005, it was closer to 30,000,[34] and this was the figure quoted by George W. Bush,[35] leading some to criticise the IBC for being too conservative and becoming 'the tool of choice for the Bush Administration and the US corporate media'.[36] In contrast, the Lancet Report measured 'excess mortality' in 2006 and estimated it at 654, 965.[37] Rather than using existing media reports, the Lancet researchers interviewed households in Iraq. They made no attempt to distinguish between 'combatants' and non-combatants',[38] and took 'excess mortality' to mean deaths above the pre-invasion median.

The reluctance to count enemy dead in Iraq was expressed differently in the context of the evolution of the phases of the war. Initially, the campaign was focused on the use of 'shock and awe', entailing 'precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve

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[30] In Ibid. p. 2
[31] In Suman Gupta The Theory and Reality of Democracy: A Case Study in Iraq London: Continuum 2006 p. 180
[32] 'About the Iraq Body Count Project' at http://www.iraqbodycount.org/about/ Accessed 21/10/08
[33] 'Iraq Body Count' http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ Accessed 25/08/09
[34] Dahr Jamail and Jeff Pflueger, 'Learning to Count: The Dead in Iraq' Truthout 13 April 2006 at http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/59/19059/printer Accessed 03/03/07p. 1
[35] Joel Roberts 'Bush: 30,000 Iraqis Killed in War' CBS News 12 December 2005 at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/12/politics/main1117045.shtml Accessed 21/10/08
[36] Dahr Jamail and Jeff Pflueger, 'Learning to Count: The Dead in Iraq' p. 3
[37] Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy and Les Roberts 'Mortality After The 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey' at http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf Accessed 21/10/08 p. 1
[38] Ibid. p.1

maximum leverage' to cause the adversary to panic, surrender, or both.[39] The focus of the military and of media reporting was on high tech weapons systems, and this tended to efface the resultant combatant and civilian deaths in ways analogous to the first Gulf War. Pointing to the 'spectacular' character of the first phase of the war,[40] William Merrin notes, it 'was designed to mobilize the home front. If its explosive power was aimed at the Iraqis, its implosive power was aimed at us to produce identification with the bomb rather than its anonymous victims.'[41] Since the declaration of victory in April 2003, during the counter-insurgency phase, the numbers of civilian deaths have continued to rise.[42] The US expressed regret '"that civilians are hurt or killed while coalition forces search to rid Iraq of terrorism"',[43] and occasionally offered (arguably meagre) financial compensation for these deaths.[44] This notwithstanding, although body counts have occasionally been used on an operational level, numbers of enemy or civilian dead have not been systematically counted in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The deaths of coalition soldiers[45] and civilians killed by insurgents[46] are recorded.

Body counts are of variable utility in ascertaining the success of war. After the 'credibility problems of body counts in the Vietnam War',[47] the US military showed reluctance to release body counts from Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, with General Tommy Franks insisting that 'I don't believe you have heard me or anyone else in our leadership talk about the presence of 1,000 bodies out there, or in fact how many have been recovered. You know we don't do body counts'.[48] It has been suggested that the fact that 'numbers are squishy, and few bodies have been found'[49] impaired the efficacy of Operation Anaconda, and the US should have accepted that 'the only way to

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[39] Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade. Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance National Defense University, 1996 at http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf Accessed 19/08/09 p. 57.
[40] That is to say, the only phase that was actually classified *as* a war.
[41] William Merrin, Baudrillard and the Media: A Critical Introduction Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005 pp. 91-92.
[42] Andrew Mack 'Strategy Maximises Iraqi Civilians Deaths' The Japan Times 14 November 2004 at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/member/member.html?eo20041114a2.htmAccessed 02/09/09 p. 1
[43] Lily Hamourtziadou 'The Price of Loss: How the West Values Civilian Lives in Iraq' at http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/the-price-of-loss p. 1 Accessed 23/09/08
[44] Ibid.
[45] 'US Casualty Statistics' at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf Accessed 21/10/08
[46] Noam Chomsky Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy London: Penguin 2007 p. 52
[47] Edward Epstein 'Success in Afghan War Hard to Gauge' originally published in The San Francisco Chronicle 23 March 2002 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020323-attack01.htm Accessed 03/11/08 p. 1
[48] In Ibid. p. 1
[49] Ibid. p. 2

measure its effectiveness is by tallying the dead, wounded, and captured'.[50] In other words, one reason for counting enemy dead is that it can demonstrate the impact of military operations and provide a way of gauging their efficacy. The problem revealed in Vietnam is that it is not always possible to ascertain whether the dead are combatants or civilians, and therefore counting may not give an accurate indication of the progress of the war, and may provide ammunition to those opposed to the war. However, the military interest in counting bodies relates to the possibility of revealing the changing fortunes of the parties at war. As Martin Shaw says, 'war is fundamentally about killing in order to achieve political goals, and therefore it is very reasonable to want to gauge the extent to which it actually produces death'.[51]

Related to this is the idea of contesting the legitimacy of a particular war, or of war in general. In this sense, body counts may be used as part of the process of challenging the legitimacy of war, and may be concealed by the belligerents due to an awareness of their potentially incendiary function, as in the Gulf War. As mentioned above, body counts were invoked as justification of the Iraq War by Tony Blair, who referred to the possible cost in life of *not* acting, while many have criticised the apparently excessive numbers of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq in consequence of certain military decisions taken by the coalition. For example, Marc Herold asked: '[w]hat causes the documented high level of civilian casualties...3,400 [from October 2001 to March 2002] in the war upon Afghanistan? The explanation is the apparent willingness of military strategists to fire missiles into and drop bombs upon, populated areas of Afghanistan'.[52] The United States, however, tended to argue that when civilian deaths in Afghanistan can be proven, responsibility for them rests with the aggressors who colluded with the attacks of September 11th 2001, for the dead have suffered as a consequence of America's just response.[53] Counting the dead is therefore closely associated with accounting for death; that is, taking (or claiming) responsibility for deaths. This produces the impression that to refuse to count the dead is to display an

[50] John Pike in Edward Epstein 'Success in Afghan War Hard to Gauge' p. 2
[51] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War p. 117
[52] Marc W. Herold 'A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan' at http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm Accessed 09/09/08 p. 1
[53] Nicholas J. Wheeler 'Dying for "Enduring Freedom": Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in the War against Terrorism' pp. 205-225 International Relations 2002 Vol. 16, No. 2 p. 205

unethical indifference towards the event of their dying, and a blindness to one's own responsibility for it.[54]

Capturing Materiality: Problems with Counting

Counting is problematic in part because it seems to resist accuracy: numbers tend always to be 'approximate', 'conservatively estimated', 'close to',[55] they are never precise. But more serious is the suspicion that counting cannot carry the weight of the multiple tragedies that it connotes; that this mathematics of death leads us to the 'dreary business of quantifying and comparing oppressions'[56] and not to an understanding of the magnitude of loss that even a single value—decreasing in significance as the numbers rise—expresses. Günter Grass's *Crabwalk* is a novel about the multifaceted, unending process of 'coming to terms with' aspects of the Second World War. His narrator says of his tally of dead that '[t]he numbers I am about to mention are not accurate. Everything will always be approximate. Besides, numbers don't say much... The ones with lots of zeros can't be grasped. It's in their nature to contradict each other... [there is] the question, to which no answer can be hoped for: What does one life more or less count?'[57] This raises the question of whether numbers are ever adequate to capture the magnitude of loss that multiple deaths signify, or to stand up to the material weight of their destruction. In this section I discuss the putative problems with body counting, and the distinction between the material body and the abstract number that body counts are arguably predicated on. I suggest that the problem with counting may be understood in some sense as a problem of representation, but that this is problematic insofar as that it leaves unexamined the question of what a body is.

Elaine Scarry says that: 'numbers and numerical operations are, presumably with good reason, habitually thought of as abstract, as occupying a space wholly cut off from the world. Even forms of counting that claim to have a worldly content sometimes seem instead characterized by the complete lack of it: the 'body count' in war is a notoriously insubstantial form of speech'.[58] This suggests that numbers are not capable of ever

[54] Dahr Jamail and Jeff Pflueger, 'Learning to Count: The Dead in Iraq'; 'Adding indifference to injury' at http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/indifference-to-injury Accessed 23/09/08
[55] Margot Norris Writing War in the Twentieth Century pp. 2-3
[56] Judith Butler 'Explanation and Exoneration, or What We Can Hear' pp. 1-18 in Judith Butler Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence London: Verso 2004 p. 14
[57] Günter Grass (trans. Krishna Winston) Crabwalk London: Faber and Faber 2004 p. 162
[58] Elaine Scarry 'Introduction' pp. vii-xxvii in Elaine Scarry (ed.) Literature and the Body: Essays on Populations and Persons Johns Hopkins University Press 1990 p. viii

corresponding to the reality of death in war, because they are insubstantial; in other words, they cannot carry or transmit the fact that the body has a real material significance; that it has the force *of* a fact. With respect to the Iraq Body Count's tally of dead in Iraq, Joseph Pugliese suggests that '[a]t this electronic morgue, flesh and blood bodies are decorporealised into so many algorithmic digits. As electronic morgue, this necrological tabulating machine has an infinite capacity to absorb its digitised corpses'.[59] It is possible to suggest in the light of these comments that there seems to be an impulse underlying body counts which is always frustrated, and this is relates to the desire to make numbers correspond to material bodies on the ground, and for the numbers to somehow carry the full weight of these bodies so that rather than converting them into 'insubstantial' numbers, they may be invoked as material things. I suggest that this need to represent the dead relates to the capacity of 'insubstantial' or 'non-material' forms of communication to express the corporeal materiality of the (dead) body, but that focusing on this dilemma obscures the question of what counts as a dead body, and what a dead body 'is'.

The first issue can be framed as a problem of representation, insofar as it relates to the perceived difficulty of capturing and expressing the material weight of the body. Margot Norris has suggested that, in the aftermath of the bloody twentieth century, one might conclude that art is 'incommensurable' to war.[60] This is because 'the scale and intensity of the violence threatened to sever art's expressive connection to war altogether',[61] following Theodor Adorno's suggestion that poetry is impossible after Auschwitz.[62] In other words, Norris questions whether representation is capable of taking account of the destruction wrought by the twentieth century, both in terms of its scale and severity. She suggests that the twentieth century produced a crisis of modernism, whereby modern art was unable to take account of modern war. For her, the words we use or the numbers we cite are insufficient for conveying the reality of the wars of the twentieth century, and 'thinking of modern wars in terms of numbers is a desperate and arguably futile gesture, because their status as dead or injured *bodies* is

[59] Joseph Pugliese 'Asymmetries of Terror: Visual Regimes of Racial Profiling and the Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in the Context of the War in Iraq' Borderlands E-Journal at http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol5no1_2006/pugliese.htm 2006 Vol. 5, No. 1 Accessed 23/09/08 p. 5
[60] Margot Norris Writing War in the Twentieth Century p. 1
[61] Ibid. p. 2
[62] Ibid. p. 2

conceptually unrecoverable or unimaginable in their materiality'.[63] Here, she echoes Scarry's concern that body counts are somehow 'non-material' and inadequate to 'account for' the war dead.

In some senses, Norris suggests that the pursuance of war is predicated upon this disjuncture between representation and the material. For example, she argues that the conduct and perceived legitimacy of war depends upon the invocation of 'nonmaterial issues' such as 'security, sovereignty [and] national identity'.[64] Numbers cannot intervene entirely effectively in this 'de-materialising' road to war, because they themselves are inadequate bearers of materiality. However, to refuse to count is in some senses even more insidious, as with the war in the Persian Gulf in which 'by coupling an instrumental military discourse to the indeterminability and invisibility of the enemy body, the Pentagon had created a sophisticated strategy for derealizing the war'.[65] By allowing itself to be dazzled by this 'derealization', postmodernism's response to this postmodern war has been impoverished and 'uncritical', according to Christopher Norris, who lambasts Baudrillard's conclusion that 'we just cannot know', and that the attempt to distinguish between 'fact' and 'fiction' is predicated upon 'hopelessly outmoded epistemic or ontological distinctions'.[66] The suggestion is that if modernism tried and failed to represent the material aspects of war; or at least to posit their unrepresentable existence; postmodernism has abandoned such efforts at discernment and has sided 'uncritically' with the spectacular images of war.

It is possible to suggest that these discussions imply that the intervention of the body into discourses about war is a potentially effective strategy for disrupting them, if only we could construct an artistic or aesthetic practice which was capable of this. Body counts are used to intervene on either side of the war, to demonstrate its efficacy, or bankruptcy. But on a more fundamental level, Margot Norris suggests that we should be troubled by the shortcomings of body counts themselves in terms of their capacity to effectively signify or 'recover' the dead body. What is at stake here, I contend, is the supposition that this capacity to efface the reality of the dead body is a condition of possibility for non-combatant populations to countenance war. For example, Paul

[63] Ibid. p. 3
[64] Ibid. p. 4
[65] Ibid. p. 11
[66] Christopher Norris Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War London: Lawrence and Wishart 1992 p. 23

Fussell discusses the fury of troops in the Second World War at the 'public innocence about the bizarre damage suffered by the human body in modern war',[67] and Scarry argues that in talking about war, the damaged human body is 'absent from view in the case of omission...actively escorted out in the case of redescription... [or] assign[ed] to an accidental, incidental, or subordinate position'.[68] The implication is that this concealment of the centrality of death in the experience of war is a condition of possibility for war. In other words, war must conceal its own purpose if it is to sustain itself which produces the impression that the dead body is the reality, or the truth, of war, but that the continuation of war is predicated on the concealment of this truth.

The way in which the body can function as the location of truth and certainty may be illuminated through a discussion of Elaine Scarry's work *The Body in Pain*, which may be said to operate from the point of view of a kind of 'materialist bias'.[69] Scarry argues that pain is somehow the foundation for certainty for the person who suffers it. She says that, 'for the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that "having pain" may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to "have certainty", while for the other person it is so elusive that "hearing about pain" may exist as the primary model of what it is "to have a doubt"'.[70] So while pain creates all sorts of problems for representation and *inter*-subjectivity, it acts as ultimate confirmation of subjectivity: *my* pain is confirmation of *me*, and the fact that it is so thoroughly confined within the boundaries of my body is what makes it possible for other people to hurt me without themselves suffering. Scarry is concerned to interrogate the conditions of possibility for the deliberate infliction of hurt on others, together with the political purpose of causing pain. Addressing the former, her contention is that it is the incommunicability of pain, results in it being radically confined within the body of the sufferer, which makes it possible for others to inflict it, and impossible for them to truly comprehend it.

Because of this, the capacity of pain to confer certainty can be deployed politically by detaching it from the suffering human body and attaching it to some other referent. Scarry says that 'the felt characteristics of pain—one of which is its compelling

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[67] Paul Fussell Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989 p. 270
[68] Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985 p. 72
[69] Margot Norris Writing War in the Twentieth Century p.15
[70] Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain p. 4

vibrancy or its *incontestable reality* or simply its "certainty"—can be appropriated away from the body and presented as the attributes of something else'.[71] Because I cannot express my pain, it is vulnerable to being detached from me and attached to some other political purpose which serves to efface the extent to which the pain is being suffered by me. So in war, the 'reality conferring' properties of the body are in play such that 'extreme attributes of the body... [are] translated into another language and forced to disappear... The force of the material world is separated from the fifty-seven thousand or fifty million hurt bodies and conferred not only on issues and ideologies that have... been designated the winner, but also on the idea of winning itself'.[72] The 'reality conferring' properties of the body would seem to become more complicated in terms of the dead body, which does not exist for itself in the way that the body in pain does. This distinction is elided by Scarry, for whom it seems that 'the dead body' and 'the injured body' are in some senses interchangeable: after her discussion of body counts she refers to the 'injuries of both sides'.[73] In her analysis, one of war's two primary functions is 'injuring', so one might suppose that in her schema 'death' is a subcategory of 'injury', which might tend to suggest that the materiality of the body is as significant as its capacity to be a container for pain.[74]

For Scarry, the body provides the foundation for certainty in war. War 'makes sense' thanks to 'the incontestable reality of the body... the legitimacy of the outcome [of a war] outlives the end of the contest because so many of its participants are frozen in a permanent act of participation: that is, the winning issue or ideology achieves for a time the force and status of a material "fact" by the sheer material weight of the multitudes of damaged and opened human bodies'.[75] She suggests that the injured/dead body is somehow emptied of cultural content so that it becomes any-body, rather than being 'North Korean, German, Argentinean, Israeli'.[76] The dead body merely 'is'. However, the properties of 'reality' are detached from the dead body and used to confer reality onto some external political cause: 'the incontestable reality of the physical body... [becomes] an attribute of an issue that at that moment has no independent reality of its

[71] Ibid. p. 13 italics added
[72] Ibid. p. 124
[73] Ibid. p. 117
[74] The link between pain and certainty is grounded in phenomenology, a move which does not make sense in the context of the dead body. Scarry seems to rely on the 'incontestable reality of the physical body' to do this work even where phenomenology can no longer be invoked. See Scarry 124;125
[75] Ibid. p. 62
[76] Ibid. p. 118

own'.[77] Because of the original independence of 'the [dead, injured] body' and 'politics', there are no constraints on the way in which the body is deployed or the cause to which it is subsequently attached. For example, with respect to the American Civil War, Scarry says that while during the war one might say '94,000 died for the cause of the South' or '110,000 died for the ideals of the North', once the war was over, the dead 'collectively substantiate, or are perceived as the cost of, a single outcome'.[78] Scarry suggests that this illustrates the 'fluidity of the injured body's referential direction',[79] that is to say, the fact that the dead body does not have any fixed political meaning, and the work of meaning-making is parasitic on, and theoretically independent of, the dead body itself.

It is possible to suggest therefore, that the issue for Scarry is not only one of representation, in which writing about war sidelines or conceals the damage done to bodies, but also one of theft, whereby war *steals* from the body in order to anchor the reality of its own outcome. For her, the (dead) body is an 'extreme fact',[80] and this facticity can be transferred away from the body onto some external political cause. But the very possibility of this transference hints that the 'incontestable reality' of the dead body is not quite as straightforward as it might first appear, since it seems not to be 'incontestable' but rather precisely the subject of heated deliberation and reclamation. Rather than focus on the idea of 'representation', I suggest that the body itself is contested and political; best understood not as a stable object which we must strive to give expression to, but rather a highly fluid and political entity which cannot be apprehended apart from its expression[s]. While re-inserting the body into the discourse of war may be admirable and necessary on one level, on another it evinces a somewhat conservative vision of the body itself. Depending upon the body to act as a counterweight to the ideological and linguistic fabrications about war may elide the extent to which the body is necessarily characterised by 'ambiguity, multivocality and polysemy'[81] and cannot do the work of making meaning for us: it cannot bypass politics.

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[77] Ibid. pp. 124-125 in italics in original
[78] Ibid. pp. 116-117
[79] Ibid. p. 117
[80] Ibid. p. 63
[81] Katherine Verdery The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change New York: Columbia University Press 1999 p. 28

Reconstructing the Fragmented Body

It is possible to suggest that the concerns of Margot Norris and Elaine Scarry about the fate of the body in modern war and war writing are underpinned by a certain constellation of values and interests, which, while they may not be explicitly drawn attention to, determine what is understood by a body, and what connotations this has for them. It seems legitimate to contend that Scarry, for example, has what we might call a 'humanitarian' interest in calling attention to the violence done to 'the body' and the ways in which this is effaced. It might therefore be possible, if somewhat simplistic, to suggest that Scarry's body is something which is imbued with the spirit of humanity, and attendant principles of consent[82] and value for example; and this is the case even where these principles are violated. I would suggest that these beliefs and political positions construct what is understood by the body—they are part of the fabric of the body—rather than being simply brought to bear on it. 'The body' may not be a stable, determined entity; the 'materiality' of the body does not conduce to certainty and in some cases 'the materiality of the body results in still more uncertainty'.[83] The eternally political character of the dead body, and its inherent mutability, may be productively explored through a discussion of the taking of souvenirs from human remains in the Pacific War, in which the intrusion of 'the body' into the discourses of war revealed a different and highly fungible, evolving set of 'truths'.

The Pacific War was characterised by a higher degree of de-humanisation of the enemy than was seen in the European theatre.[84] Paul Fussell quotes a marine on Guadalcanal as saying that "I wish we were fighting the Germans. They are human beings, like us.... But the Japs are like animals... They take to the jungle as if they had been born there, and like some beasts you never see them until they are dead'.[85] Although they might have been flawed and wicked, the Germans and Italians were distinctively human (especially the latter[86]). However, the Japanese were regarded as being 'animals of an especially dwarfish but vicious species'[87], "Beastial apes", 'wildcats'[88], or

[82] Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain pp. 151-153; Elaine Scarry 'Consent and the Body: Injury, Departure and Desire' pp. 867-896 in New Literary History 1990 Vol. 21, No. 4
[83] Thomas Hawley The Remains of War p. 80
[84] Paul Fussell Wartime pp. 115-129; John Dower War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War New York: Pantheon 1986; John Dower Japan in War and Peace: Essays on History, Culture, and Race London: Harper Collins 1995 p. 258
[85] Paul Fussell Wartime p. 116
[86] Ibid. p. 116
[87] Ibid. p. 120

rattlesnakes.[89] This racism was predicated on suppositions about the distinctness of the Occident and the Orient, and the existential danger presented by an aggressive and acquisitive Oriental power, producing '"the War of Oriental Races against Occidental Races for the Domination of the World"'.[90] Moreover, racist suppositions on each side tended to produce an escalating environment of reciprocal dehumanisation in which atrocities were committed by both the Japanese and the Americans, and in which the brutality of the war challenged the parameters of 'humanity' as such. The degree of racial prejudice on the part of both Japan and America coloured evaluations of strength, assessments of intelligence information and predictions of behaviour and produced a way of war conditioned by 'patterned rhetoric of exterminating beasts, vermin, or demons that unquestionably helped raise the tolerance of slaughter in Asia.[91]

The view of the Japanese as animal influenced attitudes towards the act of killing them, as well as attitudes towards their dead. James Weingartner points out that very low numbers of surrendering Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner of war; most were killed,[92] used as 'amusing rifle targets'.[93] And the killing borrowed heavily from the experience of killing animals, which was arguably itself embedded as a foundational cornerstone of the masculine psyche in American culture.[94] Weingartner suggests that 'combat against Japanese assumed the character of a hunt', and the 'hunting' image was used as recruitment device by the Marines, who offered 'Free Ammunition and Equipment!' with a 'Japanese Hunting License'.[95] Even where hatred and brutality were absent, the mutilated dead evoked the pity due a hunted animal rather than to a human person. E.B. Sledge remembers his first encounter with a dead Japanese soldier, in which he thought '[t]his can't have been a human being... It looked more like the guts of one of the many rabbits or squirrels I had cleaned on hunting trips as a boy'.[96] This impression seemed to sanction behaviour which would be regarded as inappropriate if it had concerned a dead *human* body: Sledge's companion admonishes

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[88] Ibid. p. 120
[89] James J. Weingartner 'Trophies of War: US Troops and the Mutilation of Japanese War Dead 1941-1945' pp. 53-67 in The Pacific Historical Review 1992 Vol. 61, No. 1 p. 56
[90] John Dower Japan in War and Peace p.259
[91] Ibid. p.260
[92] James J. Weingartner 'Trophies of War' p. 55
[93] Paul Fussell Wartime p. 120
[94] Simon Harrison 'Skull Trophies of the Pacific War: Transgressive Objects of Remembrance' pp. 817-836 in the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2006 Vol. 12 No. 4 p. 819; 821
[95] James J. Weingartner 'Trophies of War' p. 55
[96] Eugene B Sledge With The Old Breed At Peleliu and Okinawa New York: Ballantine Books 2007 p. 70

him not to "stand there with your mouth open when there's all these good souvenirs laying around",[97] the souvenirs including spectacles, fillings and items of clothing.

It was not only artefacts found on dead enemy soldiers that were taken as souvenirs; parts of the bodies themselves were taken, especially skulls, ribs and teeth. Although one could argue that 'the mutilation of the dead has been part of military behaviour from the beginning of wars',[98] it is noteworthy that 'the killers felt no sense of ownership of [enemy soldiers'] bodies'[99] in the European theatre. Rather, as Harrison and Weingartner indicate, attitudes towards the body parts of dead Japanese soldiers were conditioned by the evolving political environment in which the construction of the Japanese and their relation to America was mutating. This determined the extent to which the skulls or ribs which soldiers proudly sent home to their relatives and loved ones were seen as tokens of heroism, or were read as being a fragment of a dead human body, disrespectfully removed. In other words, the body part in question might be seen as belonging to one body (that of the acquisitive American soldier, or the triumphant American nation as a whole) or another (that of a fallen soldier who also fought well). To whom the skull belongs or what it signifies is not settled once and for all, and the political negotiation which accompanies it plays a part in determining whether it counts as (standing in for) a human body at all.

Simon Harrison discusses a 76-year old veteran of Guadalcanal who, with others, acquired the head of a Japanese soldier, boiled it, 'breaking the bones behind the eyes to remove the brain',[100] and took it home. As time passed, the skull began to trouble him, and he eventually handed it over to a group of Japanese priests for repatriation and appropriate burial.[101] Hence, what had been a positive or at least neutral object became an 'object...of avoidance',[102] as it became less clear whether trophies 'belonged in the realm of things or persons'[103] and they started to appear as 'a reproachful human presence in the family'.[104] As well as a diachronic variance in the way in which body fragments were regarded, there was synchronic dissonance in terms of whether they were held as being emblems of personhood or trophies of war. In May 1944, *Life*

[97] Ibid. p. 70
[98] Samuel Hynes The Soldier's Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War London: Pimlico 1998 p. 192
[99] Simon Harrison 'Skull Trophies of the Pacific War' p. 826
[100] Ibid. p. 829
[101] Ibid. p. 829
[102] Ibid. p. 828
[103] Ibid. p. 830
[104] Ibid. p. 830

magazine featured as its 'picture of the week' a young woman gazing at a skull on her desk which was said to be a gift from her Navy boyfriend, inscribed 'This is a good Jap—a dead one picked up on the New Guinea beach'.[105] Many readers disapproved, however, with one counselling that we 'imagine that one of the most prominent magazines in Tokyo published the picture of a young Japanese girl in such a pose, gazing at the skull of one of our sons who died for his country—the storm of protest at such savagery would sweep the country'.[106] The materiality of the fragment of the body is insufficient to invoke the whole body, which is instead conjured through an ethico-political work of re-constructing and re-imagining the body as a son, a soldier, a human being, or alternatively as animal, or as not being a body at all.

The Pacific War was by no means the only war in which body parts were taken as souvenirs by Western powers with pretensions towards civility.[107] But rather than to sanction or condemn any particular stance with respect to the dead, the purpose of this discussion has been to demonstrate the multiple networks of political interpretation which are inextricably associated with the meaning of the dead body and which can condition what counts as a dead body. During periods of 'reciprocal dehumanisation' bodies may not be regarded as being 'human bodies' at all, but as relics of heroism, items of property, or souvenirs from a successful hunting expedition. These interpretations can be challenged by appeal to different constellations of understanding into which the body count be inserted, as for example with the reader of *Life* magazine who suggested that the souvenir skull be understood as that of a son who died for his country. Not only is the body incapable of determining which understanding is 'correct', but it cannot be understood apart from these competing interpretations: to say that it is wrong to take souvenirs from battle because it demonstrates a lack of respect for the dead body, or a failure to appreciate its human qualities, is not to express a 'truth' about the body (whatever this might mean), but to put forward a different construction of the body.[108]

[105] James J. Weingartner 'Trophies of War' p. 58
[106] Ibid. p. 58
[107] There is a large amount of material on head-hunting and scalping on the part of tribes in contest with Western colonial powers, much of it possibly apocryphal.
[108] This is not to posit some kind of moral equivalence between all treatments of the dead. It is to argue that the moral status of different attitudes towards the dead cannot be provided by the dead bodies themselves.

The ‘materiality’ of the dead body cannot found the ‘reality’ of the body, because what it expresses is always contested and political. The bone of the Japanese soldier may be the souvenir of war, evidence of the former vigour of a war veteran, or it may gesture to the loss of life of which it is a relic, but it is nothing outside these understandings. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the issue of soldiers ‘missing in action’ (MIA),[109] became highly politicised, raising questions about what material evidence was needed to prove death, and also ‘over what constitutes a body in the first place’.[110] If ‘the intelligibility of the accounted-for body is not discovered but produced’,[111] then the dual questions which arise are: how many fragments does one need to construct a body? Under what political conditions can a fragment stand in for the fictive whole of a lost body? Hawley suggests that in many cases, the materiality of fragmentary remains ‘has long produced still more anxiety and has further complicated the question of what constitutes a body in the context of the accounting effort’.[112] He says that ‘[a]n example comes from the identification in 1993 of the remains of Navy Captain Harley Hall by means of three of his front teeth. Hall’s wife found this insufficient proof of death. As she remarked at the time, “After 20 years of almost unbearable uncertainty, I now face the worst possible scenario: still not knowing”’.[113]

In the context of war, the ‘dead body’ is unlikely to be a coherent entity immediately recognisable as a human body. Katherine Verdery suggests that dead bodies are likely to have political resonance: ‘because all people have bodies, any manipulation of a corpse directly enables one’s identification with it through one’s own body, thereby tapping into one’s reservoirs of feeling’.[114] But the dead body’s resonance as a body is highly politically mediated and constructed so that fragmentary remains may stand in for the fictive missing whole, or they may conspicuously fail to do so. The ‘material’ properties of bodies cannot be considered in isolation from their imbrication in a complex terrain of political meaning-making without which they cannot be considered to be ‘bodies’ at all. It is possible to suggest, therefore, that ‘body counts’ require a prior determination as to which bodies count as bodies, and that it is not possible to invoke the ‘materiality’ of the body without engaging the dense ethico-political material

[109] In 1980, those soldiers who had previously been classified as ‘killed in action/body not recovered’ [KIA/BNR] were reclassified as MIA. See Thomas Hawley The Remains of War p. 80
[110] Ibid. p. 105
[111] Ibid. p. 85
[112] Ibid. p. 106
[113] Ibid. p. 86
[114] Katherine Verdery The Political Lives of Dead Bodies p. 33

which constructs it as such. In this sense, 'what emerges with unrelenting clarity is factuality's status as contingent and ever fugitive, something which makes a consistent and sometimes cruel mockery of the "need to know"'.[115]

The Dead Body and the Body Politic

It is potentially productive to read the process of counting, accounting for, and constructing the dead body within the wider context of state politics. Moira Gatens says that 'the body politic is constituted a creative act, by a work of art or artifice, that uses the human body as its model or metaphor'.[116] In this section I propose to examine the ways in which the dead body of war interacts with the idea of state politics. However, I would adapt Gatens' description of the relationship between the body and the state to allow for the unfinished and undetermined character of the dead body, which, I will suggest, only emerges as such through a political work of creativity. Gatens' description of the body suggests that it has properties of naturalness and coherence which the state aspires to emulate, so that the body is the model and the state the copy. However, as I have tried to show, what 'counts' as a body is itself the consequence of a political work of construction which cannot readily be bypassed by appealing to the biological grounds of bodily integrity. Therefore I would prefer to envisage the relationship between the state and the body as being one of mutual interaction and co-formation. In this section I would like to offer some necessarily tentative and suggestive thoughts on the dynamics of the co-constitutive emergence and identification of the state and the war dead.

Those who are to become the war dead are sent to war at the state's behest, and they do not return alive. It is possible therefore to suggest that one of the dynamics of the interaction between the state and the dead body of the soldier is coming to terms with this absent or missing life. In the case of Vietnam, Hawley suggests that '[o]ne of the most vital links between the individual and the national body in the context of Vietnam War memorials is the sense that the American body politic remains wounded as a result of the fragmentation caused by the war and the absence of certain bodies'.[117] He argues that memorials therefore have significant political work to do in replacing the missing

[115] Thomas Hawley The Remains of War p 40
[116] Moira Gatens 'Corporeal Representation in/and the Body Politic' pp. 79-87 in Rosalyn Diprose and Robyn Ferrell (eds) Cartographies: Poststructuralism and the Mapping of Bodies and Spaces Australia: Allen and Unwin 1991 p. 79
[117] Thomas Hawley The Remains of War p. 30

body and thereby restoring wholeness to the fractured and wounded nation.[118] In a sense, memorials may serve to take the place of the body of the soldier and becomes a permanent and unchanging monument to it, so that the properties of being a body somehow migrate to the monument. Katherine Verdery remarks 'how thin is the line separating bronze from bone',[119] and in a sense a monument may appear more perfect than the fragile finite body which went before'[t]he body shall not be a body but is greatness and strength'.[120] Secondly, the monument signals to the permanent and profound absence of the animate body which went to war, most literally through the construction of a Cenotaph, 'a word that literally designates a tomb containing no body and is thus interestingly a symbol whose primary function is to delineate an empty space'.[121]

Susan-Mary Grant suggests that it is through the dead that the body of the nation comes to life. She says that '[o]ne of the dominant symbols of the modern nation...is the empty tomb, the cenotaph, simultaneously symbolic of loss and acquisition: the loss of human life, the attainment of national life'.[122] Anthony Smith says that '[t]he fraternity of the nation is lived in and through the sacrifice of its citizens in defence of the fatherland or motherland, seen as the unchanging bedrock of the nation, and the sacred soil that nourishes its historic culture'.[123] In a sense the apparently 'unchanging' character of the dead, together with the capacity of their invocation to 'transcend... time, making the past immediately present'[124] may function as a powerful device in the emergence of a chimerical coherence to the nation. But it is possible to suggest that there are reasons to be suspicious of this conservative view that the dead body in war serves to reinforce an existing entity, and to argue that the war dead have a more transformative role than this.

Judith Butler suggests that, in the context of the global war on terrorism, '[l]oss has made a tenuous "we" of us all',[125] and that the process of mourning is transformative.

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[118] Ibid. p. 31
[119] Katherine Verdery The Political Lives of Dead Bodies p. 12
[120] Stefan Goebel 'Re-membered and Re-mobilized: The 'Sleeping Dead' in Interwar Germany and Britain' pp. 487-501 in Journal of Contemporary History 2004 Vol. 39, No. 4 p. 489
[121] M. Brady Bower 'Strategic Re-membering: The Boundary Politics of Mourning in Post Great War France' pp. 21-33 in Rethinking History 1997 Vol. 1 No. 1 p. 23
[122] Susan-Mary Grant 'Raising the Dead: War, Memory and American National Identity' pp. 509-529 in Nations and Nationalism 2005 No. 11 Vol. 4 p. 510
[123] In Ibid. p. 526
[124] Katherine Verdery The Political Lives of Dead Bodies p.27
[125] Judith Butler 'Violence, Mourning, Politics' pp. 9-37 in Studies in Gender and Sexuality 2003 Vol. 4, No. 1 p. 10

She wonders whether 'mourning has to do with agreeing to undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say *submitting* to a transformation)'.[126] Because as we are in some way constituted by our relation with the other, their loss must make us strangers to ourselves as we try to establish who we are without them. 'We're undone by each other',[127] both in our relations, and in our grief when those relations end. To complicate matters further, it is not even clear who or what we have lost, as 'when we lose someone, we do not always know what it is in that person that has been lost. So when one loses, one is also faced with something enigmatic: something hiding in the loss'.[128] One of the transformative elements of loss therefore comes from its capacity to reveal the tenuousness and chimerical character of that which we thought we unquestionably possessed. This indicates an inability to define exactly what was lost, and so what was possessed, and so what we are to lose and possess: loss sets off a chain of doubt. In this context it is possible to suggest that the lost body is always divided, multifaceted and fragmentary.

Butler suggests that 'denial of vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized fantasy of mastery) can fuel the instruments of war'.[129] In this sense, the glorification of the dead through monuments of bronze and stone could be apprehended as being complicit in this denial of vulnerability through the construction of a meta-body which effaces the destruction and decay of the dead and replaces it with a more perfect soldier who is not vulnerable to these indignities. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the state aims at the 'sacralization of memory'[130] and aspires precisely to arrest the transformative potential of loss by concealing the bodily vulnerability which permitted it. The formation of a wider fellowship of "we" who have lost may thus be prevented. However, the scale of the loss may overwhelm these attempts to construct the dead body as invulnerable. In the First World War, '[s]acrifice might have been a euphemism for slaughter but, either way, the significance of victory was overwhelmed by the human cost of achieving it. As if acknowledging that, in this respect, there was little to choose between victory and defeat, between the British and

[126] Ibid. p. 11
[127] Ibid. p.13
[128] Ibid. pp. 11-12
[129] Ibid. p. 18
[130] Karsten Brüggeman and Andres Kasekamp 'The Politics of History and the "War of Monuments" in Estonia' pp. 426-448 in Nationalities Papers 2008 Vol. 36, No. 3 p. 427

German experience of the war, memorial inscriptions were not to 'Our' but to '*The* Glorious Dead''.[131]

Following Butler, it is possible to suggest the nature of the loss that a dead body represents can never be fully known, and therefore, that the 'meaning' of the dead body can never be fully exhausted in any one representation or appropriation. Katherine Verdery suggests that the body is an attractive emblem for political power because it carries 'the illusion of having *only one* significance'[132] as a consequence of its 'concreteness' and 'thereness'.[133] But it is possible to argue that these are precisely *illusions*. Because it is not clear to us what has been lost, it is not possible to embody the loss in one unchanging expression. In this sense, the nationalism which drove the war is threatened by its dead, and the idea of glorifying the war dead, and by extension the war, may itself be undermined by different expressions of the dead body. For example, through the 'revelation of the body's capacity to be wounded, to fail and to rot as a result of combat [which] constitutes a rejection of loftier discourses that seek to sublimate human activity, to elevate it to realms beyond the earthly here and now'.[134]

Accounting for the Dead

What bodies count for, and how they are made to count as bodies, is dependent upon a work of political negotiation and contestation, which fabricates the dead body and imbues it with a certain significance. In other words, it is possible to lay claim to the dead, or to contest the meaning and significance of death. Stefan Goebel suggests that this dynamic operates under the influence of 'the dual force of personal grief and political expediency'.[135] This 'appropriation' of the dead for political ends may be contested by the families of the dead who want their death to be expressed differently, who want to emphasise the personal aspects of the death rather than their significance in terms of sacrifices made to the state. Tombs of Unknown Soldiers may be seen as being 'a means of symbolizing and honoring the sacrifice of one for the good of the

[131] Geoff Dyer The Missing of the Somme London: Phoenix 1994 p. 15
[132] Katherine Verdery The Political Lives of Dead Bodies p. 29
[133] Ibid. p.25
[134] Martin Hurcombe 'Raising the Dead: Visual Representations of the Combatant's Body in Interwar France' pp. 159-174 in Journal of War and Culture Studies 2008 Vol. 1, No. 2 p. 162
[135] Stefan Goebel 'Re-membered and Re-mobilized' p. 487. Goebel argues that memorials are divided (although not cleanly) between mourning the dead, and mobilising the living, and that historiography is likewise split between those to emphasise the work of mourning of memorialisation, and those who view memorialisation from a functionalist perspective as a political commodity like any other.

democratic whole',[136] in the sense that the dead were undifferentiated; categorised only by their sacrifice to the indivisible state. However, in the case of the Tomb of the Vietnam War unknown soldier, in 1998 the decision was taken to exhume the remains interred therein for identification in the context of more advanced forensic technologies, and of mounting political pressure for all the unaccounted for to be accounted for.[137]

In this sense, the body is subject to an evolving framework of counting and accounting for, which changes the idea of the body itself. The anonymising impulse of tombs of unknown soldiers subsume the dead within the overarching discourse of statehood/nationalism, the body stands as a cipher representing sacrifice and service, and could be *any*-body. What is important here are not the singular details of the body, but the fact of having fought and died in the colours of the state. However, from a different perspective, the importance lies precisely in these singular details which are violently effaced through the political appropriation of the body. As in Hawley's account, it may seem that the body cannot be specific, or personal, enough; 'identification' may not be something which is carried out once and for all, but an ongoing process of acceptance that the former life met its end in these remains. However, the intention is not to suggest that what is at stake is a struggle between the state and the family of the dead for the capacity to account for the dead body and the right to speak and act in its name. It is not a question of wresting the memory of the dead from the state.

Jenny Edkins says that '[w]e are not just talking about a struggle for memory between state authorities and the population at large, but something much more complex'.[138] As Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan point out, 'an ongoing process of contestation... is likely to remain one of the permanent features of remembrance. It is not the geographical location or level of economic development which is decisive here, but the nature of that complex and enduring social activity, remembrance'.[139] Some of this contestation may take the form of a suspicion that the state is paying insufficient heed of the personal sacrifices made in the service of state's designated ends. Campaigning for a Royal Mail commemoration of the fallen of Iraq, mother Paulene Ward said that

[136] Thomas Hawley The Remains of War p. 2
[137] Ibid. p. 164
[138] Jenny Edkins Trauma and the Memory of Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003 p. 58
[139] Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan 'Setting the Framework' pp. 6-39 in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds) War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999 p. 39

'[o]ur soldiers never get the recognition they deserve. This is a chance to immortalise them and see them celebrated globally'.[140] The Sun found that two-thirds of the British public think not enough is being done to recognise British soldiers killed in Iraq.[141] In this context, one could argue that the idea that the expressions of the dead are conditioned by a dual force of personal grief and political expediency is misleading insofar as that both of these 'dualities' are themselves multiple and variable: there is no single mode of political appropriation nor of grieving. Nor is it clear that 'grief' is strictly personal, and state level manifestations of it are mere political artifice.

More than this, I would contend that the dead body is not exhausted in any one memorialisation or accounting, nor can it be contained between the dyadic 'personal' and 'political'. Marc Augé challenges the idea that '[e]very body occupies its place' on the grounds that 'this singular and exclusive occupation is more that of a cadaver in its grave than of the nascent or living body. In the order of birth and life the proper place, like absolute individuality, becomes more difficult to define and think about'.[142] However, it is possible to suggest that the dead body is similarly resistant to containment in a final resting place, due to the difficulty in fixing the parameters of the dead body (how many parts make up 'the body'?) and in fashioning a discreet relationship between the living and the dead which is characterised by independence. In addition, what has been lost is subject to ongoing negotiation which refigures the body of the fallen in line with current political needs. Foucault asked 'what mode of investment [in] the body is necessary and adequate for the functioning of a capitalist society like ours?'[143] One might equally ask what kind of war dead the current society needs. I have tried to suggest that the impossibility of fixing and defining the dead body once and for all means that the political engagement with the dead must be ongoing.

M. Brady Bower suggests that the work of memorialisation is in some senses a way of overcoming the trauma that death in war represents, by making the dead comprehensible and even 'familiar', and insisting that by virtue of their sacrifice they

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[140] Gayle Ritchie 'Relatives of Fallen Soldiers Back Campaign for Royal Mail Tribute' The Sunday Mail 13 July 2008 at http://www.sundaymail.co.uk/lifestyle/real-life-stories/2008/07/13/relatives-of-fallen-soldiers-back-campaign-for-royal-mail-tribute-78057-20641360/

[141] Staff Reporter 'Fallen Soldiers "Not Honoured"' The Sun 7 March 2008 at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article888435.ece?print=yes Accessed 21/10/08

[142] Marc Augé (trans John Howe) Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity London: Verso 1995 p. 53

[143] Michel Foucault (ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al.) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 New York: Longman 1980 p. 58

remain an essential part—maybe *the* essential part—of the political community. He quotes Maurice Barrès, who said at the 1919 'Festival of Victory' in France that '[f]rom this triumphal day we take away an idea that is true only if we provide a place for the absent, for all those who have fallen in the last five years. To the visible, join with the invisible and reveal to them your hearts which could never be ungrateful. We salute [our soldiers] without piety, without distinguishing between them, the living and the dead'.[144] The image is one of a community of living and dead, in which the bonds of communion and shared experience are such that death cannot break them, and it is possible to suggest that such an impulse is present through all remembering of the dead. In one sense death may stand as the most dramatic and final loss. In another, the finality of the loss is somehow deferred through the work of memory. One might suggest that the severity of the loss is given somehow by the body: that the body was present and animate and now is no longer, and that this is the foundational boundary between the living and the dead.

How, then, are we to think body counts and ways of accounting for the body at war? If the body is a fungible and political entity through and through, then counting cannot merely be a matter of representation, since all representations are also constructions. Butler suggests that a 'hierarchy of grief can...be enumerated',[145] and that, with respect to the Iraq War, this hierarchy has tended to exclude 'Arab peoples'[146] in accordance with our 'cultural contours of the human'.[147] The prior denigration of these 'Arab peoples', however subtle, becomes a condition of possibility for killing them, or for countenancing their death as a necessary evil.[148] And in this sense counting starts to appear as a deeply conservative activity which not only fails to question underlying assumptions about in/valuable life, but may actively reinforce them by counting in terms of certain categories, and by failing to interrogate why some bodies are easier to grieve than others.

Julian Barnes parodies the 'mathematics of death' at work in the Iraq War:

> Let's start with the basic unit: one dead Iraqi soldier, score one point. Two for a dead Republican Guard, three for Special Republican Guard or fedayeen. And

[144] In M. Brady Bower 'Strategic Re-membering' p. 31
[145] Judith Butler 'Violence, Mourning, Politics' p. 20
[146] Ibid. p. 21
[147] Ibid. p. 21
[148] See Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War

> so on up to the top of the regime: 5,000, let's say, for Chemical Ali; 7,500 for each of Saddam's sons; 10,000 for the tyrant himself.
>
> Now for the potentially demoralising downside. One Iraqi civilian killed: if male, lose five points, female 10, a child 20. One coalition soldier killed: deduct 50 points. And then, worst of all (as it underlines the futility and hazard of war), one coalition soldier killed by friendly fire: deduct 100 points. On the other hand, gain 1,000 for each incident which a couple of years down the line can give rise to a feel-good Hollywood movie: witness "Saving Private Lynch".[149]

As part of an economy of war and death, counting cannot account for the prior construction of 'bodies that matter',[150] and those that do not, because these initial, non-enumerable calculations are the conditions of possibility for the apparently straightforward act of counting, which serves to reinforce their apparent 'self-evidence'. The act of counting posits the bodies of the counted as being external to those who count, and independent from them. The relationship is a technological one, which implies that the body is a discreet object for calculation. Contrary to this view, I have tried to suggest that bodies construct political communities and are constructed by them, so that there is no de facto meaning embodied by the dead body independent of a political work of making meaning. In addition, what counts as a 'dead body' is not given by some material reality but is the consequence of a praxis of valuation and interaction so that a bone can at once be 'a dead body' and a souvenir of war. In consequence, I have indicated that it is possible to think the dead body in terms of its relationship to the living, whereby its meaning may be dramatised by the actions and behaviour of the living which in turn is informed by the mythological memory of the dead. The dynamic process of embodiment may illuminate the 'palimpsest-like history of the human subject, which may be examined for the clues it offers to the interrelation of past and present'.[151]

Elaine Scarry, and others, have argued that body counts are too 'abstract' to take account of the material weight of the body. Contrary to this, I have tried to suggest that, rather than being ephemeral and disembodied, body counts have material consequences

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[149] Julian Barnes 'This War Was Not Worth A Child's Finger' The Guardian 11 April 2003 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/apr/11/iraq.writersoniraq Accessed 11/11/08
[150] See Judith Butler Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' London: Routledge 1993
[151] Benjamin Bird 'History, Emotion, and the Body: Mourning in Post-9/11 Fiction' pp. 561-575 in Literature Compass 2007 Vol. 4, No. 3 p. 561

for the fate of bodies, in terms of which bodies are counted as such. I have sought to demonstrate that body counts tend to elide the complexity inherent in counting, in terms of constructing bodies. Rather than being a self-evident material entity, I have argued that the body is thoroughly dynamic and political, and have sought to outline some of the expressions that this is the case. This being the case, it is possible to suggest that counting itself constructs bodies, in such a way as to interrupt or forestall any other kind of encounter with them, and through positing them as unproblematic objects, limits the extent to which they can have a transformative political impact. In this sense, rather than referring straightforwardly to objects in the world, counting appears as part of a process which constructs these objects as being available to technological manipulation. Discussing the complicity of the accounting profession in the Holocaust, Warwick Funnell suggests that '[a]ccounting as an instrument of the German civil bureaucracy provided at "centres of calculation" new quantitative visibilities... that were able to supplant the qualitative dimensions of the Jews as individuals by commodifying and dehumanising them, and, thereby, for all intents to make them invisible as people'.[152] In other words, it was not only that various administrative and organisation feats were made possible by accountancy (and allied mathematical sciences), but that this way of thinking about human beings made certain actions thinkable within 'ends-means relationships...able to escape moral reckonings'.[153]

Conclusion: Responding to the War Dead

Maja Zehfuss argues that the contestation of numbers in the debates about the legitimacy of the Iraq War proved 'strangely ineffectual'[154] in disrupting the logic of the war. This is, at least in part, because the act of counting the dead does not seriously challenge the separation between 'us' and 'them', and the coherence of the former. 'Whatever the precise number, the deaths have been caused by the 'we' asserted in Bush and Blair's rhetoric about the war and this is not disputed; but 'them' and 'us' remain logically separate'.[155] The question provoked by numbers of Iraqi dead takes the form of 'what should *we* do?' if it arises at all. This question is consistent with the technological approach to bodies discussed in the previous chapter, in which (other)

[152] Warwick Funnell 'Accounting in the Service of the Holocaust' pp. 435-464 in Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1998 Vol. 9, No. 4 p. 439
[153] Ibid. p. 440
[154] Maja Zehfuss 'Subjectivity and Vulnerability: On the War with Iraq' pp. 58-71 in International Politics 2007 Vol. 44, No. 1 p. 60
[155] Ibid. p. 60

bodies are the passive objects of political decision. Of course, counting is better than nothing, and it may be the first step towards (re-)presenting the dead as being grievable lives and thereby breaching the distance between 'us' and 'them': '[i]t is not merely about showing that Iraqis are people just like us, people who will be grieved by those who loved them; they are part of who we are: 'we' do not exist without our relation to others or before 'we' act'.[156]

Michael Dillon states that 'modern military power…seeks to command the very power of differentiation of inside and outside, of secure and insecure, less of a mere geo-strategic terrain of power than the capacity through the power of signification to create and command multiple terrains of power relations as such'.[157] Counting, in and of itself, is entirely compatible with the military logic which seeks to differentiate between zones of security/insecurity, even if it is intended to contest the legitimacy of the war. As Zehfuss argues, it need not disturb the coherence of the 'we' who counts, and this is the case in part because the notion of the dead body as something pre-existent, coherent and non-political reinforces the putative independence of 'us' from it. But there are other possible modes of interaction of the dead, entailing different imaginaries of the dead body, and taking account of the political nature of dead bodies (what is a dead body? How did it come to be dead?) unsettles the relationship between communities of the living and dead: 'reorganizing relations with the dead can be a way of reordering live human communities'.[158]

I have tried to show that body counts are a problematic way of accounting for the dead body at war. This is the case because they somehow assume that the body provides the truth or reality of war. Even those critiques of counting which insist on its inadequacy and ethically deficient nature tend to do so on the grounds that it fails to convey or express the material fact of the dead body, and appears as an abstract digital discourse which is all too easily dismissed along with the other 'disembodied' rhetoric of war. Scarry suggests that it is this move from the material suffering of the body to the immaterial ideologies of the state which confer power on the latter, which exploits the body's 'real' status to reinforce its own significance and to shore up its own claims to veracity and reality. In this context we might say that the body has been subject to a

[156] Ibid. p. 69
[157] Michael Dillon, 'Intelligence Incarnate: Martial Corporeality in the Digital Age' pp. 123-147 in Body and Society 2003 Vol. 9. No. 4 p. 133
[158] Katherine Verdery The Political Lives of Dead Bodies p. 108

two-fold betrayal: it is difficult or impossible to properly represent, and political power depends on taking advantage of this difficulty or impossibility. James Der Derian suggests that 'the material facticity of the dead soldier can be censored, hidden in a body bag, air-brushed away, but it provides, even in its erasure, the corporeal gravitas of war'.[159] It has been my suggestion, however, that body counts are problematic because they conceal the political work that is necessary to construct a body as a body, and as a body worth counting within a certain category. The work of determining 'whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths'[160] is so multilayered, complex, and itself embodied, that counting runs the risk of simply reinforcing its prior conclusions.

Body counting arguably entails an effort to secure a stable position from which to 'know' the body. According to this mode of surveying the body, the counter is not altered in any significant way by what is counted, which is conceived as a process of attaining knowledge about a stable entity. I have tried to suggest that this mode of knowing the body at war is dependent on a number of prior judgements as to what 'a body' is, and what importance it has. Rather than simply enumerating the numbers of bodies killed or damaged, I suggest that may be more productive to see the body itself as a contested and political entity which is dynamic and incomplete even in death. This may enable it to become more possible to expose the way in which the body is constructed as being either an object for technological manipulation or a cipher of personhood. Butler says that '[w]hen a bleeding child or dead body on Afghan soil emerges in the press coverage, it is not relayed as part of the horror of war, but only in the service of a criticism of the military's capacity to aim its bombs right'.[161] That is to say, the body may remain enmeshed in the military logic of strategic necessity, and therefore does not emerge as occupying the world of persons, whose loss should be mourned. Just as Simon Harrison suggested that bodily souvenirs from the Pacific War were mobile between the domains of persons and things,[162] so bodies themselves must be situated in one domain or another, and this situation is never once and for all, but an ongoing political work. Therefore, I have tried to suggest that the dead body is better

[159] James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network Boulder: Westview Press, 2001 p. 166
[160] Judith Butler 'Preface' pp. xi-xxi in Judith Butler Precarious Life pp. xx-xxi
[161] Judith Butler 'Explanation and Exoneration, or What We Can Hear' p. 6
[162] Simon Harrison 'Skull Trophies of the Pacific War' p. 830

understood not as a material ‘fact’ but through the event of death as something which demands a political response.

Chapter 3

Military Technology and the Future of the Body

I have suggested that strategic thought and technological writing about the body tend to present the body as being a cipher or agent of political will. In other words, the body tends only to be taken into account in terms of its ability to carry out the strategic designs of an external political force. However, there are problems with the body in this regard, due to the intrusion of extra-instrumental characteristics which tend to undermine war's claims to rationality. Firstly, the body may behave in unpredictable ways not conducive to the pursuance of war aims. For example, studies have suggested that only 15-25 per cent of US riflemen in certain theatres of the Second World War actually shot at the enemy.[1] In this case, reluctance to kill may imperil the strategic vision. Alternatively, the body may introduce an element of 'irrationality' into war by being involved in atrocities and the killing of civilians as a consequence of the stresses and provocations of war.[2] In this sense the clarity of the war aims, together with the political justifiability of the methods used, are imperilled, degrading the notion that war is a defensible instrument of policy. Secondly, the body is vulnerable to death in war, and this too challenges faith in the utility of war. Although technological writing may seek to reduce the body to the status of an instrument, it retains some extra-utilitarian qualities which may lead polities to reject war as a policy option due to the intolerable nature of the losses in which it results. This may be particularly the case in the light of claims that contemporary public tolerance of loss of life in war is at its nadir.[3]

So, the notion that we can replace the body at war with technology seems a promising one. As I discussed in chapter 1, technology has long been used to distance those who kill from those who die.[4] In the twenty-first century, advanced technologies promise to go further, and to remove the body from the battlefield altogether through the development of unmanned vehicles which would carry out tasks from surveillance to

[1] C. A. J. Coady Morality and Political Violence Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008 p. 50
[2] This is not to suggest that atrocities never serve a strategic purpose.
[3] Colin McInnes 'Spectator Sport Warfare' pp. 142-165 in Contemporary Security Policy 1999 Vol. 20, No. 3; Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq Cambridge: Polity Press 2006
[4] See also Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society New York: Little and Brown 1996 Section III

strikes without the need for human bodies to enter danger zones. The idea that technology can replace the body on the battlefield seems to offer the potential to redeem war from the horrors of the twentieth century and return it to the status of a thinkable option in the policymaker's arsenal. The US Department of Defense's document outlining their vision of conflict in 2020 cautions that 'the fundamental sources of friction cannot be eliminated. We will win—but we should not expect war in the future to be easy or bloodless'.[5] However, through the use of technology it is anticipated that it should be possible to avoid mass US casualties of the type last seen in Vietnam. And in this sense, it may be possible for war to become more rational, 'rational' referring to 'a way of looking at the world in which the meaning of an act derived entirely from its utility'.[6]

Christopher Coker points out that '[w]ithin the framework of practical rationality all means of procuring desired ends are viewed as 'techniques' or 'strategies' rather than as systems of values adhered to on the basis of ethical standards'.[7] That is to say, the political underpinnings of the framework are not interrogated when concerns of technology and utility dominate. In the light of this, I want to suggest that the idea that technology can replace the body on the battlefield and thus redeem war as an instrument of policy fails to call into question the relationship between the body and technology, and reinforces a number of assumptions about the body which merit further scrutiny. The first such assumption is that the body and technology are formally independent, and that the one can replace the other. I explore this assumption first in the context of the work of Paul Virilio, for whom the increasing influence of military technology represents a threat to the body and to politics. For me, this evinces a conservative understanding of what the body is, and the degree of adaptation of which it is capable, as well as an assumption that the body and technology are radically independent, since technology can come to change the conditions of bodily life to the extent that the continued survival of the body itself is in peril.

I want to suggest that Virilio's is a problematic reading, which essentialises the body in order to protect it as a privileged site for politics and ethics. In this way, paradoxically, it seems to evacuate all meaningful politics from the body, because it cannot take

[5] 'Joint Vision 2020' at http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm Accessed 15/02/07 p. 6.
[6] Christopher Coker The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century Oxford: Blackwell 2004 p. 26
[7] Ibid. pp. 26-27

account of adaptation, invention, or change. Rather than this, I would suggest that '[technology's] essence lies not in the tool or later the machine, but in the man who uses it. It resides in the way we think or imagine our external world and our relationship with it'.[8] I explore this contention through the work of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), much of which is orientated towards engineering a closer relationship between body and technology. While retaining a faith in the power of technology to positively transform the experience of warfare, DARPA does not share Virilio's conviction that the body is a stable object with given properties. Rather, their ambitions hinge on the capacity of the body to be positively transformed in conjunction with certain technological measures, and express the belief that body and technology may enhance each other in a symbiotic manner. This may superficially appear to be a more positive reading of the body which is sensitive to its political malleability. However, I argue that the work of military research continues to take the body as an *object* for an external knowledge and will, and moreover to see it entirely in terms of its utilitarian warfighting capacities, eliding the extent to which political decisions are at play in determining the parameters of 'utility'.

However, this point needs to be made with some care. For I suggest that the vision of the body held by military scientists has something in common with that ascribed to by critical thinkers such as Donna Haraway, who seeks to explore the capacity of ever closer body/technology mergers to destabilise the politics of identity and to create spaces for the emergence of new forms of unregulated bodily being which are not disciplined by hitherto dominant ideas about their identity, stability, and conformity with a given ideal. In this sense, it may not matter that military research pays no heed to the political assumptions behind their utilitarian engineering of the body, as Haraway suggests that important political consequences will emerge in any case.[9] I argue that what is missing from these accounts is a serious consideration of the extent to which the body is itself active in determining the conditions of its own existence, and its relation to technology. I try to show that the body does not have an exterior relationship to politics, but that it is itself thoroughly and immanently political. Through a discussion of the psychoanalytic work of Klaus Theweleit, among others, I suggest that presenting the body as an object for knowledge or technology is an incomplete rendering of the

[8] Ibid. p. 18
[9] Donna Haraway Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature London: Free Association 1991

dynamic potentialities of the body. Rather, I suggest that the body itself is implicated in the libidinal investment of technology, and in the constitution of the body as such, and discuss the implications of this for thinking about war, the body and technology without depending on identity-based categories such as 'humanity'.

Writing in the aftermath of the devastating First World War in Germany, Ernst Jünger argued against the idea that science and technology were associated primarily with reason, and were engaged in the production of the increasingly perfect rational man. He suggested that 'the genius of war was penetrated by the spirit of progress',[10] and therefore that scientific development would not necessarily conduce to peace, and was in fact entirely symbiotic with war. But more significantly, he argued that the increasing use of technology for the waging of war did not reduce the extent to which war was animated by an 'irrational vitalism'.[11] For Jünger, war was 'an intoxication beyond all intoxication, an unleashing that breaks all bonds. It is a frenzy without caution and limits, comparable only to the forces of nature. There the individual is like a raging storm, the tossing sea, and the roaring thunder. He has melted into everything'.[12] Jünger's argument was that the intoxication of war was in no way eradicated by the mechanisation of conflict, and rather than making war more rational, technology merely altered the ways in which war takes up the passions and inspires and seduces men. While forbearing from some of Jünger's spiritualist conclusions, I too want to argue that the prism of 'rationality' is too restricted to apprehend the impact of technologies of war, which cannot bypass politics, imagination and desire.

Virilio and the Body under Siege

Virilio expresses the clear conviction that war has changed as a consequence of the evolving techno-social context in which it exists.[13] The focus for his critique of the modern military is the phenomenological body, which provides the standard against which the 'inhuman' speeds of modern life are measured. This has led Douglas Kellner to argue that Virilio's project 'is essentially conservative, wishing to preserve the human body and natural life against the assaults of what he sees as demonic technology

[10] Ernst Jünger 'Total Mobilization' pp. 119-139 in Richard Wolin (ed.) The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1993 p. 123
[11] John Armitage 'On Ernst Jünger's "Total Mobilization'' pp. 191-213 in Body and Society 2003 Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 197
[12] Ernst Jünger 'Total Mobilization' pp. 119-120
[13] James Der Derian "Is the Author Dead?" An Interview with Paul Virilio' pp. 16-21 in James Der Derian (ed.) The Virilio Reader Oxford: Blackwell 1998 p. 17

which he regards as having a highly destructive impact on nature, human beings and socio-political life'.[14] Virilio preserves the body as a privileged category in the context of ever more sophisticated military technologies; technologies which, for him, also condition political life itself. For Virilio, the body has an ethical significance as a reservoir of humanity, but this is seen in terms of the possession of certain fixed properties and attributes which may be juxtaposed to 'technology'. His human body is not only privileged, however, but endangered, because of the extent to which its specificity as a perspective on the world makes it incompatible with other machine-mediated viewpoints.

Virilio argues that political life and war are thoroughly implicated in each other's emergence. He says that '[t]he city, the *polis*, is constitutive of the form of the conflict called WAR, just as war is itself constitutive of the political form called the CITY'.[15] War itself is thoroughly determined by speed: 'Speed is violence'[16] and the primacy of speed in modern society is synonymous with the primacy of the military.[17] He goes so far as to suggest that war/speed is the driving force behind the history of civilisations: 'war and the need for speed rather than commerce and the urge for wealth were the foundation stones of the city, culture and society'.[18] One implication of this is that it is the command of speed which lends itself to political and military power, rather than the possession of wealth: 'whoever commands the means of instant information, communication, and destruction becomes a dominant sociopolitical force'.[19] So in this sense, one makes war by commanding speed, and speed becomes the currency of both political and military systems of power in what Virilio terms 'chrono-politics'.[20] In both war and politics, it is an advantage to think, decide, and act more quickly than others, in

[14] Douglas Kellner 'Virilio, War and Technology: Some Critical Reflections' pp. 103-125 in John Armitage (ed.) Paul Virilio: From Modernism to Hypermodernism and Beyond London: Sage 2000 p. 103. The extent to which this is the case is somewhat dependent on which of Virilio's works we focus on. For example, one could say that his statement that 'the little Lartigue [the photographer Jacques-Henri Lartigue] ...'s assimilated his own body to the camera, the room of his eye to a technical tool, the time of the exposure to turning himself around three times', suggesting that one can become 'more like' a machine through a bodily performance. In Paul Virilio (trans. Philip Beitchman) The Aesthetics of Disappearance New York: Semiotext(e) 1991 p. 12

[15] Paul Virilio (trans. Michael Degener) Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light London: Continuum 2002 p. 5

[16] Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer (trans. Mark Polizzotti) Pure War New York: Semiotext(e) (2nd ed.) 1997p. 38

[17] Ibid. p. 51

[18] John Armitage 'Paul Virilio: An Introduction' pp. 1-32 in John Armitage (ed.) Paul Virilio p. 4

[19] Douglas Kellner 'Postmodern War in the Age of Bush II' pp. 57-72 in New Political Science 2002 Vol. 24, No. 1 p. 62

[20] Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer Pure War p. 13

order to outmanoeuvre them. However, Virilio argues that the situation changes at a certain stage of modernity, at which the speeds concerned accelerate to the point at which any kind of politics becomes effectively impossible, as there is no longer any time to deliberate or discuss. This produces what Virilio calls 'pure war', which is where, under the aegis of this hyper-fast hyper-modernity, war diffuses into politics itself.

The hyper-speed of modernity is threatening to the future of the body because it displaces it as the measure of the world. For Virilio, there is a natural speed of the body, and there is the 'unnatural' speed of high technology. He posits a distinction between 'metabolic speed, the role of the cavalry in history, the speed of the human body, the athletic body' and 'technological speed'.[21] Indeed, history is the progress from 'metabolic, then mechanical, relative speed, and absolute speed today with the boom in electromagnetic systems'[22]. So the speed of the body has been superseded and is no longer the regulatory clock for politics and war. Through technology, the body has been surpassed and left behind. Virilio borrows this idea of the body as a container for a certain standard of time from Henri Bergson, for whom consciousness depends on duration: '"the mind is the thing that lasts"'.[23] So our very capacity to think is founded upon a certain speed, a metabolic clock which regulates human time: 'the first product of consciousness would be its own speed in its distance of time, speed would be the causal idea, the idea before the idea'.[24] The body is the container for a certain measure of time, metabolic time, the time for politics and thought and humanity, so subjectivity is the consequence of a certain social speed: "You have no speed, you are speed!"'[25] So it is possible to see why, for Virilio, the passage of the regulation of speed from the metabolism to the 'absolute speed' of contemporary technologies has such radical consequences for bodies.

Because the body no longer regulates the speed of the world, it is thoroughly dispensable and may be already obsolete: 'Today, even if God may still need men, war

[21] James Der Derian "Is the Author Dead?" An Interview with Paul Virilio' pp. 16-17; Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer Pure War p. 35
[22] Paul Virilio 'The Art of the Motor' 152-165 in James Der Derian (ed.) The Virilio Reader Oxford: Blackwell 1998 p. 158
[23] In Paul Virilio The Aesthetics of Disappearance p. 22
[24] Ibid. p. 22
[25] Ibid. p. 43

does not, or barely... as victims'.[26] In this analysis, the Gulf War was evidence enough that modes of waging and perceiving war have moved beyond the realm of the human: James Der Derian suggests that it was 'the first total electronic war...the matter of the body disappearing in the process'.[27] Rather than being a war of materiel, Virilio contends that the Gulf War was a 'light war',[28] and argues that 'a *war of zero casualties* is an inhuman war, or transhuman war, and that *immaterial war,* pure war, is only ever an 'ecological accident', the fruit of the extreme development of our techno-sciences'.[29] In other words, it was not a war that was willed and planned by man, but one which manifested itself as a consequence of the 'natural environment', which is now thoroughly constituted by technology.[30] For Virilio technology is not something that we control, but something which thoroughly conditions our environment to the extent that it appears to us as being a 'fact of nature', an inescapable truth about our existence.

So man is no longer the measure of time, politics, or war, because technology has wrested regulatory power from the body and given it to systems which move faster than the body ever could. Virilio says that 'man is no longer the *centre of the world* of anthropocentrism or geocentrism; he has become, in the course of the twentieth century, the *end of the world* of a technoscientific nihilism'.[31] So in the one sense technology alienates the body from its own capacities for perception, on the other, though, it consumes the body from within by approaching it as the site for technological enhancement and control. There is an 'endocolonisation' by technology of the body[32] producing an 'almost total collapse of the distinction between technology and the human body',[33] and risking a 'slide into a future without humanity'.[34] The pace of the world is such that it is leaving man behind: he is literally becoming a 'thing of the past'. The escalating tyranny of speed is bringing about the '[d]isappearance of place and individual at the same time…[so] disappearance is our future'.[35] Technologies take over the functions of the body and in some senses leave the body behind. Kellner says that

[26] Paul Virilio Desert Screen p.10
[27] Ibid. p.136
[28] Ibid. p. 136
[29] Ibid. p. 137 italics in original
[30] Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer Pure War p.. 27
[31] Paul Virilio Desert Screen p. 138 italics in original
[32] John Armitage 'Paul Virilio: An Introduction' p. 12
[33] Ibid. p. 12
[34] See Paul Virilio and Friedrich Kittler 'The Information Bomb: A Conversation' pp. 81-90 in Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities September 1999 Vol. 4, No. 2
[35] Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer Pure War p. 133

Virilio is concerned with 'the tendency of technology to displace modes of human perception and representation in military planning and execution... human power is replaced by machines, reducing the soldier to a cog in the servomechanism'.[36]

Virilio's work is an analysis of the political consequences of the increasing impact and sophistication of military technologies. He departs from the technological reading according to which technology is merely an instrument in the service of an externally given end. Rather than being a servant of humanity, Virilio's technology has begun to dictate the conditions under which bodies exist, and has come to determine politics. So Virilio's understanding of the consequences of military technology represents a departure from the purely functionalist account, and insists that military science has an impact beyond the theatre of war. This reading deviates from the 'technological' view of technology that I outlined in chapter 1, in which technology was credited with having the capacity to redeem war by protecting the body from its harmful psychic effects and lethal physical ones. For Virilio, war is not seen in a utilitarian sense, as being a function of politics, but is seen as co-emergent with politics, as having the capacity to dictate the possibilities for politics. In this sense, the rationalist reading of technology and war breaks down, and Virilio does seek to interrogate the relationship between war and politics. However, a key feature of what we might call the rationalist paradigm is reinforced in Virilio's reading, namely, the putative independence of technology and the body.

For Virilio, war and politics are somehow co-constitutive. At a certain technological stage of development, this relationship is not inimical to the conduct of meaningful politics, because both war and politics are conducted by human bodies. However, modern technology alienates certain functions from the body and permits war and politics to be conducted at speeds which are far greater than the 'metabolic speed' of the body, and therefore the body is left behind, or consigned to obsolescence. Technology is endowed with the capacity to 'take over' functions from the body, and it is possible to envisage a framework for war in which the body does not feature and is not required. Kellner suggests that '[t]his vision of technological domination, of technology displacing human beings, has echoes of the theories of "autonomous

[36] Douglas Kellner 'Virilio, War and Technology: Some Critical Reflections' pp. 103-125 in John Armitage (ed.) Paul Virilio p. 109

technology"'[37] and represents a form of 'military-technological determinism'.[38] In his efforts to mount a critique of the operation of modern techno-military power, it is possible that Virilio has actually given far too much away to this power, partly by virtue of the fact that he sees it as an independently existing social force which is not tethered to politics of the body: it is non-political. In this sense, the body and technology are seen as being independent and the body appears as an object of technology. Christopher Coker, following Martin Heidegger, suggests that after industrialisation, '[m]an too had become the object, not subject, of technology... Men became commodities to be transformed or stored in a way that obliterated human agency'.[39]

Kellner suggests that Virilio 'denies the technological imperative and affirms the dignity and sovereignty of human beings over things'.[40] However, insisting on a radical distinction between the body and technology does involve considering the body as an object to a degree. If the body can be an object for technology, then it must be presumed to be imbued with a certain set of fixed characteristics and properties. Virilio's understanding arguably derives from his Christian beliefs and hinges around the arguably distinctively human capacities for freedom and meaning.[41] But the problem here is that one arrives at a very restricted understanding of what the scope for this freedom and meaning-creation is, since clearly it does not encompass the construction of new technological worlds. Moreover, I would argue that Virilio's account actually divests the body of real political significance in its haste to place the body at the centre of accounts of what politics is. Linking 'politics' to some fixed and stable measure, here, the 'metabolic speed' of the body, means that all change must be somehow non-political, and moreover, that the possibility for changes to the body are ruled out. In this sense the body is not itself intrinsically politically interesting, but stands only as the exterior measure for what politics is.

[37] Douglas Kellner 'Virilio, War and Technology: Some Critical Reflections' at http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell29.htm Accessed 13/08/09 p.6
[38] Ibid. p. 7
[39] Christopher Coker The Future of War pp. 21-22
[40] Douglas Kellner 'Virilio, War and Technology: Some Critical Reflections' p. 6
[41] Ibid. p. 6

Military Research and the Instrumental Body

Virilio takes a non-instrumental view of the technologies of war, choosing instead to see them in terms of an autonomous capacity to dominate politics and imperil the body. In some respects, this is the reverse of an instrumental view, since rather than technology being at the service of human bodies and politics, the latter are objects for autonomous technology. But I have suggested that Virilio himself reinforces this objectifying view of the body by ascribing to it a fixed set of characteristics and capabilities which cannot create or evolve but are vulnerable to being effaced by technology. This view of the vulnerable body is echoed by Tim Blackmore's future-orientated vision of the technologies of war. In his discussion of high-tech body armour, he suggests that the space for humanity is literally being eliminated by ever more sophisticated, ever more intimate technologies. He refers to the 'dreadful convergence of medical and military technology [which] makes the body into a horror zone',[42] and suggests that '[a]s armour becomes more penetrating, the elusive self in its tricky, risky body container retreats…The armoured soldier will need to find a home for the self that is outside the body: there will be little room left inside'.[43] Blackmore argues that '[c]onfronting an armoured suit, the soldier recognizes the whole body as a marginal zone, an understanding that makes the soldier queasy about all technology since what were once external mechanical artefacts are now potential boundary breakers'.[44]

Blackmore shares with Virilio the contention that technology has become non-rational in its functioning, but both support their claims on the basis of the supposition that the body has a defined set of characteristics and an established mode of functioning which may be disrupted by the intrusion of technology. The body is presented as being known, and change is brought to it from without by technology which imperils its existence in a zero-sum struggle for space and expression. The possibilities for a positive relationship between the body and technology are not taken into account, because this would entail accepting a degree of flexibility in terms of what the body is and what it can become. In order to mount a critique of technology, this flexibility is not admitted. This approach may be contrasted with that of DARPA, which is concerned to exploit and explore the fruitful possibilities arising from mergers between the body and technology, and in this

[42] Blackmore, Tim War X—Human Extensions in Battlespace Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2005 p. 56
[43] Ibid. p. 57
[44] Ibid. p. 57

case might be expected to take a more equivocal view of what the body actually is, and what its capabilities are. Of course, the work of DARPA must be understood within the framework of an instrumentalist understanding of war and technology. In other words, DARPA is committed to the view that war is an appropriate instrument of policy, and that technology may improve the extent to which this is the case. 'DARPA's mission is to maintain the technological superiority of the U.S. military and prevent technological surprise from harming our national security'.[45] However, it introduces the possibility that the body and technology may be considered in terms of a productive and dynamic relationship rather than as negative determinism.

DARPA was established in 1958 in response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik 1. Its mandate was creative thought with an emphasis on experimentation and innovation over feasible implementation.[46] DARPA is concerned to make the capabilities of the US military fit for future challenges, and these include the fitness of soldiers, or 'warfighters'. The first point of interest is that DARPA is engaged seeking to engineer in suitability of soldiers for future scenarios that are not yet known. There is an assumption of a degree of elasticity in the capabilities of soldier's bodies, which may be modified and enhanced for these unknown future scenarios. One researcher says that 'when we attempt to decode the biological fundamentals of questions…we are actually developing the potential to improve the warfighter's experience in ways that we can't even predict yet'.[47] This suggests that the outcome of the research is not certain, but then nor is the end for which the research is being conducted, since this is also unknown and future orientated. DARPA runs such projects as the Peak Soldier Performance project, which is concerned to examine ways of enhancing 'tolerance to extreme climates'[48] and the Preventing Sleep Deprivation project, which investigates 'novel pharmaceuticals that enhance neural transmission'.[49] These are intended to allow the 'warfighter' to function even in hostile environments, and deal with 'known' limitations on the body's endurance. However, DARPA's overall strategic goal of 'prevent[ing]

[45] 'Learn About DARPA' at http://www.darpa.mil/#learn Accessed 13/08/09
[46] 'DARPA Over the Years' at http://www.darpa.mil/body/overtheyears.html Accessed 29/01/07
[47] Amy Kruse 'Defense and Biology: Fundamentals for the Future' in DARPATech 2005 at http://www.darpa.mil/darpatech2005/presentations/dso/kruse-mod.pdf Accessed 29/01/07 p 44
[48] See 'Defense Sciences Office: Peak Soldier Performance Project' at http://www.darpa.mil/dso/thrust/biosci.psp.htm Accessed 29/01/07
[49] See 'Defense Sciences Office: Preventing Sleep Deprivation Project' at http://www.darpa.mil/dso/thrust/biosci/cap.htm Accessed 29/01/07

technological surprise'[50] seems to be concerned with more indeterminate parameters, since 'it is nearly impossible to predict what threats might emerge in two decades'.[51] DARPA therefore needs to find a productive relationship with uncertainty and the unknown in order to protect against these uncertain future threats.

DARPA is also concerned with engineering an ever more symbiotic relationship between the human body and technology both to enhance the body and to maximise the potential of the technology. J.C.R. Licklider, a DARPA employee in the 1960s,[52] was an early proponent of 'man-computer symbiosis'. He suggested that '[i]t seems entirely possible that, in due course, electronic or chemical "machines" will outdo the human brain in most of the functions we now consider exclusively within its province'.[53] Licklider said that '[i]n the anticipated symbiotic partnership, men will set the goals, formulate the hypotheses, determine the criteria, and perform the evaluations',[54] later averring that this will be the case 'at least in the early years'.[55] So DARPA has long been informed by the idea that a closer relationship between humans and technology has potentially productive consequences, running projects which treat the human brain like a machine, such as the Improving Warfighter Information Intake Under Stress (AugCog)[56] project, and seeking to improve the relationship between the human and the machine in autonomous systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[57]

Ultimately, the symbiosis between body and machine may become such that the body can be evacuated from the theatre of war and replaced by machinery. To a degree, this is the aspiration of the US Department of Defense, which has a stated commitment to the development of UAVs and their gradual replacement of manned platforms. The Defense Authorization Act 2001 states that a third of all ground vehicles should be unmanned by 2015, as should a third of deep strike force aircraft by 2010.[58] The

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[50] 'DARPA Strategic Vision' at http://www.darpa.mil/stratvision.html Accessed 29/07/09
[51] 'DARPA Strategic Plan' May 2009' at http://www.darpa.mil/Docs/StratPlan09.pdf Accessed 29/07/09 p. 37
[52] See 'DARPA Over the Years' at http://www.darpa.mil/body/overtheyears.html Accessed 29/01/07 p 24
[53] J. C. R. Licklider 'Man-Computer Symbiosis' in In Memoriam: J.C.R. Licklider 1915-1990 Palo Alto: Systems Research Center 1990 at ftp://gatekeeper.research.compaq.com/pub/DEC/SRC/research-reports/SRC-061.pdf Accessed 01/02/07 p.2
[54] Ibid. p.1
[55] Ibid. p.6
[56] 'Defense Sciences Office: Warfighter Information Intake Project' at http://www.darpa.mil/dso/thrust/biosci/warfighter.htm Accessed 29/01/07
[57] 'J-UCAS Overview' at http://www.darpa.mil/j-ucas/J-UCAS_Overview.htm Accessed 30/01/07
[58] National Defense Authorization Fiscal Year 2001 at: http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/2001NDAA.pdf Accessed 06/03/07 p. 38.

aspiration is that the network will achieve 'worldwide connectivity and... be operated by remote crews from virtually any location'.[59] So the vision is that human operators are decreasingly needed on the battlefield; they are not really present, but 'telepresent'.[60] Bodies start to appear as an element within a system, and one which is somewhat frustrating for its resistance to being fully assimilated into the system: 'humans make trouble for vehicles'.[61] It is hoped that ultimately, UAVs will be able to 'outfly and eventually outgun vehicles driven by biological packages (humans)'.[62] This has obvious advantages in terms of freeing the body from potentially perilous missions, and significantly changes the parameters of 'action' such that one can be said to 'act' in ways which have their consequences hundreds or even thousands of miles away.

DARPA's research suggests that the body is an improvable element within a military system. The body is not apprehended in terms of its 'humanity' or ethical significance, but as a set of biological processes which may become the objects for scientific study. In this sense, the body is treated as an object for scientific knowledge, but not one which possesses *a priori* limitations on the changes it can productively undergo. Displacing 'humanity' as a central concern seems to create the space for the re-imagining of what the possible relationship between the body and technology could be, such that a symbiotic improvement of the capabilities of both becomes possible. However, the focus on unmanned vehicles suggests that problems remain with the use of the body in war. Although there is a degree of flexibility admitted in the extent to which the body may be changed, military research must still deal with the problem of fatality which presents a number of political and operational problems, and which clearly does not arise in the case of autonomous technology. In addition, technologies may be apprehended as being purer objects of political will than bodies. For example, the reluctance of human players in nuclear war games to trigger a nuclear explosion lead to the development of programmes designed to do it instead.[63] In this sense, the body is subordinated to the instrumental imperatives of the work in hand, and can legitimately be replaced when technologies are available to perform in more governable

[59] Mike Francis 'Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems: The Have Blue of the 21st Century' at http://www.darpa.mil/DARPATech2005/presentations/jucas/francis.pdf Accessed 30/01/07
[60] See Scott Bukatman Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Post-Modern Science Fiction Durham, NC:Duke University Press 1993 p. 187
[61] Tim Blackmore 'Dead Slow: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Loitering in Battlespace' pp. 195-214 in Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 2005 Vol. 25, No. 3. p. 199
[62] Ibid. pp. 197-198
[63] Manuel DeLanda War in the Age of Intelligent Machines New York: Zone 1991 p. 2

and less politically problematic ways. However, the body is taken to be an object for exploratory scientific knowledge, rather than being a privileged ethical site for the preservation of humanity. In this sense, then the marginalisation of the extra-instrumental concern for 'humanity' creates the space for the emergence of a more malleable body.

The Politics of the Technological Body

I have suggested that Virilio's critique of military technology is dependent on a strong view of the identity of the body. That is to say, he assumes that one can know what the parameters of the body are, and what its ethical and ontological status is, and therefore that it can be used as a measure to condemn the insidious effects of technology: insidious above all because they alter this identity. The military industrial view of technology and the body marginalises the question of identity in order to focus more effectively on the question of efficiency or instrumental utility. No longer subordinated to the principle of identity, the body is no longer tethered to normative notions about what it should be and how it should relate to concepts such as humanity and selfhood. In this way it becomes possible to think more experimentally about the body in the absence of any foundational judgements as to what it ought to be and how it ought to intersect with politics. However, in the case of the military research agenda, this sidelining of identity takes place only so that the instrumental qualities of the body can be foregrounded. In other words, politics is again excluded as something external to the rational process of improving the efficiency of war-making instruments, of which the body is one. However, it is possible to think the relation between the body and technology in positive and productive terms without sacrificing politics for instrumentality, as illustrated by the work of Donna Haraway, which is precisely concerned to disaggregate the body from the principle of identity through an exploration of its intersections with technology.

Haraway mobilises the figure of the cyborg in order to destabilise the hegemonic categories of 'man', 'woman', and so on, and thereby to overturn the hierarchies of being that they imposed. Her cyborg is a boundary creature,[64] 'a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction'.[65] She points out

[64] Donna Haraway Simians, Cyborgs and Women p. 2
[65] Ibid. p. 148

that these cyborg beings are everywhere evident: in medicine, in fiction, in production, and in modern war, which she calls a 'cyborg orgy'.[66] She used the concept of the cyborg in order to escape the regulative Western narrative of the purity of origins, or of an original unity. For the cyborg being, selfhood is always contaminated by complexity and otherness, the body is always an aggregate of organic and inorganic influences. These complex aggregates cannot be captured or controlled by the markers of gender or humanity, and in this sense they begin to show us a way of thinking politics without identity. Haraway says that cyborgs are 'wary of holism, but needy for connection'[67] and can show us how connection can lead the way into a 'united front politics without the vanguard party'.[68] For feminist theory, this means that rather than purifying the notion of 'woman', or seeking to locate it in some organic ideal, we should seek to expand upon contaminated, monstrous 'women' and their unsettling position in society in order to show that identity is itself a chimera.

Haraway says that cyborgs are 'the illegitimate offspring of militarism and of patriarchal capitalism'.[69] For her, the consequences of body/technology couplings always exceed their original design. The instrumental view of the possibilities for the marriage of body and technology held by military researchers cannot successfully exclude unregulated change, as these are the inevitable and unpredictable consequences of new mergers between the body and technology. Although the rational instrumental view may seek to elide questions of politics, for Haraway, this is futile, because the mergers between bodies and technologies will always have political results excessive to their original instrumental purpose. She says that 'illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers are, after all, inessential'.[70] In addition, it is possible to suggest that the contention that instrumental concerns are the sole influence on military research is erroneous. After all, 'future war' is not a known or objectively existing phenomenon, as highlighted by the convergence between science fiction and military planning.[71] The notion that the body and technology are being intertwined in more intimate and more sophisticated ways purely for the practical purpose of winning wars conceals the extent to which the wars in question are the

[66] Ibid. p. 150
[67] Ibid. p. 151
[68] Ibid. p. 151
[69] Ibid. p. 151
[70] Ibid. p. 151
[71] Tim Blackmore War X p. 8

outcome of a particular political imaginary, and the issue of the social and political effects of these body technologies. Haraway says that '[t]he cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality'.[72] These imaginaries are directly engaged in the production of new bodies, however non-political and instrumental they may purport to be.

The contention is that once the principle of identity has been sidelined as a way of viewing the body, a multiplicity of political consequences ensue, associated with the degradation of all boundaries: between human and machine, between human and animal, and between material and physical. The vanishing point of these boundaries is the point at which the cyborg emerges. This indicates that rather than fearing the increasing erosion of boundaries between body and machine, or between human and animal, they should be welcomed as the catalysts for a new landscape of political possibility in which the identities that have been 'forced on us' by the 'terrible historical experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism'[73] no longer have any purchase. The point is that the connections between technology and the body presided over by pragmatic military necessity cannot help but to feed into a change in the social imaginary of bodies and selves. These implications may be cauterised by the military-industrial appropriation of the body-technology relation, but the implications of these relations do not stop at the (fictitious) boundary of pragmatics, but indeed have important implications for society, the body and identity in general.

Freeing ourselves from identity as a prism through which to view the body arguably creates a problem for how we are to think, name, and know the body, if not according to categories such as 'man', 'woman' or 'human' and 'animal'. Haraway argues that the increasing role of communications technologies has produced a 'translation of the world into a problem of coding'[74] whereby '[t]he world is subdivided by boundaries differentially permeable to information'.[75] This suggests a shift, whereby previously we knew the body through discourse: through naming it as male or female, human or animal. Now, in the cyborg era in which information technology rules supreme, we know through technology itself, which emerges as a new language for the translation

[72] Donna Haraway Simians, Cyborgs and Women p. 150
[73] Ibid. p. 155
[74] Ibid. p. 164 in italics in original
[75] Ibid. p. 164

and interpretation of bodies and things, which may no longer be usefully divided into 'bodies' and 'things', but merely according to the degree to which they are available to technologically mediated strategies. In this sense, knowledge seems to be concerned no longer with judgement or differentiation but with connection, which is an important component of this post-identity politics. For Haraway, we should celebrate the closer merger between the body and technology, whether or not this is filtered through the 'pragmatic' aims of the military engineering projects. Rather than being a zero-sum struggle between the body and technology, Haraway proposes a politics which seeks a way out of the strategy of identification which differentiates these categories.

Haraway takes the increasing intimacy between body and technology as a trigger for rethinking a politics beyond identity. For her, thinking these mixed, 'cyborg' beings is far healthier than thinking the fictitious purity of 'the human body', the loss of whose integrity is lamented by Virilio and Blackmore. The provenance of these transformations is not of particular concern. In other words, it does not matter that these cyborgs are in the first instance engineered by military technocrats with a war-mongering mission, because the connections forged in these marriages always exceed their purpose. Dianne Currier criticises Haraway on the grounds that she does not really succeed in this project of moving beyond identity, as she is still suspended between the categories that she seeks to erode. Currier says that 'in so far as the hybrid cyborg is forged in the intermeshing of technology with a body, in a process of addition, it leaves largely intact those two categories—(human) body and technology—that preceded the conjugation'.[76] She argues that Haraway's cyborg is predicated on the markers of identity that it purports to move beyond, and that it is therefore not successful as an effort to move beyond a politics of identity and remains caught in the framework of identity/difference. If we are still measuring the cyborg according to its deviation from the 'natural, organic' body, then we have not significantly changed our understanding or reconceived our political imaginary.

This criticism may be a legitimate one. Brian Massumi echoes the concerns of Currier when he says that the valorisation of the 'in-between' that hybridity theory enacts cannot show how the first terms are effectively transformed. He says that '[h]ow the subversion could react back on the positionalities of departure in a way that might

[76] Dianne Currier 'Feminist Technological Futures: Deleuze and Body/Technology Assemblages' pp. 321-338 in Feminist Theory 2003 Vol. 4, No. 3. p. 323

enduringly change *them* becomes an insoluble problem... Erase the progenitors and the hybrid vanishes: no terms have been provided with which to understand it in its own right'.[77] Even though Haraway may insist on the illegitimacy and disloyalty of her hybrid cyborg children, they are still best understood primarily through the framework of their identity-bound parents, meaning that we have not moved as far beyond the principles of identity as it may seem. However, the reading I want to give is a slightly different one. In a sense these debates all revolve around the issue of how we know the body, and the constitution of the body as an object for knowledge. For Virilio, we know the body independently of technology, and technology presents a challenge to what we know the body's attributes to be. Read through the prism of the military engineering projects of the body and technology, such as those of DARPA, the body comes to appear as something which is known through technology, with productive spaces in what we know which can be explored through experimentation. I have suggested that, for Haraway, the body may be something 'known' through information technology rather than through discursive categories, which enables a possible shift from these categories to a more connective and less categorical mode of knowledge.

I would like to re-read the body in relation to technology from a slightly different angle. Rather than think in terms of an imaginary which determines how we see the body, or a scientific practice which determines how we know the body, I would like to try to think in terms of the body as being generative of a certain mode of connection, and in this sense as being somehow constitutive of what we think of as technology. The idea that the body may be the passive object of technological reckoning, and/or that it may be becoming redundant in a world of increasingly sophisticated automation, seems predicated on the notion that the body can be detached from thought or intelligence and is thereby reduced to 'a... harvestable, highly lucrative *resource*'.[78] J.F.C. Fuller lamented that '[t]he machine sprung from out the intelligence of man has, through man's worship of it, turned man himself into a piece of machinery'.[79] But one does not need technology to turn the body into a piece of machinery; a particular mode of thinking about the body will suffice. Instead of thinking of ways in which the

[77] Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2002 p. 69
[78] Wendy Lee 'On the (Im)Materiality of Violence: Subjects, Bodies, and the Experience of Pain' pp. 277-295 in Feminist Theory 6 (3) 2005 p. 284
[79] J. F. C. Fuller Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War London: Eyre and Spottiswoode 1946 pp. x-xi

body/technology relation can be mobilised in certain ways, I want to try to suggest that we can think these terms as unfolding in a certain relation with respect to each other: a relation in which the body does not appear as an *object* for knowledge, but as a dynamic mode of knowing.

The Imagined Body

The increasingly intimate relationship between the body and technology seems to present a challenge for thinking about, and securing, the identity of the body. As technology becomes more closely integrated with the body, and a more essential part of everyday experience and action, differentiating the 'pure' body away from the contaminating effects of technology becomes problematic. For example, with respect to Stephen Hawking, Sandy Stone asks '[w]here *does* he stop? Where are his edges? The issues his person and his communication prosthesis raise are boundary debates, borderland/*frontera* questions'.[80] Stephen Hawking fully identifies with his technological prosthetics[81] and they are essential to his life and to extending his bodily capabilities. This makes judging between what is and is not of the body problematic, as do other complicating body/technology conjugations such as pacemakers and prosthetic limbs. As illustrated by the discussion of Donna Haraway, the aspiration to do away with identity as a prism through which to view the body is difficult to accomplish in practice, demanding as it does new ways of thinking and knowing. These new modes of thought may themselves be 'technological', in the sense that they are concerned not with what things *are*, but only with how they *connect*.

The question remains as to how we are to think this connection. Haraway points out that the connection between body and technology may be put into play by military-industrial research, or by other agencies not usually thought to be allied to critical thought. The increasing intimacy between body and technology creates a problem for categorising these entities differentially, but this move from identity to a compromised or contaminated identity can only by thought by continuing to refer back to the original principle of identity, referring to a purity which the body/technology assemblage fails to embody. In other words, as Massumi suggests, we lack the terms to think the

[80] Sandy Stone 'Split Subjects, Not Atoms; Or, How I Fell in Love with my Prosthesis' pp. 341-362 in Chris Hables Gray et al. (eds) The Cyborg Handbook New York :Routledge 1995 p. 395

[81] It is reported that Hawking retains his outdated voice synthesiser despite the existence of more 'human sounding' models because it has become such an integral part of his identity. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Hawking Accessed 16/12/08

contaminated body in positive terms, and are restricted to highlighting its points of deviation from the ideal of identity. Moreover, it seems that we are still dependent on some external agent to bring the body and technology together in the first place, although the logic of their connection will come to exceed the original purpose. In other words, the assumption is that a kind of intelligence or scientific will external to the body is necessary for the production of new relations to technology, and that in this sense the body remains caught in an objectifying frame of vision. Contrary to this view, I want to argue that understanding the relation between the body and technology must mean taking the body seriously as an agent and architect of this relation.

Klaus Theweleit's two-volume work *Male Fantasies* is a study of the Freikorps, the semi-autonomous anti-Communist militia of post-First World War Germany which went on to form the core of Hitler's Sturmabteilung (SA). More particularly, it represents an attempt to analyse the ways in which the bodies of Freikorps soldiers emerged as bodies of a particular kind, and is interesting because is concerned to interrogate the psychoanalytic forces which govern the emergence of particular kinds of bodies. These forces are not extraneous to the body but are precisely bodily in origin and character. The question is not one of intersecting with technologies of certain kinds, but of the constitution of the body as a discreet and bounded object. For example Theweleit presents his soldiers as being fixated with the question of boundaries and the need to demarcate themselves from 'contaminating' influences. He points out the use of the imagery of the torrent or flood with respect to seemingly uncontrollable and contaminating forces such as Communists, profiteering soldiers, and women.[82] Theweleit suggests that 'soldier males freeze up, become icicles in the face of erotic femininity... by reacting in that way... the man holds himself together as an entity, a body with fixed boundaries. Contact with erotic women would make him cease to exist in that form'.[83] This need to repel intrusive contaminants demands 'a kind of sustained erection of his whole body'.[84]

In one sense Theweleit's Freikorps soldier is thoroughly hardened against his own longing and passion because it is seen as being a threat to the integrity of the body. However, he suggests that desire is given an outlet in war and violence. '[The soldier] is

[82] Klaus Theweleit (trans. Stephen Conway et al.) Male Fantasies Vol. 1: Women, Floods, Bodies, History Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1990 pp. 229-234; 272-288
[83] Ibid. p. 244
[84] Ibid. p. 244

either the source of, or is in some way connected to, every explosion; the end of the world is staged on his behalf and from within him'.[85] In other words, '[w]ar is a function of the body of these men'.[86] War is the domain in which desire can be unleashed, but also in which the body of the soldier must aspire to become as a 'figure of steel'.[87] For Theweleit's fascists, the body is both a source of anxiety and of fetishisation, it is the object of technological improvement and the potential downfall of aspirations to martial purity. But what is notable is that the changing images of the body do not depend upon the existence of technological prosthetics or a certain degree of technological sophistication. Rather, it is the investment of libido in the body which determines the way in which the boundary of the body is conceived. The protection of this boundary may be regarded as essential with respect to the insidious environments of feminity or Communism. It may be seen as less so in the context of war. But this does not mean that 'war' is a term which exists independently of the body. Rather, the body's investments in war are themselves immediately productive of the image of war.

Theweleit approaches the question of identity through its construction in war and images of war. In other words, for him, identity is not taken as a pre- or objectively existing phenomenon, but rather one that emerges in a dynamic relation with the world. He seeks to escape from the dyadic understanding of identity in terms of difference: specifically, of male identity in terms of female difference. Rather, his work represents a shift towards thinking of the body in terms of its own production of itself, and of a certain social reality. In other words, rather than seeing the body in terms of an identity which is somehow independent of social context, or seeing it as being socially (and technologically) constructed from without, Theweleit's body is thoroughly implicated in its own production and the production of a certain kind of social world. Rather than being endowed with an objective boundary, the image of the body and its perimeter are consequences of the libidinal investment of the body itself, which is productive of a certain mode of investment with the world, and consequently of a certain kind of world. Rather than think of identity, it becomes more coherent to think in terms of a process of identification in which the body itself actively participates.

[85] Klaus Theweleit (trans. Chris Turner et al.) Male Fantasies Vol. 2: Male bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror Cambridge: Polity Press 1989 p. 191
[86] Ibid. p. 192
[87] Ibid. p. 206

The extent to which the body may be thought of as being a dynamic entity capable of being expressed in a variety of different ways may be illustrated by the ways in which 'disorders' of the body are perceived to be active in changing the parameters of the body and its relationship to the external world. For example, Roger Caillois posits a kind of psychosis in which 'space seems to constitute a will to devour. Space chases, entraps, and digests them in a huge phagocytosis… the subject crosses the boundary of his own skin and stands outside of his senses. He tries to see himself, from some point in space. He feels that he is turning into space himself—dark space into which things cannot be put... And he dreams up spaces, that "spasmodically possess" him'.[88] What he terms 'legendary psychasthenia' is a form of psychosis in which the subject cannot locate himself in space. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that the subject does not have a self to locate, since he has dissolved into the space from which he should be separated.

The emergence of a bounded conception of a coherent body may be presented to be one which emerges developmentally, over time. In this sense, it is as part of the activity of growing up that the body becomes articulated and experienced as a discreet and finite entity. This trajectory eventually gives us a body which is experienced as a coherent object for the self who inhabits it, but which is also articulated as a self, in other words, I experience my body as my own, as me. Elizabeth Grosz suggests that '[t]he idea of space, the child's notion of location and positionality... is acquired only gradually and through various phases of neurological and psychological development'.[89] This psychological development may be interrupted or impaired such that the way in which body is experienced and expressed is altered, making the boundary 'unnaturally' permeable or unstable. Margaret Mahler's research on 'psychotic' children suggests that their problems derive from the fact that they 'have never attained the security of body boundaries libidinally invested from within'.[90]

The point is the biology alone cannot enlighten us concerning the nature and capacities of the body, and that the identity of a body as mine, and as separate from the world, is an accomplishment rather than a starting position. Didier Anzieu suggests that the

[88] Roger Caillois 'Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia' pp. 89-103 in Claudine Frank (ed.) The Edge of Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2003 p.100
[89] Elizabeth Grosz Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994 p. 47
[90] Klaus Theweleit (trans. Chris Turner et al.) Male Fantasies Vol. 2: Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror Cambridge: Polity Press 1989 p. 211

psyche emerges out of the interface between the biological body and the social body.[91] He discusses case studies in which those who have suffered severe burns may experience relief through talking and emotional support, partially ameliorating their pain. He says that the ego may thrive on 'socio-cultural' rather than physical support; that 'the skin of words that is woven between the burns victim and an understanding interlocutor may re-establish symbolically a containing psychical skin that is able to make more bearable the pain caused by a wound to real skin'.[92] Alternatively, a lack of maternal affection in infancy may produce what Anzieu refers to as a 'body on sufferance', whereby it 'has been emptied of affect, reduced to mechanical functioning...bodily functioning is not assumed as one's own, that is, as a possible object of knowledge and enjoyment'.[93]

I have suggested that there are reasons to be suspicious of the idea of a facile distinction between 'biology' and 'society', and have proposed instead that the idea of a division itself can be seen as the consequence of political work. But Anzieu is interesting for the way in which he traces the process by which the body becomes an object for knowledge, and an object which is possessed by an owner. For him, the body as object for knowledge is not stable and does not automatically exist. Rather, it emerges through the nurturing processes which govern 'normal' infant development, and may be interrupted by abnormalities in this process, or by physical or psychical injury at any stage in life. Although Anzieu's 'abnormal bodies' are very clearly juxtaposed to normal ones, through the emphasis on deviation and disorder, for me his work dramatises the extent to which the 'normal' body is a fragile and provisional one, and that the boundary of the body is in constant contestation. That the 'disordered' body may be experienced in a multiplicity of different ways calls into question the stability and 'naturalness' of the 'normal' body, and even challenges the notion that any body is the coherent stable object of thought that we might presume. Rather than being an unproblematic object of knowledge, the object-like properties of the body appear to be dependent on a particular mode of libidinal investment which may always give rise to a body of a different kind.

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[91] Didier Anzieu (trans. Chris Turner) The Skin Ego: A Psychoanalytic Approach to the Self New Haven: Yale University Press 1989 p. 4
[92] Ibid. p. 205
[93] Ibid. p. 205

This seems to militate towards a change in the way in which we see the body, whether as an object for knowledge, or as a dynamic participant in the construction of its own relationship with frameworks of knowing and acting. What we might call the 'psychoanalytic' approach briefly outlined here (and notwithstanding the difficulties of generalising about 'a psychoanalytic approach') can speak to both the techno-phobic view of Virilio and Blackmore, and the more adaptive experimental perspective of DARPA and Haraway. In the first instance, the identity of the body is of paramount importance in challenging the insidious effects of technology, and indeed in having the capacity to name them as insidious. Virilio in particular ascribes a certain normative identity to the body, related to its humanity and its ability to act as the foundation for a certain kind of politics. On the other hand, the work of DARPA sidelines the question of identity in favour of a consideration of utility, a move which is taken up by Donna Haraway in her insistence that the connections made between the body and technology always have a political impact in transforming our expectations of what a body is and should be. However, the impression one has from these readings is that identity and technology intersect with the body from without, which appears in each case as an *object* for technology, albeit in some cases a malleable object.

The problem with these readings is that the body itself remains relatively unexamined, and appears only as the surface upon which various technological imaginaries play themselves out. The body appears as the object for knowledge, and only the paradigms of knowledge change. The politics of knowledge, and the politics of technology, are thereby occluded to a degree, for although it may be possible to interrogate the effects of changing ways of knowing the body on politics, the politics of the body itself remains opaque. In order to counter this impression, I have suggested that the body may be considered to be active in its own self-constitution. That is to say, that the image of the body originates with the body itself, and that this image is constitutive of a certain kind of relation with the world, and consequently with technology. No 'natural' boundary exists between the body and technology, only that which is created by the body itself. Elizabeth Grosz says that acquiring the ability to use tools involves 'not simply the technical problem of how they are used but also the libidinal problem of how they are invested'.[94] This investment does not take the form of a decision, we are not necessarily aware of the ways in which the body is engaged in constituting a fluid

[94] Elizabeth Grosz Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism p 80

relation with the world. This indicates that the 'rationalist' framework may not be sufficient in thinking through the relation between the body and technology. The libidinal investment of the body which brings in to existence this body/technology relationship cannot be considered from the point of view of instrumental reason, but must be thought of as underpinning instrumental reason: as providing the framework within which judgements of reason can be made.

Rethinking the Body and Technology

The concept of humanity may be invoked to overcome partisan lines between competing identity groups, or may be juxtaposed to the ethnic or religious divisions which characterise internecine strife. The idea of a 'shared membership of the human race'[95] may be a challenge to those who would seek to do violence to certain groups on the basis of their perceived racial or religious characteristics. However, the idea of humanity may not be as inclusive as it first appears, as 'humanity' comes with attendant demarcations into sub-categories which are more or less worthy of political significance. The archetypal distinction is that between 'man' and 'woman', which, as I suggested in the introduction, may be associated with the distinction between the body and the 'will' or 'reason' whereby the body and female are the denigrated terms.[96] In this sense, the concept of humanity is thoroughly striated by lines of differentiation which operate along the lines of identity, and which function so as to determine the degree to which a particular individual embodies the ideals of 'humanity'.

David Campbell and Michael Dillon argue that the 'rational political subject' of modern political thought, is also a 'violent political subject' due to the underlying conception of politics, and the expectations of the subject that it entails.[97] In other words, there is a mode of thought associated with the political subject that is arguably associated with modern conceptions of 'humanity', so therefore if we are to think differently about the subject, or the body, to return to the focus of this thesis, then we need to think the entire political landscape, and indeed, thinking itself, differently as well. If '[f]orms of life...are...functions of how we think and imagine the human condition and the world

[95] Amartya Sen Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny New York: Norton 2006 p. 3
[96] See Elizabeth V. Spelman 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views pp. 109-131 in Feminist Studies Spring 1982 Vol. 8, No. 1
[97] David Campbell and Michael Dillon 'Introduction: The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations' pp. 1-47 in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds) The Political Subject of Violence Manchester: Manchester University Press 1993 p. 1

which sustains it',[98] then it may profit us to supplant humanity as the central image of the world and to consider the politics of the production of these forms of life. Some theorists have established vivid images through which they do just that. Coker's Heideggerian reading suggests that the key theme for modern technology was 'that man himself was now exploited as a resource, or... a 'standing reserve''.[99] Although this may be the grounds for lamentation, as Virilio takes it to be, it may also serve as the trigger for a rethinking of the space of politics which displaces humanity from the central position, and thereby severs the collusion of reason with violence. Technology may therefore function as a catalyst for a new way of thinking politics which is not beholden to the central image of the [hu]man.

Marshall McLuhan has suggested that technology has reduced us to being the 'sex organs of the machine world'.[100] In his study of the modern military systems and technologies, the philosopher of technology Manuel DeLanda declares from the outset his intention to write 'from the robot's point of view'.[101] He imagines a 'hypothetical robot historian'[102] tracing its own evolution through military organisational and technological developments to which humans are merely the accidental adjunct and occasional facilitator. The robot historian 'would see humans as no more than pieces of a larger military-industrial machine—a war machine'.[103] Rather than being the creators of this military-industrial machine, humans are merely its functionaries, 'as little more than...industrious insects pollinating an independent species of machine-flowers that simply did not possess its own reproductive organs during a segment of evolution'.[104] The whole evolutionary landscape is characterised by a migration of capabilities from the human body to machines, and machine code.[105] This vision is predicated on a technological gaze which refuses any creative or dynamic capacity to the body, and thereby allows its gradual evacuation from the military system through the acquisition of accelerating technological sophistication. It provides an evolutionary teleology which, while de-vitalising, is also reassuring in that it eclipses the need to accommodate any irritatingly irresolvable ambiguities and contradictions such as inhere in the body.

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[98] Ibid. p. 4
[99] Christopher Coker The Future of War p. 21
[100] In Andrew Feenberg Questioning Technology New York: Routledge 1999 p. 3
[101] Manuel DeLanda War in the Age of Intelligent Machines p. 10
[102] Ibid. p. 4
[103] Ibid. p. 3
[104] Ibid. p. 3
[105] Ibid. p. 4

DeLanda attempts to re-imagine our political future without humanity at the centre of it, displacing the body in favour of the machine, for which it is merely a functionary, or appendage. However, he has perhaps been too hasty in de-centring humanity. Attempting to do without identity as a prism through which to view the body, DeLanda jettisons the body as a perspective on the world. The foundational distinction between the robot and the body, however, is that the latter is the product of its own self-imagining, whereas the former is an objectively existing fabrication. By suggesting that the robot is the future of humanity, DeLanda denies the importance of libido. Contrary to this, I would suggest that the idea of libido has a two-fold importance. The first is that the body is not exhausted by being surveyed and managed from without. Although one can approach the body from an instrumental perspective, the body is always in dynamic interplay with the world and is active in its own self-constitution. Secondly, and somewhat contradictorily, I want to argue that one *cannot* approach the body from a *purely* instrumental perspective. For such approaches are always made by other bodies which are perpetually engaged in the libidinal investment of themselves and the social world.

Richard Doyle writes that '[s]ometimes... there was a tendency to act as though there was nothing but information...[but]... these creatures can be quite seductive...machinic seduction is itself a kind of possession'.[106] The point is that the instrumental view is itself the outcome of a certain mode of libidinal investment, or, in other words, that the rational, instrumental view is predicated on a pre-rational bodily imaginary. If this were not the case, then we would not really have displaced the instrumental view from the centre of the political framework, but merely shifted the burden of reason from 'humanity' to 'technology'. I have sought to suggest that the stability of both 'humanity' and 'technology' as categories depends upon the prior animation of these categories by the body. In this way it becomes possible to see the instrumental view of the body and technology as an *effect* of a certain mode of investment by the body. This insight requires first calling into question the stability of the body as an object for knowledge or for an ethical view of the political landscape, as Virilio's view proposes. Denying the possibility of a facile distinction between 'the body' and 'technology', and refuting the contention that the body has a fixed set of characteristics permits

[106] Richard Doyle Wetwares: Experiments in Postvital Living Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2003 p. 3

experimentation on the relationship between the body and technology, and the way in which they intersect. This prefigures a politics beyond identity, such as that described by Donna Haraway. However, I have suggested that a second move is necessary if we are to displace the centrality of the instrumental view of the body, and that this involves considering the body's own activity in determining its own parameters and in constituting 'technology'. Without this move the body remains a passive object for technologically-driven change, and the instrumental logic of thought with respect to it is not significantly challenged.

I have presented the body as being the source of a different, non-rational mode of thought. I have suggested that there is a bodily imaginary, the first task of which is to imagine the body itself. This may be contrasted to the instrumental view of the body technology relation. The body becomes the thinking substance, rather than merely the object for thought. This presents a challenge to the notion that any mode of thought can be *purely* instrumental, if the objects for thought are active participants in it, and are not stable referents but fluid and dynamic modes of interaction. The instrumental mode of thought relies on bodily complicity: on the body functioning as its object, and being seduced by this image of thought. Jünger asks; '[w]hat purpose would be served by all these iron weapons levelled against the universe, were they not intertwined with our nerves, were it not our blood that hissed on every axis?'[107] In this sense, I want to suggest that the notion of war as purely instrumental elides the extent to which it animates us on a non-rational and indeed pre-subjective level out of which the appearance of instrumentality emerges.

Michael Shapiro points out that, for Max Weber, 'the process of rationalisation is a relentless force, opposed by the human desire to achieve coherence and control over meaning'.[108] However, I have tried to suggest that the autonomy of technology is illusory. Rather, we should be thinking in terms of levels of engagement with technology, whether conscious or unconscious, rational or irrational. Shapiro refers to 'a valuing process that valuing subjects do not understand and control, for the meanings of the objects resonate with dimensions of subjectivity that are not parts of conscious

[107] In Klaus Theweleit Male Fantasies Vol. 2 p. 179
[108] Michael J. Shapiro 'That Obscure Object of Violence; Logistics and Desire in the Gulf War' pp. 114-136 in David Campbell and Michael Dillon The Political Subject of Violence p. 115

and rational choice procedure'.[109] In other words, technology cannot be fully autonomous, but it can come to surpass the conscious, rational ability of humans to control it. Similarly, it is possible to suggest that care needs to be taken in discussing the extent to which the body can become alienated from technology and war through the increasing sophistication of autonomous technologies which do not require bodily participation. For example, the use of projectile weapons imposed a distance between killers and killed, and thus offered a way of overcoming the ambivalence about killing that many soldiers felt. However, Joanna Bourke's study of killing in the First, Second, and Vietnam Wars concludes that 'while technology was used to facilitate mass human destruction, it did little to reduce the awareness that dead human beings were the end product'.[110] This is at least in part because '[c]ombatants used their imagination to 'see' the impact of their weapons on other men, to construct elaborate, precise and self-conscious fantasies about the effects of their weapons'.[111]

Although technology may have the capacity to operate without human intervention to a degree, this does not mean that it is fully autonomous from the body. This is the case not least because images of war are dependent on our imagining them. Discussing DARPA, I suggested that the *politics* of imagining the pressures of future war was concealed beneath the *pragmatics* of planning for it, but that this distinction could not really be sustained. Planning for war always involves a degree of imagination, or fantasy, in conjuring the image of the war that is being planned for, and this cannot be contained within the rational logic of military engineering. It is possible to argue that an image of war must be created before it can become the foundation for future planning. This act of creation is precisely political in the sense that it does not depend on any necessity, and this takes it into the domain of something other than the mere application of knowledge. Maja Zehfuss says that 'when 'the path is clear and given'... we are dealing with a matter of applying knowledge rather than exercising responsibility'.[112] From a Derridean perspective, it is the confrontation with the aporia of the undecidable which demands a decision rather than something 'part of a calculable process, merely

[109] Michael J. Shapiro 'That Obscure Object of Violence' p. 115
[110] Joanna Bourke An Intimate History of Killing: Face-To-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare London: Granta 1999 p. 7
[111] Ibid. p. 6
[112] Maja Zehfuss Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002 p. 256

an application'.[113] Calculation is only possible once certain decisions have been taken. In this sense, I want to argue that the (social-) science of war, bodies and technology is more than scientific, and therefore cannot be understood through the framework of the application of knowledge.

In planning for future war, DARPA scientists, and others responsible for military technology, make a decision about what this future war will look like and entail. This judgement may be couched in terms of the available data we have about current wars, together with evidence of trends over time, but nonetheless it involves a high degree of incalculable decision about what that future war will look like. Tim Blackmore points out that Robert Heinlein's *Starship Troopers* (1959) and Joe Haldeman's *The Forever War* (1975) and *Forever Peace* (1997) are required reading at West Point,[114] indicating that the convergence between fictional future war and the future war that is planned for is significant. This relates, I want to suggest, to the contention that the body is active in changing its own parameters beyond the boundaries of knowledge. For what animates and sustains these images of contemporary and future war, if not the libido of the body itself? As with Theweleit's Freikorps, for whom war represented an environment within which a certain kind of bodily life was possible, I want to suggest that the images of war which populate military and popular culture are sustained because they represent the possibility of a certain kind of bodily reality.

The location of politics in the question of the relationship between the body and technology is of prime importance, as the responsibility for the instigation of war is differentially located according to the image of war/body/technology in play. For example, Sue Mansfield suggests that it has been 'fashionable' since the Second World War to argue that 'human beings are naturally aggressive and therefore that war is inevitable, [and] that war making is somehow an innate human propensity or instinct'.[115] It is possible to locate the responsibility for making war in the body itself, possibly at the pre-rational level. In this sense, wars tend to follow from the fact of humanity itself, as the inevitable consequence of innate violence. Alternatively, one can place the responsibility for war with technology which overrides natural human inhibitions on killing. Technology may impose a distance between humans, making

[113] Ibid. p. 256
[114] Tim Blackmore War X p. 8
[115] Sue Mansfield The Rites of War: An Analysis of Institutionalized Warfare London: Bellew 1991 p. 1

killing 'with relative ease' possible.[116] More dramatically, with nuclear power, technologies of war have the capacity not only to make bodies redundant on the battlefield but to make them obsolete as living entities. The technologies of war seem to impose a war-like logic of their own, imposing rhythm and necessity onto the conduct of war, from which humans are increasingly alienated. In this way, ultimately, technology can threaten the instrumental utility of war as it is no longer able to serve human politics.

The problem is that these views do not take account of the politics involved with the creation of an image of war as a whole. By locating 'war' in either the body or technology, the processes through which these identities come to exist in certain relation to each other are elided. I have suggested that the imaginary of war does not derive from any instrumental logic of calculation, but must depend on some prior construction of a certain vision of war. Similarly, the relationship between the body and technology does not unproblematically exist, but is the consequence of an anterior dynamic of creation out of which the appearance of independent 'body' and 'technology' categories emerge. In either case, what is elided is the political moment at which the identities are formed and relationships are set into motion. For the point is not to say that the objective body and autonomous technology 'do not exist'. Rather, my purpose has been to call into question the naturalisation of particular images of reality whereby the body, technology and war seem like self-evident categories of concern. Instead of despairing at the potential of technology to expedite the demise of humanity, or rejoicing at its capacity to minimise death in war and thereby further enhance its utility, it may be more productive to enquire how these images come to have such purchase over our thinking. This in turn will involve a different mode of thinking, considering the way in which 'war' and 'technology' grab us at the visceral level and contribute to the emergence of a certain type of body.

John Armitage discusses the way in which 'religious, mobilizing, or dissident socio-political discourses' and '[c]ontemporary film and literature' act so as to 'accomplish the translation of civilian bodies into militarized bodies'.[117] These agencies all express images of war which structure our thinking and determine our responses. Images of war

[116] Dave Grossman On Killing p. 97
[117] John Armitage 'Militarized Bodies: An Introduction' pp. 1-12 in Body and Society 2003 Vol. 9, No. 1 pp. 2-3

are not contrasted to the 'real thing', however. I do not mean this only in the sense that war has come to be dominated by the extent to which it can project certain images of itself through television and photography. Rather, I have suggested that war can only ever be apprehended via a certain image, as 'war', 'the body', and 'technology' do not have pre-existing identities which are independent of context. Instead, I have suggested that they should be considered in dynamic interplay with each other; a process through which identities emerge and are contested. In this sense, rather than the body being amenable to unproblematic classification as 'military' or 'civilian', I have tried to suggest that identity categories are the consequence of a prior bodily investment. Conceiving of different categories as objects for knowledge elides the politics at work in determining the way in which these identities emerge and are sustained. In this sense, an instrumental knowledge of the body is insufficient for the interrogation of the conditions under which the body emerges in relation to other bodies and to the social world, and the ways in which its investments come to constitute technology as such.

Conclusion: Thinking Beyond Instrumentality

It has been my aim in this chapter to insist upon the inadequacy of 'technological' readings of the body and military technology, and to indicate that rather than being the passive object of technology, the body may be understood as being an active agent in the construction of its own material reality. I sought to illustrate this point through a discussion of libido, through which I indicated that the parameters and capabilities of the body were constructed by the body itself, and, rather than being fixed, had the potential to express themselves in a variety of ways. The consequences of this reading of the body and technology are multiple, and in the conclusion I want to draw out a few points of significance which have arisen in the course of this discussion. Slavoj Žižek argues that '[w]ith biogenetics, the Nietzschean program of the emphatic and ecstatic assertion of the body is thus over. Far from serving as the ultimate reference, the body loses its mysterious impenetrable destiny and turns into something technologically manageable…something the 'truth' of which is this abstract genetic formula'.[118] The increasingly sophisticated modes of knowledge through which we come to apprehend the body seem to signal a transformation in its political significance. This transformation may be viewed in a positive light, as with the conviction that the

[118] Slavoj Žižek Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences New York: Routledge 2004 p. 25

increasing role of technoscience in modern warfare may render it ever more amenable to control and may enable the evacuation of the passional or irrational elements of war. Alternatively, following Haraway, it may be the case that new modes of knowing the body—through information rather than discursive categories—enable it to forge new connections with technologies and bodies, and thereby facilitates a re-conception of the terrain of politics. For me, all these points are problematic because they share an assumption that the body is an object that we can know, and if our knowledge is incomplete, then the fault must lie with the modes of knowledge we employ, not with the object that we seek to know.

However, these ways of thinking about the body themselves contain grounds for being suspicious of this view of the body and technology. For example, DARPA's work involves engaging with the future which cannot be known but must be somehow imagined in order for it to be secured militarily. This imagination is not a process which is contained by science/knowledge, but actually involves a leap of political creation which is overwritten by the pragmatics of engineering that it seems to require. While not rational, I have suggested, this process is bodily, in the sense that it involves the consideration of what the realm of bodily possibility is, as well as a 'non-rational' investment in a particular image of future war. Indeed, this insight is not confined to *future* war, as I have suggested that war is inherently difficult or impossible to totalise, or to generalise about. In this sense, all images of war are an imaginary construct which are not exhausted by 'rational calculation'. Moreover, Haraway's vision of the future politics of the cyborg, read as a manifesto for open ended change, incorporates the impossibility of knowing the outcome of such bodily changes, as well as acknowledging that the imaginaries of bodily becomings are an active component of any such cyborg politics.

In this sense, I want to argue for the non-rational to be taken seriously in considerations of the body and military technology. By this, I do not mean the irrational, but rather that which forms part of the conditions of possibility for the judgement of rationality to take place. Before the body and military technology can be posited as distinct, I have tried to suggest that they must already exist in certain relation to each other, and that this relation is determined by the libidinal investments of the body. Similarly, planning for any current or future war involves a political moment of imagination which constructs the image of war which then becomes the object of calculation. In this sense, it is

erroneous to hope that technology can make war a more perfect instrument of reason, because the use of technology is always predicated on a non- or pre-rational investment. In addition, images of 'high-tech' warfare may be intensely seductive and exert a powerful hold over the imagination even in the face of evidence which calls into question the efficacy of certain technologies. Moreover, distancing the soldier from the battlefield in no way cauterises the mode of identification with the weapon in question, and by extension the act of killing.

What we might call the defence of the body waged by Virilio holds that the body is an entity with certain fixed properties, and is a vehicle for personhood which cannot endure radical transitions in form. Technology is positioned as being the agent of change and transformation, whereas the body is attributed properties of constancy and predictability. I have tried to suggest that this involves a de-politicising move which ironically denigrates the body by denying it any transformative power of its own. For the technologists of military engineering, the body is an object for calculation and improvement in the service of future war. It is malleable within certain scientifically knowable parameters. This too occludes the extent to which this body may be the active agent of change itself, as well as concealing the embodied investments of the technologists themselves in constructing an image of future war. Categories such as 'male', 'female' and so on signify efforts to impose a certain identity on the body. Technological modes of knowing are equally designed to fix the body according to certain parameters, but they cannot account for the ways in which the investments of the body in certain technologies and images of thought are preconditions for this knowledge. I want to suggest that all such prisms through which we can view the body at war, whether they be 'technological' or normative, serve to restrict our understanding of the body and act as a barrier to appreciating the extent to which bodily investments are thoroughly implicated in the conceptions of 'war' and 'the body' that are too often taken as starting positions.

Christopher Langton says that "Only when we are able to view *life-as-we-know-it* in the larger context of *life-as-it-could-be* will we really understand the nature of the beast".[119] Taking account of the transformational potential that is immanent to the body is vital for understanding the politics at work in every reductive decision which seeks to pin

[119] In Richard Doyle Wetwares p. 26

down what characteristic is essential to that body. However, the truth of this really depends on what is meant by ‘taking account’. For if it entails submitting the mutability of the body to a process of scientific calculation, then this does not represent a significant development in the way in which we should expect to know the body. For I have tried to argue that the body as object, or the body as calculable, is secondary to the primary investments of the body in an image of itself, and in various technologies, images and institutions in the world. These investments are not calculable, but they are intensely political, because they provide the underlying conditions for all subsequent calculation. Therefore, understanding what is at stake in the relation between military technology and the body must involve a consideration of the politics of the body which takes account of its self-generated relation to the world.

Chapter 4

Rethinking the Body: Deleuze, Guattari and the Political Body

War is a confusing environment in which to think. Accounts of war may give voice to the impossibility of attaching a coherent narrative to events, or of giving an accurate account of what the body has undergone. In many cases, accounts of battle convey only confusion. Joanna Bourke says that 'in the heat of battle, experiences were often confused, indeterminate, and unarticulated'.[1] She quotes a soldier in a Manchester regiment in the First World War: 'Ay! but that was a fight. If only somebody could describe it. But, there, they can't, for it was dark, with very little room, and nobody could say exactly what he saw'.[2] The body at war seems problematic, due to its indeterminate, unpredictable, and confusing nature, and the apparent impossibility of thinking clearly in battle. If those who have been there 'understand' war, they do so in a way which appears difficult to articulate and communicate. The suggestion that '[t]he man who has not understood with his flesh cannot talk to you about it',[3] seems to point to a particular form of understanding, and a particular relationship to the body. This singular response seems to resist generalisation; as Tim O'Brien says '[t]o generalize about war is like generalizing about peace. Almost everything is true. Almost nothing is true'.[4] The idea that there can be any 'universal response to modern war'[5] appears imperilled by the momentary impressions which make up a persons' war. This calls into question our capacity to rely on any apparently ubiquitous features of the human body to disclose the truth of the experience of the body at war.

But if it is difficult to think about war through the prism of the body at war, it is equally or more problematic to try to think without the body. This is not only because war is primarily about killing and being killed, but also because excluding the body means that we must dismiss accounts of the seduction and pleasure of war. It becomes very difficult to account for the pervasive influence of discourses and images of war in

[1] Joanna Bourke An Intimate History of Killing: Face-To-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare London: Granta 1999 p. 9
[2] Ibid. p. 9
[3] Samuel Hynes The Soldier's Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War London: Pimlico 1998 p. 27
[4] Tim O'Brien The Things They Carried: A Work of Fiction London: Flamingo 1991 p. 77
[5] Catherine Merridale 'The Collective Mind: Trauma and Shell-Shock in Twentieth Century Russia' pp. 39-55 in Journal of Contemporary History 2000 Vol. 35, No. 1 p. 39

society, and for the very persistence of war as such, in the absence of any consideration of the seductive or 'irrational' aspects of war. Julian Grenfells, serving in the First World War, wrote home 'I *adore* war. It's like a big picnic without the objectlessness of a picnic. I've never been so well or so happy'.[6] It is tempting to dismiss this as hopeless naiveté, or indoctrination, or illusion. To be sure, much is made of the innocence of those who went to fight in the First World War, an innocence destroyed by the war.[7] However, it is possible to insist that every war has components which attract as much as they repel, and if we have seen—with the benefit of 90 years of hindsight—the futility of the First World War, we are far from apprehending the futility of war as such. To argue that war is merely an instrument of policy and nothing more is to discount a swathe of evidence suggesting its transformative, thrilling, alluring and petrifying effects. It entails dismissing these effects as mere epiphenomena emerging from the serious business of war, diplomacy and *realpolitik*

There are a number of ways in which seeking to rethink the body (at war) could become problematic. For example, David Harvey suggests that an impetus in favour of a rethinking of the political body is an effect of post-structuralist, and particularly deconstructionist, thinking. He suggests that this thinking has called attention to the fallibility of the categories of reason and science which necessitated the flight from the body in the first instance, so demanding a return to it. Harvey suggested that the body may be 'the site of a more authentic (epistemological and ontological) grounding of the theoretical abstractions that have ruled for too long'.[8] But the problem is that this image is that it presents the body as not being itself political, notwithstanding the fact that it has an acknowledged ability to make a useful contribution to political thought, and act as a corrective to its wilder excesses. If the body is looked to as an antidote to the complexities of contemporary thought, then it is being treated as a homogenous category; 'silent, neglected, and violently objectified'.[9] Moreover, emphasising the biological naturalness of the body leaves it vulnerable to relegation to the status of ''the toil and trouble' inherent in the biological cycle to whose motor human life is bound'.[10]

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[6] In Samuel Hynes The Soldier's Tale p. 39
[7] See Paul Fussell The Great War and Modern Memory Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000 (3rd ed.).
[8] David Harvey Spaces of Hope Berkeley: University of California Press 2000 p. 101
[9] Abigail Bray and Claire Colebrook 'The Haunted Flesh: Corporeal Feminism and the Politics of (Dis)Embodiment' pp. 35-67 in Signs 1998 Vol. 24, No. 1 p. 37
[10] Hannah Arendt (intro. Margaret Canovan) The Human Condition Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999 p. 131

There is a potential problem with *what* we think in thinking the body, and accounting for the body as an object for knowledge is a limited approach in terms of vitalising the body and highlighting its political significance. But there is also a potential problem arising from *how* we think. Thinking the body as political may be interpreted as simply applying established political philosophical terms to the body as a way of taking account of it. The problem with this is that it serves to efface the distinctiveness of the perspective of the body, and thereby to largely obliterate the value of considering it at all. Paul Harrison, remarking on the project of (re-)thinking emotions as a kind of knowledge, says that we 'all too easily tend towards discrediting and atrophying emotions within the sophism of the subject, making emotion into a set of strategies, conjectures and judgements by other means and so removing the aspects of exposure and nonintentional affectation which... mark out the origins of 'the emotional' as such'.[11] In other words, it is no use identifying an alternative perspective such as emotion, or here, the body, if in the very act of identification its alterity is effaced. And 'other words' are what is called for if this is to be avoided, for to avoid the regulatory effects of habitual modes of thought which position the body in certain ways relative to politics, the subject, and so on, then it is necessary to experiment with new ways of bringing language to bear. Harrison muses that perhaps his disquiet is 'no more than grammatical',[12] but the difficulty of the task of writing a different perspective into view should not be underestimated.

Thinking the body, there is a danger that the body is essentialised into an object for knowledge, which is open to analysis. But thinking from the perspective of the body is also problematic inasmuch as we are trying to bring an alternative perspective to bear on thinking about war and politics. There is a real risk of sacrificing alterity for clarity so that the idea of the body as offering an alternative perspective from which to think is compromised to facilitate the ease of the thinking. What is needed is 'a new thinking of the body, a different way of enabling the body to think, not a new theory about the body as an object of knowledge'.[13] This chapter aims to introduce a way of thinking about the body which does not take the body as an object for thought, but attempts to develop an understanding of it whereby it becomes a prism through which thinking takes place.

[11] Paul Harrison 'Corporeal Remains: Vulnerability, Proximity, and Living on After the End of the World' pp. 423-445 in Environment and Planning A 2007 Vol. 40 No. 2 p. 10
[12] Ibid. p. 9
[13] Jill Marsden After Nietzsche: Notes Toward a Philosophy of Ecstasy London: Macmillan 2002 p. 75

To this end, I begin with an introduction to Deleuze and Guattari's thinking about the body before moving on to a consideration of the consequences of this work for (re-)thinking the body and war. Deleuze and Guattari may be considered to be philosophers of the body who are concerned with provoking a wholesale reassessment of what we thought we knew about bodies: their potentials, relationships and constitution. As such, they may be deployed as a starting point for a reconsideration of the body which must also produce a rethinking of war, society and politics; and possibly a rethinking of thinking itself.

The Social Construction of Bodies: Nietzsche and Deleuze.

Thinking the body as something other than an object for knowledge seems to require that it is wrested from the arms of biological determinism, in order that it can be thought of as being in a dynamic relationship with politics, rather than simply the foundational material upon which politics, culture and society are built. This section outlines the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari (and their interlocutors), dramatise the contention that 'one is not born a body but becomes one',[14] in order to suggest some possible ways in which one might think the body as something other than merely an object for thought. For Deleuze and Guattari, the body is thoroughly political, not in the sense that it is a material upon which political power works, but as the outcome or product of this political work. I will try to argue that this position is a necessary one if it is to be possible to disentangle the body from both biological and social necessity, and therefore to introduce an element of uncertainty within the body which makes it more than a distillation of social and biological forces. There are two moves necessary to express this point. The first conceives of the body as being the outcome of social and political techniques of fabrication which discipline the way in which the body is expressed and articulated. In this sense, there is an argument against the biological determination of the body, which insists instead that it is thoroughly and originally political. The second must somehow refrain from the conclusion that the body is *thoroughly determined* by politics rather than biology in order to retain an element of uncertainty and unpredictability in the body. If this were not the case, I will suggest, it would be unclear why the body should be privileged as a perspective, or why it is

[14] Gayle Salamon 'The Bodily Ego and the Contested Domain of the Material' pp. 95-122 in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 2004 Vol. 15, No. 3 p. 105

desirable, or even possible, to think the body as something other than an object of thought.

For Friedrich Nietzsche, a certain kind of embodied subject has to be constructed through a disciplinary bodily process. In order that one might refer to *my* body, and to experience and articulate that body in a certain way, there is political work that needs to be done. Nietzsche insists that '[p]eoples were the creators first; only later were individuals creators. Indeed, the individual himself is still the latest creation'.[15] If society is to be predicated on the existence of individuals, then it must first create these 'autonomous, more than moral individual[s]'.[16] And the way in which this creation takes place is through a violent process in which the body is subject to various disciplinary strategies in order to mould it in a certain way. Nietzsche calls this 'mnemotechnics', and it is carried out in accordance with the principle that '"[a] thing is branded on the memory to make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will stick"'.[17] So all societies, conventions and beliefs have cruelty at their origin: 'whenever on earth one still finds solemnity, gravity, secrecy...in the life of an individual or nation, one also senses a residuum of that terror with which men must formerly have promised'.[18] Nietzsche recites a litany of cruelties that were visited upon subjects to create them as subjects: 'drawing and quartering, trampling to death with horses, boiling in oil or wine... By such methods the individual is taught to remember five or six "I won'ts" which entitled him to participate in the benefits of society'.[19]

For Deleuze and Guattari, this is the principle of social discipline: 'with its imprint of fire, its alphabet inscribed in bodies',[20] which lays the groundwork for all subsequent forms of representation and control. It is through the body that politics and economy are at first constructed and sustained, as in the beginning, [wo]men must be made to remember the rules of society and to believe that its injunctions have real force. Deleuze and Guattari say that '[a]ll the stupidity and the arbitrariness of the laws, all the pain of the initiations, the whole perverse apparatus of repression and education, the

[15] Friedrich Nietzsche (trans. Reginald John Hollingdale) Thus Spoke Zarathustra London: Penguin 1969 p. 85
[16] Ibid p. 191
[17] Friedrich Nietzsche (trans. Francis Golffing) The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals London: Anchor 1990 p. 192
[18] Ibid. p. 192
[19] Ibid. pp. 193-194
[20] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p 205

red-hot irons and the atrocious procedures have only this meaning: *to breed* man, to mark him in his flesh'.[21] As societies mature they rely less on the bodily practices of subject-creation, and more on the moral restraints of religion, conscience and the norms of society. But underlying the purchase that these regulative ideas have, underlying the society as such, is the originary pain which brought it into being, such as existed in what Deleuze calls 'savage formations' or 'primitive societies'.[22] This does not mean that they do not exist in contemporary politics. As Polymeris Voglis says, '[i]n acute socio-political crises like civil war, the state, in order to regain and establish its power, rediscovers the whole arsenal of punishments at its disposal'.[23] However, as society and politics evolve, so does the way in which the body is controlled, which becomes less explicitly violent and more dependent on abstract laws and prohibitions. For Deleuze and Guattari this is because the body has learnt to be self-regulating, and so does not generally require the forcible intervention of the state in order to ensure its compliance.

In a 'mature society', the body is controlled by the individual subject, and so begins to appear to be private and non-political. Hannah Arendt's insistence on the importance of the private realm to 'shelter the intimate'[24] and the care of the 'biological life process of the family'[25] suggests that the processes of biological bodily life are independent of the exercise of political power. Deleuze and Guattari insist, however, that rather than being a 'natural' state of affairs, this appearance of independence between the body and politics is actually the consequence of a history of discipline intended to construct the body in a certain way. Rather than being the direct concern of the state, the body is administered by the subject which has been formed through the generative process of disciplinary socialisation: I am conscious of my body, of orientating and articulating it in certain ways, and of controlling the way in which it comes into contact with other bodies (Deleuze and Guattari's paradigmatic example of this is the ban on incest). And because of this, as far as the political economy is concerned, the body starts to appear as a resource. Deleuze and Guattari say that 'the elements of production ... are not reproduced in the same way as humans themselves, but find in them a simple material

[21] Ibid. p. 208
[22] Ibid. pp. 205-207 For a critique of Deleuze and Guattari's ethnology see Christopher L. Miller 'The Postidentarian Predicament in the Footnotes of *A Thousand Plateaus*: Nomadology, Anthropology, Authority' pp. 6-35 in Diacritics 1993 Vol. 23, No. 3
[23] Polymeris Voglis Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners during the Greek Civil War Oxford: Berghahn Books 2002 p. 3
[24] Hannah Arendt The Human Condition p. 38
[25] Ibid. p. 64

that the form of economic reproduction preorganizes in a mode that is entirely distinct from the form this material has as human reproduction'.[26] In other words, after centuries of bodily discipline, the political economy now need not concern itself directly with biological life, but can merely take advantage of the resources that the biological body offers up to it.

Deleuze and Guattari chart the changing relationship between the state (politics) and the body in order to confound the impression that the state belongs to artifice and the body belongs to nature. They insist that there is nothing particularly 'natural' about the body. Indeed, it is only as a consequence of a certain political technique that bodies are expressed and experienced as bodies at all. This is indicated by the potentially confusing distinction they make between the '*organism'* and the '*body'*. The crucial thing about the organism is that it is organised in a certain way, so that the organs have a certain hierarchical relationship to each other. For example, discussing the face, Deleuze and Guattari insist that the face does not 'belong to' or express the person 'behind' it: 'The face is not an envelope exterior to the person who speaks, thinks, or feels'.[27] We do not 'have faces' by virtue of some biological fact of our embodied existence, but because of a political fact related to our social existence. Rather than being associated with expression, the face is related to the power to impose order: both in society ("the judge had a firm expression, his eyes were horizonless"...[28]) and over the body, as the face becomes the focus for significance and signification. What Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with is 'the face' as a concept as it operates in society. When they say 'if human beings have a destiny, it is ... to escape the face',[29] they do not mean that one should tear the skin from one's head, but that one should deny 'the face' the capacity to organise. There are multiple modes of social and political control which construct an organism through the decree 'You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body—otherwise you're just depraved'.[30]

The idea that an organism is a specific political product, rather than being in some senses 'natural', seems counterintuitive. It is tempting to suggest that it is self-evident

[26] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 285
[27] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. and foreword Brian Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p. 186
[28] Ibid. p. 196
[29] Ibid. p. 189
[30] Ibid. pp. 176-177

that the organs have a particular relation to each other and to the world, which is ordained by biology, rather than determined by politics. Discussing the organism, Deleuze and Guattari invoke a litany of tragic bodies from history. For example, 'Miss X claims she no longer has a brain or nerves or chest or stomach or guts. All she has left is the skin and bones of a disorganized body'; and Judge Scheber: '"He lived for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with a torn oesophagus, without a bladder, with shattered ribs... But divine miracles ('rays') always restored what had been destroyed"'.[31] They cite multiple examples of bodies which refuse the proper functioning of the organism, for example, hypochondriacs, paranoiacs, anorexics, masochists and drug addicts.[32] These are what we would tend to classify as aberrant or deviant organisms, in need of treatment and 'normalisation'. But our confidence in this conclusion cannot withstand a consideration of the politics inherent in deciding between the normal and the deviant,[33] and the recognition that the body is a resource for the political economy begs the question of whether the edifice of biological determinism which conditions our thinking about the body is not one of its greatest achievements. In discussing the significance of the idea of the organism, Deleuze and Guattari make great play of these unhappy, 'deviant' bodies. They ask themselves '[w]hy such a dreary parade of sucked-dry, catatonicized, vitrified, sewn-up bodies'?[34]The answer is in part that the 'normal' body is also in some senses thus shorn of its potential, and the 'deviant' body is used to dramatise both the politically constructed character of the organism, and the extent to which this construction should not be uncritically accepted as an optimal mode of existence.

The Unknown Body: Transformation and Becoming

This vision of the constructed body is potentially problematic in terms of catalysing a rethinking of the body. For if the body is the outcome of a work of power political construction, then it becomes difficult to see what the significance of thinking from the perspective of the body is. One could respond that it may be able to function as some kind of symptom from which one could diagnose the way in which state power operates in certain times and places. But it would be possible to think the body in this way while

[31] Ibid. p. 166
[32] Ibid. p. 166
[33] See Michel Foucault (trans. Graham Burchell) Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975 London: Verso 2003
[34] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 167

continuing to regard it as an object for knowledge, and therefore the significance of the perspective of the body is diminished. In addition, if the body is the consequence of the operation of state power, and is entirely constituted by this power, it is unclear whether it has any resources over and beyond this from which to wage a critique or through which to engage in any kind of *re*thinking or re-evaluation. In this sense there is the danger of simply replacing biological determinism with a kind of political fatalism. Most seriously, the kind of body politics briefly introduced above seems to speak little to quotidian bodily life, which is much richer and more confusing than the notion that the body is the outcome of a political work of construction. In this sense, we have arrived at a curiously disembodied thinking about the body.

However, the idea that the body is manufactured, rather than being 'natural', does an important work of 'ungrounding' and de-essentialising it which creates the space for a more positive rethinking. If it is accepted that the body is the outcome of political work; constructed rather than biologically grounded, and that the body is not the same in all places and times, then it must follow that 'the body' has the potential to be expressed in a variety of different ways. In this case, seeking to define what a body is, we are faced with the task of itemising all these different bodies and cataloguing their attributes. This task is an impossible one, not least because one could not know what kind of bodies will exist in the future. These problems are amplified if we introduce the possibility that the body is not only the object of political will, but also that it has active properties of its own. The body is not only moulded by external forces, but interacts positively with them. For example, Deleuze says that 'Nietzsche criticises [Charles] Darwin for interpreting evolution in a purely reactive way. He admires [Jean-Baptiste] Lamarck because Lamarck foretold the existence of a truly active *plastic force*'.[35] His point is that neither 'nature' nor politics can exhaustively determine what a body is, or delimit the scope of its activity. For Benedict de Spinoza as well as for Nietzsche, it is precisely the impossibility of entirely subordinating the body to any single explanatory regime that accounts for the significance of the body, and for the starting point for rethinking.

[35] Gilles Deleuze (trans. Hugh Tomlinson) Nietzsche and Philosophy London: Athlone Press 1983 p. 42. Most scientists would agree that Nietzsche was wrong in backing Lamarck over Darwin, but Nietzsche was equally disdainful of scientists, on the grounds that they too subordinated the activity and unpredictability of life to a regulatory explanatory framework. See Gilles Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy pp. 73-75

Spinoza says that 'we do not even know what a body can do',[36] a statement which for Deleuze is 'practically a war cry'.[37] This claim requires closer scrutiny in order to reveal why, for Deleuze, it is such a radical and important one. An essential tenet of Spinoza's thought is that there is a single substance from which life, in all its complexity, is composed. This is the idea of the 'univocity of being', which suggests that there is 'a single substance having an infinity of attributes'.[38] This view is one of 'extreme corporeality',[39] according to which 'the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension'.[40] What makes the difference between things in the world—what makes difference itself—is a matter of expression or a mode of existence, not of essence. That is to say, it is the *way* a body is which is distinctive, not *what* it is. There is no essential difference which lies behind the actual manifestation of a thing. One consequence of this position is that a large degree of possibility for transformation or change is introduced, since there is no essential character to the body, but only a contingent one which is expressed at a certain time. Deleuze and Guattari use the example of a carthorse, which may have more in common with an ox than with a racehorse, in terms of the function it performs, the way it responds, and so on.[41] What this indicates is the desire to escape from essential definitions of what a body is, whether they are framed in terms of biology or through any other mode of identification. In turn, this leads to an appreciation for what is particular in a certain body, rather than seeking to identify generalisable principles concerning bodies of a certain type.

The insistence on the variability and specificity of bodies seems to preclude the possibility of devising a definition of 'the body', and therefore calls into question the utility of the concept, which seems to connote only the impossibility of connotation. However, the idea of the body does have a positive function, which is arguably to identify this changeable property itself. Deleuze says that '[w]hat defines a body is... [the] relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces

[36] Gilles Deleuze (trans. Martin Joughin) Expressionism in Philosophy : Spinoza New York: Zone 1992 p. 255
[37] Ibid. p. 255
[38] Gilles Deleuze (trans. Robert Hurley) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy San Francisco: City Lights Books 1988 p. 17
[39] Antonio Negri (trans. Michael Hardt) The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1991 p. 144
[40] Benedict de. Spinoza (trans. Edwin Churley and Stuart Hampshire) Ethics London: Penguin 1996 p. 71
[41] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p.283

constitutes a body—whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship'.[42] The point is that the body is a system in disequilibrium, and it is this which accounts for its ability to be transformed by the encounters it has with other bodies. The kinds of encounters to which the body is susceptible varies according to the specific body: '[a] horse, a fish, a man, or even two men compared with the other, do not have the same capacity to be affected: they are not affected by the same things'.[43] These encounters may be positive, whereby the body becomes more powerful, or they may be negative, when the body becomes weaker, or is even destroyed. And in this context, 'powerful' and 'weak' refer to the capacity to affect and be affected. It might seem to be problematic and potentially misleading to insist that any relationship of forces constitutes a body, in that we seem to be being led very far from a consideration of material human bodies. But taking seriously the rejection of biological determination makes it incoherent to do otherwise, as the idea of the *human* body reintroduces a standard against which bodies are judged, and therefore tends to efface their specificity rather than reinforcing it.

I want now to address in more detail the question of why Spinoza insists that we do not know what a body can do, and why this claim is so significant, before moving on to suggest some potential implications that this has for rethinking the body. This is called for because the notion that the body is defined by its capacity to change seems to present a serious challenge for a positive rethinking of the body. There are a number of different components to the problem of thinking the body, the first arising out of the apparent illegitimacy of using general categories to organise knowledge about bodies. As has already been suggested, for example, forbearing from using the category 'the human body' for discussing the body creates an anxiety for capturing what is particular about that body. However, the category 'the human body' operates as a regulatory category, according to which bodies which fall short of the attributes necessary for a body to be classed as human can be excluded. For example, it has been subject to conjecture that what is properly 'human' is something more than 'mere' bodily existence. However, if one accepts the politically constructed nature of the body, it appears that this is dependent upon a form of bodily existence which consents to this

[42] Gilles Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy p. 40
[43] Gilles Deleuze Expressionism in Philosophy p. 217

division of life into the political and the non-political. That is to say, it is a condition of possibility for thinking the human in terms of language, or action (in the Arendtian sense) that the body be organised in a certain way, one which permits its subdivision into politically significant and insignificant components.

It might seem that some forms of classification are more problematic than others, and in a sense this is so. But in fact, the gesture of naming, or classification is always fraught with difficulty, because it operates according to the principle of identity. For example, the category 'woman' is associated with a certain set of images and criteria which actually existing women must reflect or be deemed to embody, in order that they be properly categorised as women. This category thereby tends to discipline the bodily expressions of women who must orientate themselves with respect to it. Even women who somehow subvert the ideals of the category (and of course, most do) do so according to degrees of difference. In other words, they are positioned relative to the ideals of this category, and ordered hierarchically according to their capacity to reflect them. One can envisage 'an oppositional framework of culturally constructed significations: male versus female, black versus white, gay versus straight and so on. The body corresponded to a 'site' on the grid defined by an overlapping of one term from each pair. The body came to be defined by its pinning to the grid'.[44] However, the category of 'woman' is also an important one for Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of how to think not with categories, but through and beyond them.

Classification has a restrictive effect inasmuch as it introduces a set of criteria by which a body must be judged, and a set of expectations as to what the body can and properly should do. It also obscures the particularity of a body by interpreting it in terms of general categories. However, the existence of different categories of bodies brings with it the possibility for the degradation of these categories. For example, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the possibility of 'becoming animal'. This does not mean imitating a dog, for example, because that would involve one category (human) consciously interacting with another category (dog), whereas the point is to get beyond categories altogether. They say that 'becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, and imitation, or, at the limit, an identification... Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor phantasises. They are perfectly real'.[45] This sounds

[44] Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual p. 2
[45] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p.262

deeply problematic, for one cannot literally turn into a dog, so how can a becoming-animal be 'real'? The answer is that to turn oneself into a dog (even if such a thing were possible) would be to move from one category of being to another. The significance of becoming, on the other hand, is that it is opposed to being: it is the movement or the connection in itself: 'What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes'.[46] The idea of 'becoming' is used to signal the inadequacy of categories such as 'man', 'woman', 'animal' in exhausting the potential of the body. It points instead to an ongoing process of transformation which takes place not from one term to another but through and beyond the terms themselves.

The idea of 'becoming-woman' is especially significant for Deleuze and Guattari, because the category of 'woman' has a privileged status as the intimate, and inferior other of 'man'. 'Man' is the category that we must get away from, because it is the ideal organising category par excellence,[47] which underpins the entire hierarchy of categorisation. 'It is perhaps the special situation of women in relation to the man-standard that accounts for the fact that becomings... always pass through a becoming-woman'.[48] This does not mean that one should imitate actual woman. For '[e]ven women must become woman'.[49] The deployment of the concept 'woman' in this way has been unsettling for many feminist thinkers.[50] However, what is at stake is a rejection of the categories of being, and the hierarchy within which they are organised in order to liberate the capacity of the body to make connections. In thinking the body as having a fixed identity, its possibility for transformation is obscured and presented only in the sense that one might emulate other identities, or possibility move from one to the other, but rather than the identity, Deleuze and Guattari want to privilege the movement itself, untethered from the points of identity through which it passes.

The necessity for this refers back to Spinoza's insistence on the use of the question 'What can a body do?'[51] as a starting point for thinking about it. Deleuze and Guattari say that '[i]n the same way that we avoided defining a body by its organs and functions,

[46] Ibid. p. 262
[47] Ibid. p. 322
[48] Ibid. p. 321
[49] Ibid. p. 321
[50] See Jerry Aline Flieger 'Becoming-Woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular Identification' pp. 38-63 in Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (eds) Deleuze and Feminist Theory Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2001 pp. 38-41
[51] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 283

we will avoid defining it by Species or Genus characteristics. Instead we will count its affects'.[52] 'Affects are becomings'.[53] The problem with categories such as 'man' or 'woman' is that these categories predispose certain assumptions as to what affects the body in question is capable of; in other words, what it is and what it can do. Rather, we are encouraged to think of the body in process, rather than as an object or a 'being' with stable properties and attributes. This in turn suggests that we should have different expectations about what thinking the body should entail, and should abandon the notion that we should be able to say 'the body is *x*'. 'We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it, or to join with it in composing a more powerful body'.[54] The trouble with using named categories such as 'man' or 'woman', is that they do not tell us what the body can do, they tell us only what it is *not permitted* to do, and in this sense limit the capacity to countenance expressions of different kinds.

The Limitations of Consciousness: Rethinking 'Thinking'

The mode of 'rethinking' the body that I have adumbrated above presents a number of challenges in terms of how this new thinking should be conducted. I have tried to show that re-thinking the body along the lines that Deleuze and Guattari (informed by Spinoza and Nietzsche) advocate presents a challenge because the kind of body they enjoin us to think cannot be defined according to any classificatory system, and is always underpinned by its capacity to change, which means that any conceptualisation must be provisional. Our sudden apprehension of the slipperiness of the body as an object for thought creates an anxiety for thinking about it, given the lack of clarity about what 'it' is. But this elides the question of what it is to think, in the sense that it constructs the image of a coherent process of thinking which struggles to get to grips with the ephemeral object of thought. But of course, from a Spinozist perspective, we cannot separate thinking and the object of thought in this way, nor leave unexamined the question of who thinks. For if the body is both unknown and subject to continuous open-ended change, then it cannot be the case that the capacity for thought remains

[52] Ibid. p. 283
[53] Ibid. p. 283
[54] Ibid. p. 284

itself unchanged. So in order to think through the possibility for rethinking the body along Deleuzian lines, it is necessary to consider both the body, and thinking, in order to demonstrate the relationship between them, and the problems and possibilities of thinking through the Spinozist body.

Nietzsche suggests that the notion of a unified subject who is conscious, analyses and makes decisions, is an illusion. Rather, what we would call 'the subject' is composed of a competing multiplicity of drives. And 'it is our drives that interpret the world—and not our egos, not our conscious opinions. It is not so much that I have a different perspective on the world than you; it is rather that each of us has multiple perspectives on the world because of the multiplicity of our drives'.[55] So when we say 'I have decided...' what we mean is that one drive has triumphed over the others. Nietzsche says that '[w]hile 'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive *which is complaining about another*, that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the *vehemence* of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement drive, and that a *struggle* is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides'.[56] These drives are to be understood as aspects of the body, not least because for Nietzsche, the body is all there is. He says that ''I am body and soul'—so speaks the child. And why should one not speak like children? But the awakened, the enlightened man says: I am body entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body. The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman'.[57]

What this suggests is that what we call 'consciousness' is actually a retrospective identification with whichever drive has emerged victorious, and so that consciousness is not an active capacity which determines the body's actions and affects, rather it is the *ex post facto* rationalisation of the ego attempting to make sense of these. Deleuze says that '[c]onsciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what it is capable of. And what is said of consciousness must also be said of memory and habit'.[58] And Nietzsche suggests that there is a distinction between the self, which resides in the body, and the ego which purports to rule it: 'Behind your

[55] Daniel W. Smith 'Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward an Immanent Theory of Ethics' pp. 66-78 in Parrhesia 2007 No. 2 p. 69
[56] Friedrich Nietzsche (trans. Reginald John Hollingdale, intro. Michael Tanner) Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices on Morality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982 p. 65
[57] Friedrich Nietzsche Thus Spoke Zarathustra p. 61
[58] Gilles Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy p. 41

thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, and unknown sage—he is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body. There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom'.[59] This seems to create a distinction in two possible ways of thinking, between the ego-driven conscious thought, and the bodily 'thinking' which undergirds and informs this. This is not to cleave back to binary body/mind divisions, as Deleuze says, '[w]hen Descartes says...'I think therefore I am' but not 'I walk therefore I am' he is initiating the distinction between the two subjects'.[60] But it is to distinguish between the form of thinking that makes this distinction and that which does not.

It is immediately evident that this demand to rethink thinking raises some serious problems. Nietzsche refers to a kind of linguistic deficiency according to which we can only describe the more 'extreme' drives which move us, 'the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our character and our destiny'.[61] But this difficulty is not only linguistic, it is one of consciousness, as if we are not conscious of these 'lower' drives, then surely we cannot ever express or articulate them. This is only a problem, however, if we are seeking to ground thought in certainty, or to demand that thinking may be easily communicable. In fact, for Deleuze, what is ethically significant about a certain kind of thinking is the very fact that it refuses or evades certainty. And it is thinking the body, and thinking through the body, which introduces the extent to which the unknown and the uncertain underlie all the confidences of consciousness. Deleuze says that '[t]he body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself…It is on the contrary that which it plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the unthought, that is life. Not that the body thinks, but, obstinate and stubborn, it forces us to think what is concealed from thought, life'.[62]

If by 'thought' we mean the correspondence of signs and objects, and the coherence of the representational universe, then the body does create a serious problem for thought. However, this is not what Deleuze means by thought. He says '[w]e no longer believe in the whole as interiority of thought—even an open one; we believe in a force from

[59] Friedrich Nietzsche Thus Spoke Zarathustra p. 62
[60] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 142
[61] Friedrich Nietzsche Daybreak p.115
[62] Gilles Deleuze (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta) Cinema 2: The Time Image London: Athlone Press 1989 p. 189

outside which hollows itself out, grabs us and attracts the inside'.[63] Rejecting 'interiority' must mean doing away with the distinction between inside and outside the body, and this entails doing away with the image of the body itself: 'the "body image" [is] the final avatar of the soul, a vague conjoining of the requirements of spiritualism and positivism'.[64] What this indicates is that it is not a matter of thinking through the body, or thinking with the body, but of thinking along the connections that the body is capable of making if it is not regulated by an image of what the body should be. The real danger for thought is not that it is chaotic or incomplete, but the very opposite, that it might collapse into a solipsistic system which is concerned with the production only of more of the same, rather than allowing different connections to be forged, and kinds of life to emerge.

Resources for Rethinking the Body at War: Affect

It has been my aim to indicate some of the ways in which Deleuze, with Guattari, Nietzsche and Spinoza, departs from convention (and 'common sense') in thinking the body, and thinking 'thinking' itself. In refusing the distinction between thought and the body, Deleuze presents the body as neither an object for thought nor an obstacle to it, but rather as its impetus. Deleuze proposes that we think the body as an object of indeterminacy. As Brian Massumi says, '[t]he charge of indeterminacy carried by a body is inseparable from it'.[65] This indeterminacy means that we can never know in advance what a body will be capable of in a given place and time, but we are assured that the normative, constructed political body does not have priority, and should not be accorded any privileged position in terms of ordering or disciplining other, 'inferior' bodies. In terms of the body at war, then, this conduces to taking seriously all expressions of bodily experience at war, and not only forbearing from judging them according to normative criteria such as 'bravery' or 'patriotism', but also refraining from classifying them according to the sense-making standards of 'normal' narrative or speech.

The disjuncture between regulative norms and warrior body is evinced on return from battle, when the sense made of war does not chime with the expectations of how the

[63] Ibid. p. 212
[64] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 24
[65] Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual p. 5

experience should be assimilated. For example, a British soldier who fought in Iraq writes:

> War's beauty's delicate, he finds
> It snags and tears, as friends
> in London nod
> Or flinch and ask, and was it bad?
>
> It was, he says, and yet.[66]

Catherine Merridale discusses the responses to post-war psychological trauma in the Soviet Union, which came to be seen in some quarters as a failure to embody the socialist ideals of the Soviet Union, a kind of retrograde weakness which could only signify ideological unsoundness whereby '[a]ny individual who fell short of the collective criteria came to be regarded as deviant'.[67] From a Deleuzian perspective, the response to these different bodily experiences should avoid the application of normative criteria to returning 'damaged' bodies, but, as with his 'deviant, vitrified' ones, should mobilise them to unsettle the concept of the stable, sound, functional body.

Another axis along which the potential of the body can be explored relates to the apparent incoherence of experiences of war, which seem to resist being compiled into a clear narrative, and occasionally elude the consciousness of the person in question, appearing only in shadow. Writing about war can dramatise the limitations of consciousness in apprehending the experiences and capabilities of the body. For example, the narrator of *All Quiet on the Western Front* writes that '[a]n animal instinct awakens in us, and it directs and protects us. It is not conscious, it is far quicker, far more accurate and far more reliable than conscious thought…If you had relied on thought, you would have been so many pieces of meat by now'.[68] What the body can do exceeds what consciousness apprehends of its capabilities, as well as the capabilities of consciousness itself. Deleuze and Guattari would enjoin us not to re-package these experiences in the light of the norm of the disciplined image of body and thought which prioritises the latter and asks of it certain standards of reasonableness. The potential insurgency and unpredictability of the body at war is vulnerable to being re-grounded, if

[66] Aris Roussinos in Cathy Galvin 'Blood, Bombs and Bards' pp. 54-61 in The Sunday Times Magazine 9 November 2008 p. 61
[67] Catherine Merridale 'The Collective Mind' p. 44
[68] Erich Remarque (trans. Brian Murdoch) All Quiet on the Western Front London: Vintage 1996 p. 39

not in social norms, then in biological or pseudo-psychological ones. For example, in the Second World War, ‘‘normal’ men were psychologically capable of killing’[69] while ‘[m]en unable to cope with killing were an aberrant group’.[70]

When thinking about the body at war, the temptation is to think about it relative to some normative vision of what the body should be. More often than not, the body is thought either in relation to the image of the domesticated civilian body, or to the idealised warrior body. And insofar as this is the case, thinking continues to travel along regulatory lines which continuously relate the body to a categorical image of it which contains certain assumptions about what the body is and what it can do. This is not to say that this way of thinking is ‘wrong’, and indeed it must be taken into account in light of its pervasive influence on the self-understandings of soldiers and the policies of military organisations.[71] However, there are possible other ways of thought, which exploit the destabilising and disorientating effects of war on the body, rather than seeking to contain them. I have suggested the concept of affect as being important for the constitution of the body, in that ‘[w[hat a body can do corresponds to the nature and limits of its capacity to be affected’.[72] I will try to show that the idea of affect, or what I have called ‘becoming’, has the potential to stimulate a non-categorical thinking about bodies, and to provide us with the resources for thinking about bodies (at war) without restricting the potentially transformative effect of their experiences.

Defining ‘affect’ is not straightforward. While ‘[a]ffect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion’,[73] this use is misleading, because emotions are the predicate of a subject: *I* feel fear, or joy. Affect, on the other hand, is outside the boundaries of subjectivity, and while affective responses may be interpreted in the language of emotion, this does not make them synonymous. Affect is a bodily response or capacity which may be only partially registered consciously, or not at all. The suggestion is that the body is richer than we can ever think it is, because ‘[w]ill and consciousness are *subtractive.* They are *limitative, derivative functions* that reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed’.[74] The principle of the univocity of being suggests that all substances are different expressions of the same thing: there is no essential ground for

[69] Joanna Bourke An Intimate History of Killing p. 254
[70] Ibid. p. 248
[71] See Ibid.
[72] Gilles Deleuze Expressionism in Philosophy p. 218
[73] In Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual p 27
[74] Ibid p. 29 (italics in original)

distinguishing them. There is a sense of 'the One manifesting itself in the Many'.[75] This suggests that the body should be thought of as containing the potential to be different in an enormous variety of ways, as it is merely an expression of [a single] substance, and 'substance contains within itself the infinity of its points of view upon itself'.[76] In other words, what a body is cannot be separated from what it could have been and what it could become. In Deleuzian terms, it is *virtual* as much as it is actual. Massumi says that '[t]he body is as immediately abstract as it is concrete; its activity and expressivity extend, as on their underside, into an incorporeal, yet perfectly real, dimension of pressing potential'.[77]

Discussing the United States' Homeland Security colour-coding system, which ranks the threat level from green to red depending on its severity, Massumi suggests that this is an expression of the way in which affect can be deployed for political ends. Devoid of any real content or meaning, the codes work not on 'subjects' cognition but rather bodies' irritability'.[78] Devising a coherent message which appealed to American citizens across the board would present a serious challenge in the context of the variability of those subjects and their ideas,[79] and also limit the utility of the appeal, which would become anchored within a specific set of contexts and concerns. Rather, the result of the colour coding system was to generate an atmosphere of fear bypassing conscious evaluation. This fear becomes integrated within the bodily performance of everyday life, and because it takes place on the pre-conscious level it comes to determine the content of experience while itself being prior to this. Massumi says that '[p]art of the affective training that the Bush color alert system assures is the engraining in the bodies of the populace of anticipatory affective response to signs of fear even in contexts where one is clearly in no present danger'.[80] Fear is introduced on the affective level and therefore the hope is that the subject accounts for this fear through explanations supplied by the government: global terrorism, so *that's* why I am afraid. This is not assured, however, as responses to an affective stimulus may vary in unpredictable ways.[81]

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[75] Gilles Deleuze Expressionism in Philosophy p. 16
[76] Ibid. p. 22
[77] Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual p. 31
[78] Brian Massumi 'Fear (The Spectrum Said)' pp. 31- 48 in Positions 2005 Vol. 13, No. 1 p. 32
[79] Ibid. p. 34
[80] Ibid. pp. 40-41
[81] Ibid. p. 47

The suggestion is that the body may react on a pre-conscious, affective level, and that any cognitive response is driven by the bodily one. William James says that 'bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion'.[82] In other words, the bodily response is prior to the conscious perception of the response, and is never exhausted or fully determined by cognition. Tim O'Brien's novel *Going After Cacciato* dramatises the role of pre-conscious sentiments in creating a sense of unease which cannot be satisfactorily explained. Of his protagonist, he writes that 'Paul Berlin was the first to feel uneasy. He couldn't quite place it. A milky film clouding the hot days. Lapping motions at night. Artificiality, a sense of imposed peace'.[83] Later, '[h]e thought about the difference between good times and bad times, and how funny it was that he could not state the difference, only feel it'.[84] There was a sense of being in a '[b]ad place, bad time...Silence that wasn't silence'.[85] The unease is an affective response, which lacks content; in other words, which cannot be rationally explained. It comes as a relief when something happens, as this enables the floating, ill-defined sense of tension to be ascribed to something: so *that's* what we were worried about. O'Brien says that '[w]hen Rudy Chassler hit the mine, the noise was muffled, almost fragile, but it was a relief for all of them'[86]. Until then all symptoms of unease had been somatic 'Harold Murphy's face puffed up in a rash of boils and open ulcers. Stink Harris complained of numbness in his fingers and feet. Even Doc felt it'.[87]

For both Tim O'Brien's Vietnam War soldier and Brian Massumi's mobilised citizen, fear or unease is characterised by a lack of certainty, an apparently content-free sense of destabilisation. The medic for O'Brien's group of soldiers diagnoses the problem thus: 'A vacuum. No substance, no conceptual matériel. Follow me? Bad logistics. We're getting short-changed on conceptual supplies... Can't win in a vacuum'.[88] For Massumi, this uncertainty is the contemporary experience of fear, whereby '[t]he pertinent question is not Who?, Where?, When?, or even What? The enemy is What*not?*—an unspecifiable may-come-to-pass, in an other dimension. In a word, the enemy is the

[82] William James Principles of Psychology Vol. 2 New York: Dover 1950 p. 449 (italics in original)
[83] Tim O'Brien Going after Cacciato London: Collins 1988 p. 103
[84] Ibid. p. 105
[85] Ibid. p. 109
[86] Ibid. p. 110
[87] Ibid. p. 106
[88] Ibid. p. 106

virtual'.[89] This is the case even though the virtual was earlier identified as that which signifies the multiple (or infinite) potential of the body, and the impossibility of pinning it down to an 'it is'. What was formerly described as being a source for transformation and a resource for critical thought appears now to be being named as the origin of an oppressive and pervasive fear. Massumi discusses the way in which war, or danger develops in 'proximity to pleasure... intertwining with the necessary functions of body, self, family, economy'.[90] He suggests that this produces a 'loss of the specificity of the landscape of fear'.[91] This does not mean that we cannot speak of 'war' in any positive sense, for war is not synonymous with fear. But it does suggest that taking seriously the body as a prism through which to view war, we may have to reject the notion that it can be comfortably divided away from what is not war. And to accept that certain affects of war may bleed far beyond the battlefield. The confusion and uncertainty associated with war may in fact be part of the fabric of everyday life for many, meaning that some bodies may be at war without ever having seen combat.

Resources for Rethinking the Body at War: Desire

Discussing affect, the impression is of the body denied the resources for activity in the face of the disorientating effects of war. The suggestion has been that fear can hold us in a paralysing limbo, and that this fear is associated with preparations from war (on the understanding that even when 'at war', one is always also preparing for the next battle, the ultimate encounter with the face of war). This runs the risk of reinforcing an insidious misconception about war, namely, that it comes to us from without, and we are helpless in the face of its inexorable logic—or violent lack thereof. Rejecting the idea that war is imposed on us from without seems to present difficulties, however. Arguing that we are not passive in the face of war seems to demand a belief in the integrity and autonomy of subjectivity which runs counter to the ideas developed in this chapter about consciousness. For how else can we position ourselves against these potent forces working at the level of pre-conscious affect? Related to this is the problematic nature of the apparent corollary of arguing against the idea that we are powerless in the face of war, namely the conclusion that we must therefore *choose* war. In fact both these problems are chimera based on a common assumption concerning the

[89] Brian Massumi The Politics of Everyday Fear Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1993 p. 10
[90] Ibid. p. 9
[91] Ibid. p. 21

autonomy of choice. It is no contradiction to say that one may be seduced by war without having *chosen* it. This seduction is thoroughly corporeal. Indeed, activity and passivity are two sides of the coin when it comes to the body at war, with neither entirely determining our being towards it.

The exploration of the idea that war can structure experience, and be interacted with positively on a bodily level, will be developed through Deleuze and Guattari's concept of desire, which may be understood as being synonymous with Nietzsche's concept of 'drives', discussed above.[92] In *Anti-Oedipus,* Deleuze and Guattari state that they are concerned with developing a 'materialist psychiatry'.[93] The flaw with the 'idealist psychiatry' of Freud, as they see it, is that it proposes a structural distinction between unconscious desire and fantasy, on the one hand, and society and politics on the other. Contrary to this, Deleuze and Guattari insist that desire does not produce fantasies or illusions, but reality itself. They say that '[i]f desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality'.[94] Desire has an unmediated correspondence with the social world, such that there is no structural difference between 'reality' and 'fantasy': '[t]here is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one hand, and desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other',[95] because the social and the unconscious are actually far more interdependent than this. Deleuze and Guattari say that '[w]e maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, and that the libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade the productive forces and the relations of production'.[96] In this way, Deleuze and Guattari combine Marx and Freud and through them devise a new understanding of the social world in which desire is given an immediate productive power.[97]

The idea that desire produces reality should not be interpreted to mean that reality is actively desired, as in wanted, by subjects. For this would be to conflate desire, which is pre-personal and pre-subjective, with interests, which are the outcome of a particular social-political arrangement. Daniel Smith dramatises the distinction through the quotidian example of buying toothpaste: 'at the drug store, I almost automatically reach

[92] Daniel W. Smith 'Deleuze and the Question of Desire' p. 71
[93] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 23
[94] Ibid. p. 28
[95] Ibid. p. 30
[96] Ibid. p. 31
[97] Ibid. p. 63; Daniel W. Smith 'Deleuze and the Question of Desire' p. 71

for one brand of toothpaste rather than another, since I have a fervent interest in having my teeth cavity-free and whiter than white... but this is because my desire is already invested in the social formation that creates interest, and that creates the sense of lack I feel if my teeth aren't whiter than white, or my breath fresher than fresh'.[98] In other words, ('rational') interests are the consequence of the investment of desire in a particular social network of institutions and values. So what is wanted, on the conscious level, is secondary to the investments of desire which create the conditions of possibility for wanting that thing. This is how Deleuze and Guattari approach the problem of fascism, which they say is the 'fundamental problem of political philosophy'[99]: why do people not only allow themselves to be repressed, but actively work to bring this situation about? Their answer is that 'under a certain set of conditions, they *wanted* fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for'.[100] This does not mean that they were suffering from 'false consciousness', or irrationalism. It means rather than under certain conditions the historicised desire of the social field and the 'group fantasy'[101] of 'the masses' resonated together.

In insisting on the congruity between the social world and unconscious desire, Deleuze and Guattari are arguing for the immanently political nature of the unconscious. In terms of the body, this suggests that the body is the outcome of the specific investments of desire in the social world, as well as the disciplinary outcome of the historicity of the social. In other words, the body appears in the space between desire and the social, and the same applies to interests. And this accounts for the character of Deleuze and Guattari's prescriptions for revolutionary politics, which emphasise the liberation of desire over any policy or interest based action, which would leave the underlying configuration of the social world intact. Guattari said that '[b]y contrasting the two different types of social investment, we're not contrasting desire, as some romantic luxury, with interests that are merely economic and political. We think, rather, that interests are always found and articulated at points pre-determined by desire'.[102] Hence for a 'revolutionary politics' along Deleuze and Guattari's lines, 'it's not a matter of

[98] Daniel W. Smith 'Deleuze and the Question of Desire' p. 74
[99] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 31
[100] Ibid. p. 31
[101] Ibid. p. 33
[102] 'Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 'On Anti-Oedipus' pp. 13-24 in Gilles Deleuze (trans. Martin Joughin) Negotiations 1972-1990 New York: Columbia University Press 1995 p. 19

escaping "personally"... but of allowing something to escape... Desire never resists oppression, however local and tiny the resistance, without the challenge being communicated to the capitalist system as a whole, and playing its part in bursting it open'.[103]

Deleuze and Guattari's insistence that desire and the social are immediately related to each other may assist in a rethinking of the body and war by enabling a new perspective to emerge on the status of the concept of war. This can be explored if we equate 'war' with Deleuze's 'institution'. In line with the conviction that all being is immediately social and political, Deleuze theorises the institution as a framework within which desire is translated into interest. In other words, it is a device for the organisation of experience. He says that 'money will liberate you from hunger, provided you have money; and marriage will spare you from searching out a partner, though it subjects you to other tasks. In other words, every individual experience presupposes, as an *a priori*, the existence of a milieu in which that experience is conducted'.[104] It is possible to understand the military as an institution as being something which structures our experience and conditions the way in which interests are articulated and experienced. Deleuze says that '[e]very institution imposes a series of models on our bodies, even in its involuntary structures'.[105] In other words, the military may be part of the institutional fabric of our experience. In this sense the military actually determines how interests are developed, how bodies are orientated, and thereby acts like a kind of social world of its own.

Thinking war as an institution, however, creates a potentially misleading impression of the ways in which we interact with the idea of war, and the extent to which they permeate culture. There are multiple ways in which war is represented to us, composed of a plethora of tropes of heroism, suffering and patriotism. Representations also take the form of the compelling images of military technology in action, from Second World War tanks to the 'spectacle' of the First Gulf War. It is both historical, undergirding ideas of statehood and family relationships, and futuristic, incorporating high technology and the colonisation of new planets. We access these representations through the news, through film, through the proliferating set of computer games

[103] Ibid. p. 19
[104] Gilles Deleuze 'Instincts and Institutions' pp. 19-21 in Gilles Deleuze (ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina) Desert Islands and other texts 1953-1974 New York: Semiotext(e) 2004 p. 19
[105] Ibid. p. 21

concerned with wars past, present and future. Images of war are presented through multiple contradictory and irreconcilable messages and media, the fascination of which is evidenced by their very pervasiveness. I have suggested that social organisations and institutions owe their existence to their ability to channel or organise desire. They are invested with desire, and all subsequent subjective judgements emerge out of this relationship: the body itself is a consequence of this investment. Therefore it seems reasonable to propose that since the military may be understood as an institution, it may have a structuring effect on desire and thus come to form part of the background to social life. However, I want to suggest now that something does not have to be an *institution* to have this capacity to organise desire.

Deleuze and Guattari are suspicious of the idea of 'representation'. The problem with it is that it does not take account of difference, because representation is founded on the principle of the identity or similarity between image and the copy, in which the latter is inferior. Keith Ansell Pearson explains that '[i]n the crucial difference that Plato makes between the original and the image, and the model and the copy, the first term refers to the superior, founding identity in which the Idea is nothing other than what it is…and the copy it to be 'judged' in terms of its internal resemblance…[a system designed to] provide criteria for selecting the 'good images' (those that resemble) and eliminating the 'bad' ones (the simulacra)'.[106] What this means is that both the 'original' and the 'copy' are subject to a kind of restriction in which they are made to be coherent. In the case of the represented item, then this may mean extracting its essential features so that they may be replicated, and excluding the contingent and specific. Deleuze said that '[i]t is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be represented'.[107] So the problem of representing war would be: which war do we represent? Which aspect of war do we represent? But there is an additional problem with representation, based on Deleuze and Guattari's commitment to 'materialist psychiatry'.

Deleuze and Guattari hold that desire is productive, and that it immanently invests the social field without mediation. However, the fact is that we do not always apprehend this unity, and indeed are frequently convinced that the body is private and non-

[106] Keith Ansell Pearson Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze London: Routledge 1999 p. 17
[107]Gilles Deleuze (trans. Paul Patton) Difference and Repetition London: Continuum 2001 p. 56

political, that desire is only concerned with fantasy, and so on. It is representation which forges this separation by constructing a set of limited criteria by which desire can be interpreted. In the paradigmatic example, Oedipus purports to represent the unconscious, and thereby to provide the criteria by which it can be explained. Therefore, we never need know about the social and political potency of desire, because these can always be explained in terms of the terms set out by Oedipus. This the significance of Deleuze and Guattari's aspiration to 'blow up all of Oedipus and totally demolish its ridiculous claim to represent the unconscious, to triangulate the unconscious, to encompass the entire production of desire'.[108] The problem with representation is that it produces 'an unconscious that no longer produces but is content to *believe*'.[109] Representation founds the distinction between the ideational/imaginary and the material.

The point of thinking about war beyond representation is to expose the extent to which the idea of war is predicated upon the investment of desire. And it is here that the distinction between aesthetics and institutions collapses to a certain extent. Because there is nothing 'frivolous' or non-political about the circulating images of war which condition our understanding of it, any more than there is frivolity in the military institutions that are commissioned to undertake the actual work of war fighting. Accepting that cultural forms of war are 'representations' elides the extent to which they also depend upon investments of desire and assimilate themselves into the fabric of daily life. To dramatise this point, one could refer to the computer game *America's Army* which was developed by the US Army to 'provide civilians with insights on Soldiering from the barracks to the battlefields'.[110] The extent to which games such as *America's Army* can be accepted as 'mere' representations is very limited, particularly given the ever increasing synchrony between 'recreational' war games, and simulations used in military training.[111] But the point is that one need not refer only to 'high-tech' simulations of war. Questioning the integrity of the concept of representation, it becomes possible to suggest that all 'representations' of war have a productive role in structuring desire, and that desire is productive in generating expressions of 'war'.

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[108] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 48
[109] Ibid. p 326
[110] 'America's Army' http://www.americasarmy.com/about/ Accessed 24/02/09
[111] See previous chapter, and James Der Derian Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network Boulder: Westview Press 2001

Viewing desire as productive suggests that the images of war which populate our universe may be integral in structuring it. A Deleuzian perspective would suggest that, rather than being dismissed as representations, images and ideas about war are to be taken seriously as social and political entities as 'real' as government and military institutions. That is to say, ideas about war and images of war play an active part in constructing the social political landscape which forms the terrain of everyday life, because they are invested with desire. It is for this reason that it makes sense to say that we desire war, or are seduced by it. This is precisely not to say that we endorse it, but rather that it creates the conditions in which we make decisions. War is part of the historical conditions of life, and therefore part of the systems of social power which condition our existence to the extent that we may be considered *Homo historia* [112] from the very beginning. And this suggests that one cannot defeat war on the grounds of its irrationalism, since it provides the context for the distinction between the rational and the irrational.[113] This should not be taken to imply, however, that because it forms part of the conditions for life, 'war' in all its multiple forms cannot be challenged. For example, Deleuze and Guattari say that '[a]rt often takes advantage of this property of desiring-machines by creating veritable group fantasies in which desiring-production is used to short-circuit social production'.[114] Taking art seriously, in terms of desire and production rather than representation, means handing to it greater 'revolutionary' power.

Reimagining the Body and War

I have suggested that war has the capacity to structure experience by being part of the underlying conditions of everyday life within which 'experiences' take place. In this sense, war, as an aggregate collection of ideas, institutions and practices, has an ordering effect on life. But I have also suggested that war may unsettle the conditions of everyday life by constituting a new environment in which the usual rules and habits of social engagement do not apply. As an essentially unpredictable undertaking, war may have unexpected consequences for social life, releasing possibilities which were not originally present, or sufficiently powerful to take hold. In addition, the warzone itself may be characterised by a degree of chaos, or produce a heightened sensitivity which

[112] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 35
[113] Ibid. pp. 31-32
[114] Ibid p. 34

makes new forces and sensations felt. As such, war appears as *an event* which unsettles the previously stable referents of the body, making it difficult to make sense of the new environment and the body's role in it. This is indicated by a degree of disorientation and confusion of the body at war, whereby meanings and relationships slide into indeterminacy. The concept of the event in Deleuze is designed to refer to this situation in which something comes to the body from without, and transforms it. He says that '[t]he event is always produced by bodies which collide, lacerate each other or interpenetrate, The flesh and the sword. But this effect itself is not of the order of bodies'.[115] What this means is that we cannot employ the standard empiricist rules of causation to explain the transformation which the event produces in the body, because the transformation which takes place subverts and changes these rules themselves.

While this appears confusing, the idea of the event is here intended to point to war as having the capacity to expose bodies to a new range of possibilities, thereby effecting a bodily transformation. The Deleuzian event is not an event in the conventional sense, in that it does not take place, and then become assimilated into experience without significantly changing it. This kind of event is a phenomenological one, in as much as it presumes a being to whom things happen. But this is not at all what Deleuze is interested in, because for him what is important is the transformation of being through exposure to an infinite range of possibilities. The event signals the openness of the body, where it is not possible to designate what the body is open to. So rather than being something that has happened, the event is something that might happen; or rather, it is a space within which anything might happen. Jack Reynolds says that 'the event never actually happens, or is present; it is always that which has already happened, or is going to happen'.[116]

This can be dramatised by another reference to Tim O'Brien's character Paul Berlin, for whom the Vietnam War is understood through the prism of possibility. He is accused of speaking only in possibilities,[117] and the story contains many instances in which it seems that 'a genuine miracle to confound natural law'[118] has made the impossible possible. He is aware that later, a framework will be imposed, and these chaotic and

[115] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam) Dialogues II London: Continuum 2006 p. 48
[116] Jack Reynolds 'Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time and Ethics of the Event' pp. 144-166 Deleuze Studies 2007 Vol. 1, No. 1 p. 145
[117] Tim O'Brien Going after Cacciato p. 278
[118] Ibid. p. 230

seemingly impossible events 'would become a war story'.[119] The war is a slippery twilight zone in which facts and established knowledge cannot be made to cohere. But, contemplating his pre-war days, Paul Berlin suggests that this slipperiness, this lack of certainty, are not only features of 'the war', but are aspects of life which are immanent to life.[120] In other words, one does not have to go to a specific place or wait for a specific politico-military occasion in order to be subject to an event in the Deleuzian sense. Rather, this possibility is a permanent feature of bodily life, whereby the body, a consequence of socio-political ordering, is always skating on the thin surface over disorder, and sometimes cracks may appear. The point is not to argue that war is the arena proper to the event, but that the event is a concept through which war may be explored, and which may disturb the positional status of war, so that we see 'breakdowns' distant from the 'warzone' as being intimately connected with war.

As well as being associated with uncertainty, war is also connected with a highly regulatory military system which has a disciplinary function on the bodies it commands. The military is concerned to simulate war, so that, should war occur, its soldiers will be pre-acclimatised to it to a certain extent. In this way it is associated with the manufacture of a certain kind of body: an especially obedient, resilient and strong one. In addition, I would suggest, it is engaged in producing a certain relationship between the body and technology so that this relationship becomes natural, and augments the capability of the body: it extends the range of what the body 'can do'. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that bodies and technologies have to be understood in relation in a specific 'assemblage'. For example, '[t]he lance and the sword came into being in the Bronze Age only by virtue of the man-horse assemblage... The stirrup, in turn, occasioned a new figure of the man-horse assemblage'.[121] The term 'assemblage' here indicates a body of capability; the man-horse, which makes new weapons and new relations possible. Anthony Swofford recalls the slogan of US Marines: 'This is my rifle. There are many like it but this one is mine. My rifle is my best friend. Without me, my rifle is nothing. Without my rifle, I am nothing'.[122] What is important is the capability of the soldier *and* the rifle: of the soldier-rifle *assemblage*.

[119] Ibid. p. 316
[120] Ibid. pp. 217-218
[121] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 440
[122] Anthony Swofford Jarhead London: Scribner 2003 p. 105

The consequences of a new assemblage cannot be foreordained. Each brings in new sets of relations and new possibilities which cannot be known in advance. As an example one could cite an unexpected outcome of Swofford's war, 'Gulf War syndrome'; an apparent consequence of the very soldier-drug assemblage which was intended to produce resilience and invulnerability. Moreover, '[a]ssemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire... the Eros of war changes'.[123] There is always the chance that desire may escape or forge unexpected connections. The point is that the opposition between order and disorder is always in the process of collapsing: when things seem chaotic and fluid, there is a process of 'making sense', ascribing a narrative, telling a war story, establishing the facts. And similarly, the greatest efforts at producing order and predictability cannot help but unleash the forces of unpredictability and disorder as new connections are made. And this is why the body is so important as a perspective from which to view war. The body is always oscillating between 'judgement, and the plane of consistency in which it unfurls and opens to experimentation'.[124] It is the product of social disciplinary manufacture, which organises it and mandates certain modes of bodily expression and experience. This becomes part of the fabric of bodily life, like Bourdieu's *habitus*, the 'structuring structure' which takes the form of 'embodied history, internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history'.[125]

Recalling Spinoza's 'war cry' the body is of ethical and political interest because it is also essentially unknown (and unknowable). Intimacy and immanence to this cipher to the unknown thereby makes it possible to think without the 'common sense' given by habit. The body is in a constant state of transformation, as it comes into contact with other bodies, and this transformation can never be known in advance but only deciphered as part of the process of transformation. Massumi says that '[a] body is defined by what capacities it carries from step to step. What these are exactly is changing constantly. A body's ability to affect or be affected—its charge of affect—isn't something fixed'.[126] As always ordering and disordering, the perspective of the body introduces the possibility of thinking the chaotic/disciplinary characteristics of war without contradiction, which is to say, without seeking a resolution or a middle ground. Rather organisation and disorganisation may be understood as tendencies of the

[123] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus pp. 440-441
[124] Ibid. p. 176
[125] Pierre Bourdieu (trans. Richard Nice) The Logic of Practice Cambridge: Polity Press 2003 p. 56
[126] Interview with Brian Massumi 'Navigating Movements' at http://www.brianmassumi.com/interviews/NAVIGATING%20MOVEMENTS.pdf Accessed 20/03/09

body, or ways in which the body might possibly interact with technology and other bodies. In the end, the concepts of 'order' and 'disorder' themselves must be judged on the type of body they produce. In other words, in thinking war, the aim is not to apply certain criteria to the body, to ascertain how organised (or otherwise) it is. Rather it is to think through the body under certain conditions and diagnose its changing possibilities.

Conclusion: Producing Bodies, Producing War

In this chapter I have tried to show the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari can be pressed into service to produce an understanding of the body which does not reduce it to being a mere object for knowledge. Rather, the body is highly contingent, and cannot be founded in biological readings which occlude the extent to which the way in which the body is experienced and expressed is highly socially particular. I have argued first of all that the body is always immediately political, both in the sense that it is the consequence of a certain work of artifice, and in the sense that its conformation with the strictures of a certain social form is a condition of possibility for the survival of that form. However, while it is the product of a work of social discipline, the body is not exhausted by any particular political iteration, as it always has the potential to be otherwise. This is evidenced by the 'disorders' and 'deviations' which afflict bodies which fail to conform to the socially prescribed mode of expression. But what is important is that the body is always in some senses unknown or uncertain, and we never know the limit of what it might become. In order to think with this uncertainty, the imperative is to avoid thinking the body in relation to a set of regulative normative criteria, and instead to think it in terms of the connections it makes and the transformations it undergoes, 'transformation' referring not to the change from one thing to another, but to the fluidity which is the immanent property of all things.

In thinking war, I have tried to show that one must take seriously all the proliferating forms in which war is expressed or through which it resonates. One cannot confine considerations of war to policy documents, foreign policy activities or troop movements. Nor can one assume that there are theories which are proper to an understanding of war—deterrence theory, strategic theory, game theory—and those which are not. All modes of interaction with war, hallucinatory or 'rationalistic', are connected and must be taken equally seriously. For example, it has been suggested that deterrence theory became an article of faith in the US Administration during the Cold

War.[127] The spectre of mutually assured destruction is the subject for O'Brien's novel *The Nuclear Age*, in which the protagonist is haunted by the nightmare of nuclear war, the fear of which produces in him a variety of physical and psychological 'disorders'. 'One minute I was sitting quietly in study hall, finishing up some geometry problems, then a dizzy-scrambly feeling came over me... topsy turvy, no traction... everybody yelled, "Give him air". I almost laughed. I didn't *need* air. I needed peace'.[128] His parents, and later his wife and daughter, think he is crazy and irrational. But for Deleuze and Guattari, this distinction between the rational society and the irrational individual is predicated on an erroneous distinction between the two. For them, there is no such distinction. Deleuze and Guattari refuse to separate 'the real object rationally produced on the one hand, and irrational, fantasizing production on the other'.[129] There is only a certain structure to the investment of desire which produces the 'irrational'. Each society produces a specific kind of 'madness'.

Deleuze and Guattari say that 'it is not possible to attribute a special form of existence to desire, a mental or psychic reality that is presumably different from the material reality of social production'.[130] It follows that one cannot distinguish the serious business of war from the 'frivolous' production of 'recreational war images' such as films, video games and so on: they are all structuring, and structured by, desire. The suggestion is that 'desire constitutes the very texture of society in its totality'.[131] But what this means is that art, for instance, can make a meaningful intervention into the social world, for it is to be taken no less seriously than a military coup. In fact, it should be taken more seriously, since a military coup would be in some senses in accordance with the existing logic of society, whereas art can produce a questioning of this logic, or even bring about its downfall. elin O'Hara slavick's work creates maps of the sites of US bombing, decorated with beautiful, abstract colours which seem to be at odds with the horror of the events which took place there.[132] But it is possible to suggest that this is a kind of reclamation, providing a new way to respond to the unthinkable through the

[127] See for example Ken Booth 'Nuclear Deterrence and "World War III": Will History Judge?' pp. 251-282 in Roman Kolkowicz (ed.) The Logic of Nuclear Terror London: Harper Collins 1987; Michael MccGwire 'Deterrence: The Problem—Not the Solution' pp. 55-70 in International Affairs 1986 Vol. 62, No. 1
[128] Tim O'Brien The Nuclear Age London: Flamingo 1986 p. 41
[129] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus pp. 31-32
[130] Ibid. p. 32
[131] Gilles Deleuze 'On Capitalism and Desire' pp. 262-273 in Gilles Deleuze (ed. David Lapoujade, trans Michael Taormina) Desert Islands p. 266
[132] elin O'Hara slavick Bomb After Bomb: A Violent Cartography Milan: Chartra 2007

'open-endedness in form and content'.[133] In addition, slavick's splodges of paint push to the limit the abstraction and 'dangerously awesome beauty of war'[134] which is particularly evident in air war. In this sense, the work aspires to reclaim this beauty, and these views from above, from their militarised context. In addition, perhaps the paintings succeed in producing an 'unexpected memory'[135] dramatising the extent to which war is personal and intimate.

There are significant implications for how we think about war and the body arising from the Deleuzian perspective outlined here. If we are enjoined to think about the body without constraining it with definitions and judgemental concepts, then it becomes unclear which bodies we should be thinking when considering the body at war: what is a military body? What is not? For concentrating on 'soldiers', for example, brings with it an panoply of attendant assumptions about what a soldier properly is, does, and can do, and therefore constrains a thinking through the body that takes an exploratory approach to these questions. It is also too restrictive in terms of its accounting for individual involvement in war. Jean-Paul Sartre writes that '[w]hen a peasant falls in a rice paddy, every one of us is hit... little by little the whole human race is being subjected to this genocidal blackmail piled on top of atomic blackmail'.[136] But it is not only in terms of the moral accountability for war that we are all connected to it, but due to the extent to which images and affects of war pervade our culture and our politics. Insofar as war is part of the social imaginary, we are all 'military bodies'. A dimension of discussing the body at war must therefore surely involve an ongoing reflection on our own relationship with war, and the extent to which we are fascinated, appalled, horrified, and so on. Through these affects, we produce a war of a certain kind. Therefore account must be taken of the production of war as well as of war's production of bodies, in order to illuminate an understanding of war and the body which sees neither as fixed and determinate, but rather as being engaged in an ongoing process of co-production.

[133] Carol Mavor 'Blossoming Bombs' pp. 13-33 in Ibid. p. 27
[134] Ibid. p. 30
[135] Ibid. p 15
[136] Ibid. p. 19

Chapter 5

Shell Shock and the Deterritorialised Body

Who are these? Why sit they here in twilight?
Wherefore rock they, purgatorial shadows,
Drooping tongues from jaws that slob their relish,
Baring teeth that leer like skulls' teeth wicked?
Stroke on stroke of pain, - but what slow panic,
Gouged these chasms round their fretted sockets?
Ever from their hair and through their hands' palms
Misery swelters. Surely we have perished
Sleeping, and walk hell; but who these hellish?

- These are men whose minds the Dead have ravished.
Memory fingers in their hair of murders,
Multitudinous murders they once witnessed.
Wading sloughs of flesh these helpless wander,
Treading blood from lungs that had loved laughter.
Always they must see these things and hear them,
Batter of guns and shatter of flying muscles,
Carnage incomparable, and human squander
Rucked too thick for these men's extrication.

Wilfred Owen 'Mental Cases'.[1]

Arthur Hurst, a Major with the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), reported a case of apparent shell shock. 'Private M' 'became dazed and lost the power of speech... He believed he was still in the trenches which were being heavily shelled; his pupils were widely dilated and he sweated profusely... In his dreams he saw the ghosts of Germans he had bayoneted come to take their revenge on him... Repatriated to England, Private M became paralysed from the neck down, lost all memory'.[2] Both Owen and Hurst, the poet and the medic, can be seen struggling to express the phenomenon of shell shock. They describe soldiers being lost to the present, suffering from mysterious bodily paralyses and malfunctions, disabled by the war, but not straightforwardly through injury. These men were transformed by the war, but they were not changed into a form of body or subject that could be unproblematically named or understood. The

[1] Wilfred Owen 'Mental Cases' at http://users.fulladsl.be/spb1667/cultural/owen/mental-cases.html Accessed 29/04/09
[2] In Charles S. Myers Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 :Cambridge: The University Press 1940 p. 14

disordered bodies and fractured psyches of soldiers could stand at once as a haunting critique of the cruelty of the war, as symptoms of a flawed or defective manhood, or as an indictment of a society which had lost its will and resolve. But they also have the potential to express the degree to which these categories of body, war, and society, are more fragile and more interconnected than might be supposed.

The First World War has been the subject of a wealth of literature, scholarly work and artistic representation. For many, it stands as an epochal event which gave birth to the bloody twentieth century[3] and which brought to a close the golden Edwardian innocence which had gone before.[4] In addition to its social impact, the catastrophic effects of the First World War on the human body have been well documented.[5] All of this seems to call into question the value of selecting the First World War as the perspective through which to suggest some fresh approaches relationship between the body and war. However, I want to suggest that it is precisely this highly represented, intensely historicised character which makes the First World War a potentially fruitful perspective through which to see the body and war differently. From a certain angle, it would appear that we know a lot of the important information about the First World War as an event: we know when it began and ended, and there is a general convergence of historical thinking surrounding its causes and broad geo-political effects. In this sense, the First World War seems thoroughly embedded in the past. However, this image of a past (and passed) discreet historical event can be unsettled through the figure of the shell shocked body, for whom the war will not pass, and in whom the unpredictable and affective effects of the war resonate, irresolvable by technological discourses about the geopolitical causes and effects of the war.

At the same time, the body itself was unsettled by the war, and the contingency of its construction exposed. The shell shocked body did not function in prescribed ways, and subverted the categories which had habitually been used to contain and explain bodies, for example 'courage', 'manliness' and the triumph of the will over the body. Foundations for understanding the body were disturbed, and this created the possibility for the unknown aspects of the body to momentarily appear. In Deleuzian terms, we

[3] See Eric Hobsbawm The Age of Extremes: 1914-1991 London: Abacus 2003
[4] See Paul Fussell The Great War and Modern Memory Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000 (3rd ed.). For a critique see Lynne Hanley Writing War: Fiction, Gender, and Memory Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1991
[5] See especially Leo Van Bergen Before my Helpless Sight: Suffering, Dying, and Military Medicine on the Western Front 1914-1918 London: Ashgate 2009

might say that the war and the body *deterritorialised* each other. What this means is that their relationship effected a movement from a system of organised 'things' with coherent identities, to a more indeterminate system of becoming which functions not by identity but by affect.[6] Bringing war and the body into relation in this way, it may be possible to see both of them differently, not as discreet objects or historical moments with coherent identities, but as entering into an affective relationship with each other. Of course, this does not mean that identity has no role to play. On the contrary, emphasising the contingent and constructed nature of 'war' and 'the body', it becomes possible to ask how these constructions are carried out. I aim to show the multiple ways in which the shell shocked body was constructed and explained. I have suggested that the shell shocked body rendered problematic the categories habitually used for constructing the body, but, in ways in which I will develop below, the disordered body was re-ordered and re-constructed in accordance with various images of the body. To return to Deleuzian terminology, we might say that *reterritorialisation* accompanies deterritorialisation. The 'coming undone' of deterritorialisation[7] is always followed by a process of remaking a subject, albeit possibly a 'flawed' one which suffers from 'neurosis, perversion, and psychosis'.[8]

I am suggesting that there are multiple 'apparatuses of capture'[9] to which the body is subject. If it fails to conform to the social regulatory norm, there are other disciplinary structures which construct and regulate disordered 'deviant' bodies. Deleuze says of the schizophrenic that 'the one who does not allow himself to be Oedipalized is psychoticized in the land of the asylum; when the one who escapes the family and the asylum is perverted in the artificial locales'.[10] In other words, there are multiple modes of bodily organisation or 'reterritorialisation', and flights of the body from organisation and regulation are always subject to recapture. Being named as such, deviant bodies are replaced on the hierarchy of bodies and organised relative to the 'normal majority'. However, the departure of bodies from the normal ordered standard has an effect on this standard, causing it to be brought into question, and weakening it as an organising

[6] Allusions to deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation exist throughout *Anti-Oedipus*. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004
[7] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p.354
[8] Ibid. p. 353
[9] This phrase is taken from *A Thousand Plateaus.* See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. and foreword Brian Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p. 468
[10] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 351

force. Deleuze says that 'deterritorialization is always double, because it implies the coexistence of a major variable and a minor variable in simultaneous becoming'.[11] What this suggests is that the shell shocked body (the minor term) and the 'normal' soldiers' body (the major term) unsettle each other through their proximity, and the parameters of both are changed.

This chapter examines the shell shocked body in the First World War in order to expand on the question of how a Deleuzian perspective can assist us in rethinking the body and war. I structure this exploration through the Deleuzian concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. I focus initially on the reterritorialisation of the shell shocked body: on the analytic and disciplinary tools which were used to make sense of the body and to ensure that it fitted into the broader social organisation of bodies. Construction and description are seen as part of the same process of organising and subdividing bodies in such a way as they may be 'managed'. Therefore, the way in which shell shocked bodies were named, diagnosed and treated are all relevant in tracing the way in which the body is disciplined. The goal was generally to return the body in question to the front in a useful state. However, even where this was not possible, the task of naming and treating the shell shocked soldier was necessary to render the body comprehensible within the existing social order, and to orientate it relative to 'normal bodies' and to other categories of 'lunatic'.[12] I try to show the ways in which therapists attempted to return the shell shocked body to a 'normal' body image. In the second section, I focus on the moments of deterritorialisation which existed between the body and war, and which put the coherence of both identities into question. Through this reading I try to show that the body and war may be understood not only through the language of bio-medicine and geo-politics, but that they may also be understood to be in a dynamic relationship of co-existence and co-becoming.

[11] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 338

[12] Fiona Reid points out that, in England, care was taken to differentiate shell shocked men from 'ordinary lunatics'. See Fiona Reid 'Distinguishing between Shell-shocked Veterans and Pauper Lunatics: The Ex-Services' Welfare Society and Mentally Wounded Veterans after the Great War' pp. 347-371 in War in History 2007 Vol. 14, No. 3

Territorialisation

Introducing Shell Shock: Naming and Diagnosis

Contemporary theoreticians of the problem of shell shock suggested that 'never before in the history of mankind have the stresses and strains laid upon body and mind been so great or so numerous as in the present [First World] war. We may therefore expect to find many cases which present not a single disease, not even a mixture, but a chemical compound of diseases, so to speak'.[13] Shell shock presented a challenge to diagnosis because of the way in which it seemed to complicate the parameters of individual responsibility, and the boundary between the individual and the wider community. Not only this, but the eventual grudging recognition that 'even highly moral men can be subject to shell shock'[14] challenged the notion that will-power could be the supreme determinant of manliness, as well as the idea that war was the proper arena in which this masculinity was exercised and developed.[15] As a consequence, the idea that the body and mind were mirrors of each other, and that will-power could exercise total control over them both, came under threat. In this section I wish to explore the ways in which conceptions of shell shock reflected a certain image of the 'normal' body, and its relationship to society and to 'the mind'. I suggest that the condition could be said to have emerged as a kind of borderline disorder which positioned it in disturbing proximity to the 'normal body'. I discuss this in the context of Deleuze's work on diagnosis and the work of constructing a certain kind of (in this case, degenerate) body.

The psychological and psycho-somatic diseases of shell shock were prefigured by a rise in apparently 'hysterical' conditions around the turn of the twentieth century which were generally ascribed to accelerating industrialisation. For example, 'railway spine' was an apparently hysterical paralysis which was found in people who had been in train crashes but who had escaped seemingly uninjured, only to be stricken in subsequent days. The rising prominence of nervous disorders led one doctor in 1909 to suggest that '[n]ervous breakdown is the disease of our age'.[16] The implication was that the socio-economic conditions were active in the production of a certain kind of psychological

[13] G. Elliot Smith and T.H. Pear Shell-Shock and its Lessons Manchester: Manchester University Press 1917 p. 2
[14] George L. Mosse 'Shell-shock as a Social Disease' pp. 101-108 in Journal of Contemporary History 2000 Vol. 35, No. 1 p. 105
[15] See Jessica Meyer 'Separating the Men from the Boys: Masculinity and Maturity in Understandings of Shell Shock in Britain' pp. 1-22 in Twentieth Century British History 2009 Vol. 20, No. 1
[16] Ben Shephard A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 London: Pimlico 2002 p. 10

disorder. However, co-existent with this was the view that only people who were already in some senses defective succumbed to nervous disorders. George L. Mosse writes that 'already in 1888 during the American Civil War, a report on soldiers' afflictions ... singled out those not able to adjust to the hardships of war as young men of feeble will and highly developed imaginative faculties'.[17] Though war neuroses predated the First World War, only then did they appear on such as scale that 'it was first recognized as a problem that necessitated serious military-medico diagnosis'.[18] The inability to cope with stresses was associated with certain groups, for example, the Irish,[19] and it has been suggested that, in the German case, the demarcation of certain groups as latently psychologically defective segued into a post-war racism. Mosse says that 'a line can be drawn from the wartime perception of shell-shock to the postwar defamation of left-wing and racial enemies. They also were suffering from the same unpatriotic social disease, except that if they were of an inferior race there was no cure'.[20] In this sense 'shell shock' signifies a failure to live up to the expectations of the state.

Because of the extent to which 'shell shock' was infused with assumptions about the proper function of the body and the moral failing behind bodily weakness,[21] diagnosis and judgement were inextricably linked. The term 'shell shock' was first used by Charles S. Myers, and in the first instance the symptoms were thought to be the result of being too close to an exploding shell and suffering from the compression and release of poisonous gasses.[22] This conviction of an organic cause became implausible, and was eventually supplanted by a more thoroughly 'psychological' view, and the term 'shell shock' was banned by the Army Medical Service in 1917,[23] having become a stigmatised term.[24] From 1915, instructions were that the 'shell shocked' individual be

[17] George L. Mosse 'Shell-shock as a Social Disease' p. 102
[18] Wendy Holden Shell Shock London Channel 4 1998 p. 7
[19] Joanna Bourke 'Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: The Sufferings of 'Shell-shocked' Men in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-39' pp. 57-69 in Journal of Contemporary History 2000 Vol. 35, No. 1
[20] George L. Mosse 'Shell-shock as a Social Disease' p. 107
[21] See Joanna Bourke Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War London: Reaktion 1996, Chapter 1
[22] Cathryn Corns and John Hughes-Wilson Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great War London: Cassell 2005 p. 73; Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely 'The Impact of Total War on the Practice of British Psychiatry' pp. 129-148 in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds) The Shadows of Total War Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003 p. 131
[23] Martin Stone 'Shellshock and the Psychologists' pp. 242-271 in W.F. Bynum et. al. (eds) The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry Vol. 2: Institutions and Society London: Routledge 1985 p. 258
[24] Ben Shephard A War of Nerves pp. 54-55

judged differentially according to whether their trauma was proven to be the direct consequence of enemy action, or whether it came after engagement of the enemy and was therefore more 'psychological' in character. This led to some men being classified as either 'shell shock—wounded' or shell-shock—sick'.[25] The latter attracted far less sympathy, and problems resulted from the time delay caused by attempts to discover into which category an individual properly fell.

The diagnosis and judgement of shell shock reveals the way in which the body was fractured along certain lines. For example, a purely psychological reaction to the war was regarded with a scepticism which did not attach to those who were physically injured. Physical injury was seen as being something which could happen to anyone, or was even read as a sign of heroism. In this way, a distinction was made between body and mind in which the latter was supposed to have complete mastery over the former. However, not only did shell shock and other nervous disorders complicate the relationship between body and mind, but they also blurred the boundary between individual or minority group responsibility and general social phenomena, so that it became possible simultaneously to suggest that neurosis was the consequence of industrialisation, and to argue that it was an affliction of enfeebled individuals or denigrated social groups. Finally, the boundary between a shell-shocked soldier and a 'normally traumatised' one was at times unclear. Pleading before an Army Medical Board for his friend Siegfried Sassoon to be labelled 'shell-shocked', Robert Graves burst into tears several times, leading a 'well known Harley Street psychologist' in attendance to remark, "Young man, you ought to be before this board yourself".[26] Moreover, the boundary between 'normal' and 'abnormal' could be very small in temporal terms, with cases moving from one to the other in a very short space of time. Charles S Myers observed that '[s]everal of my cases have been so temporary as to pass the border line from insanity to sanity while under care here [at a Casualty Clearing Station]'.[27]The work of conceptualising and diagnosing shell shock amounted to an effort to construct and organise distinctions between body, mind, and society.

Deleuze discusses the way in which the work of identifying symptoms and gathering them into a 'disease' is creative in ways analogous to the author's work of creating a

[25] Cathryn Corns and John Hughes-Wilson Blindfold and Alone p. 74
[26] Robert Graves Goodbye to All That London: Penguin Books 2000 p. 216
[27] Charles S. Myers Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 p. 83

fictional character. A character in a novel is the embodiment and dramatisation of a certain way of life. It is not so much the personality and the individuality of the protagonist in question which matters, but the way in which they are the expression of a certain way of living, bringing together certain characteristics and aspects to produce a certain effect. He suggests that symptomatology, which is 'the isolation of a set of signs which belong properly to that disease'[28] is to medicine what character-creation is to literature. For Deleuze, medicine is both etiology (the discovery of causes) and symptomatology (the organisation of signs), and it is the latter which makes diagnosis resemble a work of art or literature. Deleuze says that ''[e]tiology, which is the scientific or experimental side of medicine, must be subordinated to symptomatology, which is its literary, artistic aspect''.[29] The physician is somehow engaged organising the multiple expressions of deviation from 'normal' bodily behaviour, and deeming them to be indicative of (to be signs of) an umbrella syndrome designated 'shell shock'. In other words, the physician must interpret certain behaviours and feelings as *signs* of something else (a broader clinical phenomenon) before naming this syndrome.

Of course, the identification and organisation of signs is not 'simply' a matter of representation. As I outlined in the previous chapter, Deleuze and Guattari are troubled by the role of representation in psychoanalysis, because of the way in which it places constraints on the way in which signs must be interpreted. They are never in themselves, but are always understood with reference to some theory about what certain signs or symptoms 'really' mean. In the case of the Oedipus Complex, for example, its powers of explanation 'are ideological forms, which have taken the place of units of production'.[30] The effect of this is to materially restrict the extent to which desire invests the social world directly and is seen as so doing, for the ideological forms act as a mirror which reflects desire back onto the individual body. Thus, the individual is pathologised and society is exonerated and allowed to continue unaffected. The danger is that diagnosis becomes a conservative device which underwrites the bodily ideal when it names deviance from it. The extent to which the diagnosis itself is a product of a certain socio-political configuration of power is elided by the re-inscription of signs onto the body itself. The danger is the diagnosis takes place with respect to the 'normal'

[28] Daniel W. Smith '"A Life of Pure Immanence": Deleuze's "Critique et Clinique" Project' pp. xi-liii in Gilles Deleuze (trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael Greco) Essays Critical and Clinical Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1997 p. xvi
[29] In Ibid. p. xvii
[30] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 326

ego, and therefore takes the form of an identification of the avenues of departure from this.[31]

H.C. Marr wrote in 1919 that '[n]umerous anomalies of the bodily framework and organs are now universally acknowledged as indications of mental deficiency, backwardness and instability';[32] the idea being that physical features could be used as a diagnostic tool to reveal underlying psychological defects. The causes of these could be heredity,[33] physical damage[34] or nervous strain without physical damage.[35] The work is one of gathering up various expressions and behaviours and returning them to a body which can be apprehended as an object for knowledge. This process changed bodies and changed the knowledge that was held about them. But it also revealed much about the way in which bodies are (re-)constructed, and the lapses in this process through which we can see the escape of desire, or the reservoir of the unknown, which lies behind every body. I expand on the idea of the construction of a divided body in the section on psychoanalysis and shell shock below.

The Ego and the Divided Body

The ego was one device through which to explain and constrain the unruly body of the shell-shocked soldier. The psychoanalytic approach tended to posit the cause of shell shock as residing within the ego, or as being caused by a crisis in the ego triggered by war. In this way, the body and the ego are presented as being functionally independent, albeit with mediated relations between them. I discuss the way in which this body/war relation is produced and what is excluded or taken for granted by it. Moreover, in producing shell shock as a personal and somehow internally generated dysfunction, the wider socio-political implications of it are concealed. The political character of bodily expression is excluded both in terms of the causes of shell shock and in terms of its consequences.[36] As a therapeutic stratagem, psychoanalysis was of limited utility in the First World War, not least because it was too time-consuming. In addition, there was

[31] Daniel W. Smith '"A Life of Pure Immanence" p. xx
[32] H. C. Marr Psychoses of the War including Neurasthenia and Shell-Shock London: Hodder and Staughton 1919 p. 31
[33] Ibid. p. 48
[34] Ibid. p. 49
[35] Ibid. p. 50
[36] See Jenny Edkins Trauma and the Memory of Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003 p.50

arguably a suspicion of psychoanalysis in Britain,[37] because of a general 'physicalist' bias, and due to a distaste for what were seen as its excessively sexual preoccupations.[38] This notwithstanding, it became incorporated into British practice in diluted form.[39] Moreover, it was often regarded as being a more 'humane' counterpoint to some more 'physical' methods which will be explored in further detail below.

Shell shock presented a challenge to Freud in terms of the need to establish the extent to which 'war neurosis' was a specific form of neurosis separate to that seen in peacetime. Freud argued that 'most of the neurotic conditions which had been brought about by the war disappeared on the cessation of the war conditions',[40] and therefore that the war must be active in producing a certain kind of neurosis, which must nonetheless be explicable in terms of the ego. He determined that the war produced a certain form of ego conflict which accounted for the symptoms of neurosis or 'shell shock'. War neuroses were understood to be the consequence of 'the conflict [which] takes place between the old ego of peace time and the new war-ego of the soldier, and it becomes acute as soon as the peace-ego is faced with the danger of being killed through the risky undertakings of his newly formed parasitical double. Or one might put it, the old ego protects itself from the danger to life by flight into the traumatic neurosis in defending itself against the new ego which it recognises as threatening its life'.[41] These are distinct from a 'traumatic neurosis' which does not depend on any ego conflict, and occurs after a fright even in peacetime.[42]

This conflict arose in part because '[t]he manhood of a nation is in war not only allowed, but encouraged and ordered to indulge in behaviour of a kind that is thoroughly abhorrent to the civilised mind, to commit deeds and witness sights that are thoroughly revolting to our aesthetic and moral disposition'.[43] One ego was bound by the norms of war, the other by the norms of peace, and this produced violent conflict between them. But the question is also one of narcissism, because the flight from this

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[37] Anthony Babington Shell-Shock: A History of the Changing Attitudes to War Neuroses London: Leo Cooper 1997 pp. 32-33. This has been contested. See Tracey Loughran 'Shell-Shock and Psychological Medicine in First World War Britain' pp. 1-17 in Social History of Medicine 2009
[38] Charles S. Myers Shell Shock in France p. 59
[39] Cathryn Corns and John Hughes-Wilson Blindfold and Alone p. 80
[40] Sigmund Freud 'Introduction' pp. 1-4 in S. Ferenczi et al. Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses London: The Psycho-Analytic Press 1921 p. 1
[41] Ibid. pp. 2-3
[42] Ibid. p. 3
[43] Dr. Ernst Jones 'War Shock and Freud's Theory of the Neuroses' pp. 44-59 in S. Ferenczi et al Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses p. 48

conflict which neurosis was the expression of was based on the desire for self-preservation, or even simply for an easier life. In a speech given at the 'Fifth International Psycho-Analytical Congress', Freudian analyst Dr. S. Ferenczi argued that there was an element of 'wish fulfilment' in war neurosis, according to which the patient has an interest in a military pension, security away from the front, and so on. To support this point, he argued that 'traumatic neuroses are practically never seen in prisoners of war. The prisoners of war have no interest in remaining sick after being captured... The theory of mechanistic shock can never explain to us this difference in the behaviour of our own soldiers and prisoners of war'.[44]

The (divided) ego is posited as being the foundation upon which the shell-shocked[45] body may be understood. These active components in the production of disorder are isolated from the 'organic' or 'mechanistic' aspects of the body, which must be presented as being irrelevant to the understanding of shell shock. Dismissing the connection between physical trauma and shell shock, Karl Abraham insisted that 'men who have received severe organic injuries show such mental attitudes which must surprise us. For example, I have always found that in the amputation hospitals a strikingly cheerful mood prevails'.[46] Physical symptoms which are manifested as part of the neurosis are precisely only symptoms of something mental: 'all physical symptoms represent conversions of something psychical',[47] since '[t]he body is the instrument of the mind upon which it (the mind) allows its unconscious to manifest itself in plastic and mimic expression'.[48] Paul Lerner suggests that '[i]n their steadfast rejection of traumatic pathology, psychiatrists implicitly denied the traumatizing impact of war as a whole and in many cases embraced it as a positive influence on the minds of individuals and the spirit of the nation'.[49] Psychoanalysis enabled its practitioners to be positive towards the war while continuing to treat those whom it had ravaged by dividing the ego off from 'the body' (narrowly conceived).

In order to preserve the ego and the wider psyche as the privileged domain for causation and explanation, it was necessary for the psychoanalysts to demarcate the ego from the

[44] S. Ferenczi 'Speech given to the Fifth International Psycho-Analytical Congress' pp. 5-21 in S. Ferenczi et al. Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses p. 9
[45] It is worth reiterating that shell shock and neurosis are not (necessarily) synonymous.
[46] Dr Karl Abraham pp. 22-29 in S. Ferenczi et al. Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses p. 26
[47] Dr. Ernst Simmel pp. 30-43 in Ibid. p. 31
[48] Ibid. p. 31
[49] Paul Lerner Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry and the Politics of Trauma in Germany 1890-1930 Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2003 p. 10

physical body so that hurt or trauma to the latter could not be a causal factor in disorders of the former. Influence was seen to run from the ego to the body, which was only the 'instrument of the mind' so that all disorders of war could be seen to originate from within the neurotic. As Lerner points out, many psychoanalysts were actually firm adherents to the idea that the experience of war could be highly beneficial in curing a '"decaying culture... [and a] degenerate nervous epoch"'.[50] He quotes a doctor as saying that "[t]he experience of war causes things that concern the individual ego to appear less significant, the attention is devoted to the body populace [*Volkskörper*], the individual feels no longer in the center of things, rather as a member of the whole nation".[51] War can overcome the narcissistic impulses of the ego. What this indicates is that the coherence of the ego is of the utmost importance, while the body is only incidental. As long as a soldier is fully invested in the body-politic, then it should not matter that his own flesh is damaged.

From a Deleuzian point of view, there is a homology between the coherence of the subject and the coherence of the body: 'The dissolutions of the logical identity of the subject has as its correlate the physical disintegration of the organic body'.[52] The endurance of this arrangement is dependent upon the wider social order which regulates desire in such a way so as to support the organised body, for it cannot depend on any foundation in nature. In many instances, Deleuze uses theistic language to express the way in which the integrity of the body and the self are anchored to each other. For example, he says that '[e]very time desire is betrayed... a priest is behind it',[53] adding that '[t]he most recent figure of the priest is the psychoanalyst'.[54] What is meant by the 'betrayal' of desire is that this priest figure strives to bind it to the individual subject/body who is subject only to *personal* desires, hallucinations and nightmares which have nothing to do with the rest of society and mean only that this individual has failed to overcome some issue from their childhood, or to resolve their relationship with their parents.

Continuing in this language of religiosity, Deleuze says that '[Pierre] Klossowski insists that God is the sole guarantor of the identity of the self and of its substantive base, that

[50] Ibid. p. 49
[51] Ibid. p. 50
[52] Daniel W. Smith '"A Life of Pure Immanence" p. xxxvii
[53] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p 171
[54] Ibid. p. 171

is, of the integrity of the body. One cannot conserve the self without also holding on to God. The death of God essentially signifies, and essentially entails, the dissolution of the self: God's tomb is also the tomb of the self'.[55] What is meant by 'God' here? I suggest that 'God' refers to the capacity for judgement, specifically, the judgement between things; the capacity to distinguish between one thing or being and another, and to assign them relations of priority with respect to each other.[56] In order for the psychoanalyst to be able to determine what is properly of the ego, what of the body and what of the world, he must operate in a social environment which is structured such as to make such distinctions possible. That is to say, God (an organised social structure) must exist in order for the psychoanalyst/priest to do his work of binding desire to the ego. This being the case, the body is accorded a position inferior to that of the ego, and is given no positive creative power of its own.

However, if we question or refuse the social conditions and underlying assumptions which serve as the conditions of possibility for the hierarchical organisation of the ego, body, and social world, it becomes more difficult to make these psychoanalytic distinctions. Deleuze and Guattari argue that '[f]rom the alienated starting point of our pseudo-sanity, everything is equivocal. Our sanity is not 'true' sanity. Their madness is not 'true' madness. The madness of our patients is an artefact of the destruction wreaked on them by us and on them by themselves. Let no one suppose we meet 'true' madness any more than we are truly sane... True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego'.[57] It might seem curious or even callous to suggest that the shell shocked soldier is not absolutely more 'insane' than the non-shell shocked one, given the level of suffering involved. However, Deleuze does not mean to argue that the sane or the insane are any 'happier'. Indeed, 'pleasure' (or 'happiness) is problematic for Deleuze because it is concerned with reinforcing the organised body/coherent subject.[58] In other words, pleasure is personal: *I* feel it. Moreover, the 'mad', those who are dissolved bodies and dispersed identities, 'know incredible sufferings'.[59]

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[55] Gilles Deleuze (trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale) The Logic of Sense London: Continuum 2004 p. 334
[56] Deleuze says that God stands for 'the master of the disjunctive syllogism' (Anti-Oedipus p. 14), which refers to the determination of 'this is not that'.
[57] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 143
[58] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p 173
[59] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 142

I have tried to show that psychoanalytic understandings of shell shock involved dividing the body into the essential and the inessential, the active and the passive. The commitments of the Freudian psychoanalysts meant that it was necessary for them to see shell shock in terms of a disorder of the ego, where the ego was somehow doubled between a 'war ego' and a 'peace ego' which were in conflict and in need of reconciliation. Dismissing the wider affects and responses of the body as mere epiphenomena of the ego meant that the body was merely a passive reflection of the inner workings of the psyche. This sets up a distinction between the surface (the body), which was in need of interpretation in the light of the analysts inner knowledge of the depth (the psyche), which was the real source of all disorder and therefore the only possible site for its resolution. Contrary to this order of priority, Deleuze insists upon the privileged status of the surface,[60] which is the space for becoming and change. This is in part because the notion of depth creates a distinction between the ego and the world which can only be bridged by mediation (through images and behaviours which require interpretation by the analyst). Moreover, the schism between the soldier and the war is absolute, since the internal ego is the source of all disorder, and the fate of the body make no impact upon it.

Speech, Therapy and the Shell Shocked Body

Shell shock had multiple bodily expressions or symptoms, which were found to be differentially distributed among soldiers of different levels of seniority. For example, officers were twice as likely to suffer from shell shock as those in the ranks.[61] On the other hand, officers were less likely to suffer from physical paralysis, the suggestion being that their more 'complex and varied' mental life meant that they did not need to take recourse to these crude physical forms of shell shock.[62] However, this does not mean that no officers suffered from paralysis, blindness or mutism.[63] I want here to address the phenomenon of 'mutism [and] hysterical mutism'[64] as a component of shell shock. This is interesting from the point of view of the body because it entails a

[60] Gilles Deleuze The Logic of Sense p. 10
[61] Martin Stone 'Shellshock and the Psychologists' p. 249
[62] Elaine Showalter The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture 1830-1980 London: Virago 1987 p. 175
[63] See the case studies in Lewis R. Yealland Hysterical Disorders of Warfare London: Macmillan and Co. 1918
[64] Peter Leese 'Why Are They Not Cured? British Shellshock Treatment During the Great War' pp. 205-221 in Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner (eds) Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma in the Modern Age 1870-1930 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001 p. 217'

rejection of the way in which the body is supposed to function, and a refusal to carry out the duties which it ought to carry out. This should not be taken to imply a conscious decision to refuse or reject. Rather the body itself is the source of this reconceptualisation of its social function, in which it ceases to function as an organism 'ought'. Moreover, the treatment may be understood as being a disciplinary measure which insists that the fractured body articulate itself as an organised body once more.

It was not uncommon for a shell shocked soldier to be "entirely mute, unable to make the slightest sound, whistle or blow".[65] This made the ego inaccessible from a therapeutic perspective, and therefore presented a problem in terms of treatment. The history of the treatment of mutism and paralysis in the First War World often focuses on the work of L.R. Yealland, who was, according to Ben Shephard, 'a medical primitive... who revealed a talent for treating hysterical patients—driving the devils of paralysis and mutism from their bodies with evangelical fervour and electric shocks'.[66] Yealland's approach has been criticised on the grounds that it was inhumane, and that he deployed the inequality of power between him and the patient in order to ensure their compliance.[67] It is significant, however, in terms of the way in which the body is disciplined into becoming again subordinate to the powers of language and reason, and due to what it reveals about the importance of speech in sustaining an organised body. The problem of mutism in shell shock is illuminating in terms of the work of making sense (of war), and the extent to which the body is implicated in this.

Yealland's technique generally involved restraining the patient in a darkened room and informing them that they would be unable to leave until 'cured'. He then applied electric shocks ('faradic current') to the larynx (in the case of mutism) while asking the patient to speak. Reporting on the treatment of a 24 year old private suffering from persistent mutism, Yealland said that '[p]lacing the pad electrode on the lumbar spines and attaching the long pharyngeal electrode, I said to him, "You will not leave this room until you are talking again; no, not before"... a strong faradic current was applied to the posterior wall of the pharynx... "Remember, you must behave as becomes the hero I expect you to be," I said'.[68] Becoming distressed, and convinced that electric

[65] Caroline Cox 'Invisible Wounds: The American Legion, Shell-Shocked Veterans, and American Society 1919-1924' pp. 280-305 in Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner (eds) Traumatic Pasts p. 289
[66] Peter Leese 'Why Are They Not Cured?' p. 207
[67] Jessica Meyer 'Separating the Men from the Boys' p. 13
[68] Lewis R. Yealland Hysterical Disorders of Warfare p. 9

current was the route to cure; the patient requested that more shocks be applied to speed the process up. Yealland responded "[s]uggestions are not wanted from you; they are not needed. When the time comes for more electricity you will be given it, whether you wish it or not".[69] Finally, the patient can speak. "Are you glad to have made such progress [Yealland asked]?" I expected him to answer me, but he did not; instead he began to cry and whispered in a stammer "I want a drink of water".[70]

The point is not to pass judgement on Yealland's apparently harsh methods, although Joanna Bourke suggests that they contained 'a strong element of torture'.[71] The purpose is rather to investigate the ways in which speech and discipline come together to form a certain image of the body and to repress the fractures in this body image and conceal the extent to which it is a political construct. It is possible to suggest that the body-image may be somehow shattered through war, and the mute or paralysed body is a form of expression of this, revealing at the same time the extent to which the 'organised body' is a political product rather than being a natural one. In this sense, the project of making the body speak and move as it should entails erasing the body's capacity to express the sense and affect of war, and to return the body to its passive and subordinate position. Deleuze said that 'language brings the identity of a person and the integrity of a body together in a responsible self, but maintains a silence about all the forces which cause the dissolution of this self'.[72] There are things of which one cannot speak in as much as that speaking is about identity and integrity, so speaking of the forces of dissolution and the disorganised body must be a different kind of expression.

For Deleuze, language does not originate with those who speak it. Rather than being a form of 'self expression', speaking is a gesture of conformity with a certain kind of social structure and a certain set of rules about what is articulable and how. Language is not about 'communicating information'[73] but exists in order to 'be obeyed, and to compel obedience'.[74] Language is a profoundly social institution,[75] but one which functions such as to require a certain kind of body in those who speak it: a mouth which speaks, a body which is the silent objective object for knowledge and that which can be

[69] Ibid. p. 10
[70] Ibid. p. 11
[71] Joanna Bourke Dismembering the Male p. 116
[72] Gilles Deleuze The Logic of Sense p. 331
[73] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 84
[74] Ibid. p. 84
[75] Ibid. p. 88

spoken of but which can never speak: 'It is not only our mouth that feels beset upon, forced to utter unending explications of every word, but our bodies. For words energise, prod, badger, poke at, harass, excite, agitate, soothe, hypnotise and stupefy our bodies'.[76] Just as important as what is said, therefore, is what is not said. To speak in language means to speak according to the rule of language, which is accustomed to naming discreet bodies which belong to coherent subjects, so it involves a kind of acceptance of a certain kind of social order, as well as a repression of the capacity of the body for dissolution, change, rupture, and so on.

For Deleuze and Guattari, speaking and saying 'I' is one of the ways in which a body is disciplined into a coherent form, identified with a subject. This is a process by which the individuality of the body is imposed. Of course, saying 'I' does not account for the different modes of being of those who pronounce it: the linguistic container 'I' is in this sense generic rather than 'singular'. But its function is to act as part of the apparatus which forms the individual body and separates it from 'politics' and 'society'. Hence Deleuze's schizophrenic, a figure who expresses the possibility of refusing this disciplinary move, says that '"I won't say I any more, I'll never utter the word again; it's just too damn stupid. Every time I hear it, I'll use the third person instead, if I happen to remember to. If it amuses them. And it won't make one bit of difference'.[77] In this sense, the failure to conform to the demands of linguistic convention is a form of resistance which is of importance for the body because it implicitly refuses the self-evidence of the body, and thereby creates the space for alternate expressions to emerge. In other words, the possibility exists for the forces of dissolution to be expressed.

Deleuze says that '[r]epressive forces don't stop people expressing themselves but rather force them to express themselves'.[78] Moreover, '[s]tupidity's never blind or mute. So it's not a problem of getting people to express themselves but of providing little gaps of solitude and silence in which they might eventually have something to say'.[79] Those who speak unproblematically are not really saying anything new, but merely reproducing the forces of order and cohesion which underlie the construction of their 'social reality'. But there is another reality, that of dissolution and the flux of

[76] Alphonso Lingis 'Language and Persecution' pp. 169-182 in Paul Patton and John Protevi (eds) Between Deleuze and Derrida London: Continuum 2003 p. 170
[77] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 25
[78] Gilles Deleuze 'Mediators' pp. 121-134 in Gilles Deleuze (trans Martin Joughin) Negotiations 1972-1990 New York: Columbia University Press 1995 p. 129
[79] Ibid. p. 129

becoming which pays attention not to forms but to movements. In literature, Deleuze credits Franz Kafka with using language so as to expose its own fractures and partiality, and thereby creating the space for novelty: he manages to 'bring language slowly and progressively to the desert. To use syntax in order to cry, to give a syntax to the cry'.[80] Returning to the question of mutism as a form of shell shock, it is possible to read this as an instance of the fallibility of language, whereby the horrors of war cannot be expressed in quotidian language. Moreover, to attempt to express them thus would efface the impact of the war on the body and the very intimacy of the forces of dissolution. Yealland's therapy is an effort to compel compliance with the social order that language represents and thereby to discard the potentially unsettling or fragmentary consequences of war. Addressing a 24 year old Major with a stammer, Yealland records himself as having said "At present I do not care what you think or say, because you are not normal".[81] Only once 'normalised' is the patient able and permitted to speak (and be listened to), by which time there may very well be nothing left to say.

Deterritorialisation

State, Society and War

Approaches to war and society tend to emphasise the primacy of the latter in constructing identities.[82] In seeking to understand and explain the shell shocked body, attempts have been made to address it in terms of biology, either in the sense that it has an organic origin, or a congenital one. Alternatively, the psychoanalysts in particular sought to understand the shell shocked body through the prism of the ego and the ego conflict engendered by war. I want here to turn to the question of whether the space or idea of war can act as a foundation for understanding the shell shocked body, and if so; how. It is necessary to be careful about exactly what is meant here. The idea of a 'foundation' indicates an explanatory power. For example, if we suggest that the shell shocked body is founded in ego conflict, this means that everything about it is reducible to, and explicable in terms of, this ego conflict. Ego conflict causes shell shock, and all its symptoms and behaviours are no more than expressions of this. Of course, this is a caricatured presentation in the sense that most analysts of shell shock would admit more

[80] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans. Dana Polen, foreword Réda Bensmaïa) Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1986 p. 26
[81] Lewis R. Yealland Hysterical Disorders of Warfare p. 26
[82] Eric J. Leed No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979 p. 5

than one such foundation, or 'cause', or would allow that different causes may be operational at different moments. The questions under investigation here are: does war provide a foundation and context for the organisation of the body analogous to the state? If so, then one way in which we might consider the problem of the shell shocked body is as being 'caused by' war. But this does not produce a non-foundational thinking of the body, it rather territorialises the body through war. So the ultimate question becomes: can we think the relationship between war and the body differently?

In the early twentieth century, war was sometimes held to be a curative for the problems and pathologies of an unhealthy society. Ernst Jünger said that '[w]e lived aimlessly and were even proud of it. As sons of an age intoxicated by material achievements, we believed that progress would bring bliss, that machines would be the key to becoming god-like. But beneath this artificial mask, beneath all disguises in which we draped ourselves as magicians, we remained naked and barbaric'.[83] Technology was a modern instrument for man's eternal will to power, serving only to make him more powerful.[84] The contention was that society restrained the natural will to power of man under the repressive blanket of civilisation, and that this caused neurosis and unhappiness and could be cured by the war environment, which was more 'natural' and more in keeping with man's 'true' character. Fritz Kreisler wrote of his experiences in the Austrian Army that '[i]n the field all neurotic symptoms seem to disappear as if by magic, and one's whole system is charged with energy and vitality. Perhaps this is due to the open air life with its simplified standards, freed from all the complex exigencies of society's laws and unhampered by conventionalities'.[85]

The idea was the war was a liberation from the stultifying demands of domesticity and 'polite society', to which man had to bend his true desires. Carl Zuckmayer wrote that the war was a liberation from the '"pettiness and littleness" of the bourgeois family'.[86] This seems to present war as a space in which desire is less constrained by the demands of society, and we might expect to find a different kind of body politics in operation there. However, the quotidian means of war betrayed this vision. Industrialised war

[83] Ernst Jünger in Thomas Rohkrämer 'Strangelove, or How Ernst Jünger Learned to Love Total War' pp. 179-196 in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds) The Shadows of Total War p. 184
[84] Ibid. p. 185
[85] In Eric J. Leed No Man's Land p. 64
[86] Ibid. p. 58

deprived its participants of the space for heroism and individual agency.[87] In addition, war was functionally closely integrated into society. Ernst Jünger said that '[i]n this clash, it is no longer, as it was in the days of the sword, the individual who counts, but the big organisms. Levels of production and technology, chemistry, the school system and railway networks: these are the powers that invisibly stand behind the smoke of the battles of material'.[88] Moreover, bodies at war were very highly regimented, and rather than being an idealised return to some pre-civilisational atavism, the war was actually a kind of society of its own, and, in the case of the British forces in France, one which was very geographically and socially proximate to, and integrated with, 'the home front'.[89]

I would suggest that the First World War was not unproblematically 'a space apart' from society in general. Many of the organising principles of society (class, for example) were reproduced in the war. The extent to which military discipline attempted to make soldiers out of civilians was not a world away from the attempts of the public schools to do the same. To an extent, a key attribute of the early twentieth century 'man' was that he was at all times ready to fight for his honour and that of his country, and always retained a martial discipline over himself and his emotions. In this respect, it would be erroneous to be convinced by the more florid responses to the war (which in any case tended to die out as it dragged on) which suggested that it could be this space outside society in which untrammelled desire could escape from the straightjacket of civilised society. In fact, when at war, the demand that men master themselves and permit no uncontrolled behaviour, no extraneous emotion, meant that the body was even more strictly regulated than usual. Because of the firm discipline it exacted, it is difficult to perceive the war as being a cause of, or foundation for, the transitive shell shocked body, at least in the straightforward sense. However, the war, like the body, was not exhausted by its formal and governable properties. Rather, to an extent, 'World War I.... defied attempts to control it, and turned every participant into its sorcerer's apprentice'.[90] I will suggest three possible ways in which the war impacts on the (shell shocked) body: in terms of an image or idea which somehow liberated desire, in terms of bodily resistance and in terms of the 'social outsider'.

[87] See Thomas Rohkrämer 'Strangelove'
[88] In Ibid. p. 182
[89] See Paul Fussell The Great War and Modern Memory p. 64
[90] Thomas Rohkrämer 'Strangelove' p. 179

War Fever: The Coming War

The impending war was greeted with a measure of enthusiasm in the participant nations, and the responses to it are interesting in terms of the relationship between the war and the body, which was a potentially destabilising, unstructuring one. For example, Gertrude Bäumer of the League of German Women's Associations, recalled that in August 1914, "[t]he limitations of our ego broke down, our blood flowed to the blood of others, we felt ourselves one body in a mystical unification".[91] Here the impact of the spectre of the coming war is presented explicitly in terms of the erosion of the normal body boundaries and the individualism of the ego, and a new form of community which is not composed of a collection of individuals but of a pure collectivity. Eric Leed says that '[t]he best analogy to August [1914] is not the revolutionary overthrow of an established social order but the temporary disordering or reversal of social status that takes place in festivals',[92] characterised by '"insubordinate libido"'.[93] Rather than the overthrow of social order, which would deploy pre-existing identities as a trigger for a re-organisation of hierarchies, what is being suggested here is a situation in which hierarchies cease to have a capacity to organise life. Identities no longer regulate social interaction, and therefore what is being described is in some senses non-personal. Leed says that '[i]t was an outbreak of madness which raged through the streets at that time, an explosion such as had already been experienced and described, but which had never been fanned into such a world-burning flame'.[94]

The suggestion is that, at least momentarily, the oncoming war triggered a new form of body and a new kind of community which does not supersede the existing one but rather operates alongside it. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest a form of embodiment which is 'really *against* the body and *for* the common performativity of queer social flesh'.[95] The body is organised and ordered by social disciplinary forces—this is why it makes sense to be 'against' the body. Once disordered, bodies may connect and interrelate in ungoverned ways which are not tied to the principle of identity. It then becomes necessary to enquire how the spectre of war could be the foundation, or cause, of this new bodily being. The answer is that it could not, at least in

[91] In Paul Lerner Hysterical Men p. 51
[92] Eric J. Leed No Man's Land p. 45
[93] Ibid. p. 47
[94] Ibid. p. 40
[95] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire London: Penguin 2005 p. 199

the straightforward sense. Deleuze's discussions of the 'revolutionary' events of May 1968 resonate in certain ways with Leed's observations about August 1914. And for Deleuze, May 1968 in certain senses defied the laws of historical causation. Rather, this was 'a lawless deviation, an unstable condition that opens up a new field of the possible'.[96]

Eric Leed suggests that August 1914 saw a kind of erosion of the powers of identity, in which a disobedient 'madness' took over from the strictly regulated normal business of society. This is not 'revolutionary' in the standard sense, since it did not involve a project to overthrow the government or take charge of the state (indeed, it may have been triggered by enthusiasm for the state). However, in a Deleuzian sense it may be considered 'revolutionary'. Deleuze says that 'May '68 was an astonishing revelation. Desiring power accelerated to a point where it exploded all the splinter groups. They regrouped later on when they participated in the business of restoring order with other repressive forces: the CGT [Communist Workers' Union], the PC [Communist Party], the CRS [the riot police]'.[97] He is exasperated with those who despair at the possibility for a real revolution and who bemoan the fact that all revolutionary impulse is always being betrayed: 'You really have to be dimwitted….'[98] There have been authentic revolutionary moments throughout history 'an absolutely revolutionary America…announced the 'new man' just as the Bolshevik revolution announced the 'new man''.[99] Revolutions are always with us. The confusion comes (for the dimwitted…) with the failure to distinguish between *revolution* and *becomings-revolutionary*.

One should not think the euphoria of August 1914, nor the 'revolution' of May 1968, in terms of their outcomes. August 1914 collapsed into the dreary and regimented work of waging 'total war', and May 1968 did not end with the ultimate collapse of the Gaullist government. But for Deleuze, this would be beside the point; or rather, to lament these failures indicates that we have missed the point. Insofar as the protesters of May '68 had aims, they were not revolutionary. Aims are connected to a certain identity, a

[96] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 'May '68 Did Not Take Place' at http://www.illogicaloperation.com/textz/deleuze_gilles_guattari_felix_may_68.htm Accessed 05/04/09
[97] Gilles Deleuze 'On Capitalism and Desire' pp. 262-273 in Gilles Deleuze (ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina) Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974 New York: Semiotext(e) 2004 pp. 265-266
[98] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (trans Charles Stivale) ''G' as in Gauche' in Deleuze's ABC Interview Available at http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/Cstivale/D-G/ABC1.html Accessed 02/02/08 p. 13
[99] Ibid. p. 13

certain project, and a certain vision of society. What is revolutionary, however, is the dissolution of identity itself. One might say that August 1914 was revolutionary to the extent that it caused identity and individuality to become swept away, a necessarily temporary insurrection, or deterritorialisation, of 'insubordinate libido'. Rather than seeing war as an organising foundation for the body, here the war-to-come is presented as being a *dis*ordering influence which erodes the identity of the body and the distinctions between bodies. Moreover, the position of these disordered bodies in relation to the war-to-come is unclear. They are not straightforwardly participants or non-participants, but may be said to exist in a certain mode of anticipation towards it.

The purpose of highlighting the disordering influence of the war-to-come is to avoid the impression that the transformative powers of war are limited to changing one thing into another. For example, to propose that the First World War gave way to modernity is to posit its effect as changing one kind of social order into another. Similarly, the notion that men were changed from innocents into cynics by the war posits a change from one form of subjectivity to another. These changes may very well have taken place. However, I wish to suggest that what must also be taken into account is change in itself, the exploration of which must dispense with the idea that 'war' is wholly determined by a concrete political-historical occurrence with firm parameters and boundaries of experience. This is because to think in terms of experience tends to assume a coherent being which does the experiencing. On the contrary, I want to suggest that the shell shocked figure expresses the fractured bodily coherence and shattered ego which is in some sense the corollary of the 'insubordinate libido' which is said to have erupted in August 1914. Although war in one sense constructs bodies, for example, that of the disciplined soldier, it also deconstructs them through the unpredictable consequences of its frightening, exciting, exhausting and unknown aspects. In this sense, war is not only a mode through which the body can be explained and understood, through tropes of bravery and comradeship, for example, and through images of the idealised soldier. It is also a prism through which the disordered and unknown facets of the body may be expressed, and thereby may function also as an *anti*-foundation which serves as a cipher for deterritorialisation.

Resistance

I have discussed the possibility that the anticipation that war might constitute a space separate from society which was characterised by a higher degree of freedom and authenticity. However, this possibility was thwarted by the realities of the First World War. On the contrary, the war was thoroughly contaminated both by social norms and the continuing relevance of the class system, for example, but also by the demands of military discipline. In a sense this should not surprise us, since there is no 'authentic' or 'natural' mode of being, but only the possibility for becoming. Rather than suggest that there is some mode of life which is the ultimate goal, the Deleuzian point would be rather to consider the evasion of fixed and bounded forms of being and the emphasis on movement and becoming. It is only this mode of life which takes account of the ultimately unknown, and unknowable, character of the body, and does not foreclose the possibilities it has for forging connections. I want to suggest that one can understand the shell shocked body in terms of an expression of resistance, not only to the demands of military life, but to also to the organising principles of society in general, and their demands on the body. I take 'resistance' in this sense to refer to an assertion of the unknown potentials of the body, taking the form of an evasion of the disciplinary project of power. It is not a straightforward confrontation with power since, as suggested above, retaining the form of the organised body and changing only its position in the hierarchy of power is not 'real' change at all and expresses compliance rather than resistance.

Ben Shephard argues that 'we must see the shell-shocked soldier not simply as a victim, silently suffering, powerless to help himself, but as an agent, using his medical symptoms as a weapon of resistance to military authority'.[100] However, I would suggest that it is not productive to focus on the question of agency and agents, or at the very least, that this needs to be handled with care. The notion of agency suggests intentionality, which is misleading and even cruel in the context of genuine and un-affected suffering that many shell shocked soldiers endured. In the light of the contemporary suspicions about 'malingering' and the falsification of symptoms among soldiers,[101] it seems inappropriate to allow room for misinterpretation here. More seriously, I would suggest that the point of exploring shell shock as a vector of

[100] Ben Shephard A War of Nerves p. xxi
[101] See Anthony Babington Shell-Shock pp. 11-12

resistance is precisely that it seems to express resistance as a flight from the ordered subject-body which is the site for discipline and control. I have suggested that the organised body is the consequence of a work of social control, but also in some sense its condition of possibility, since disciplinary measures require a coherent object upon which to work. Allan Feldman has suggested that when power explicitly and directly takes the body as its object, it becomes vulnerable due to the extent that it has staked its claim to mastery on the compliance of the subjugated body.[102] In this sense, shell shock as a fracture in the body image/ego may be seen in terms of the subversion of, or resistance to, the norms of body politics.

Confined to a home for those traumatised by the war, the war poet Siegfried Sassoon was 'diagnosed' with a 'very strong 'anti-war' complex'[103] by his sympathetic therapist. He soon came to disparage his fellow suffers. He wrote that '[w]ith my "fellow-breakdowns" I avoided war talk as far as was possible... Sometimes I had the uncomfortable notion that none of them respected one another; it was as though there was a tacit understanding that we were all failures, and this made me want to reassure myself that I wasn't the same as the others. "After all, I haven't broken down; I've only broken out", I thought'.[104] Their 'authentic' shell shock was presented as being somehow inferior to his politically directed protest. A distinction is being drawn between a deliberate protest in which the former soldier retains a sense of agency and self-control, and 'genuine' shell shock, in which he does not. However, from a Deleuzian perspective, it is possible to suggest that all 'breakdown' is also 'breaking out' insofar as that it escapes from the restraints of the organised body. Deleuze says that '[m]adness need not be all breakdown …It may also be breakthrough…The person going through ego-loss or transcendental experiences may or may not be in different ways confused…True sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego'.[105] In this sense it is not a matter of agency, and it is not a matter of personality, since these are aspects of being which may be dispensed with if other ways of being are to be made possible.

[102] Allen Feldman Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991 p. 4
[103] Elaine Showalter The Female Malady p. 184
[104] Siegfried Sassoon Complete Memoirs of George Sherston London: The Reprint Society 1940 p. 523
[105] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 143

I have suggested that the body is not natural, but is organised in accordance with certain functions and hierarchies, the coherence of which are held together by the image of the ego, or individual subject. Of course, it sounds a little ridiculous to suggest that 'resistance' might occur when these are damaged or destroyed, for example as when the shell shocked soldier loses his sense of himself and his personality. For surely the retention of this is necessary for any meaningful act of resistance is to take place, so that the same person resists, and is aware of resisting. But for Deleuze this is not the case. He says that 'there is no need to uphold man in order to resist'.[106] Indeed, dispensing with 'man' may be an important gesture of resistance. In the discussion of revolution, I suggested that, for Deleuze, one ought not to think of revolution in terms of its consequences. In other words, it does not make sense to say that the Russian Revolution 'failed' because it resulted in a totalitarian system which failed to hand real power to the workers.[107] Deleuze suggests that, judged in this way, all revolutions 'fail' because they simply entail a reshuffling of the social order so that certain identities move up or down the hierarchy. But this is because we are misconstruing what is 'revolutionary' about revolutions, and this is not when identities become privileged, or certain groups manage to take power, but the moment when identities cease to organise.

Similarly in the case of resistance, one might think that this was an act in defence of the self: a confrontation with power in order to improve the conditions under which one lives: to move up or down a hierarchy. Of course, it is this to an extent. In terms of women's rights movements, for example, Deleuze says that '[i]t is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity'.[108] By 'molar politics', he means a politics of identity, in which women affirm their identity as women. However, a more significant form of resistance is the rejection of the constraints of identity and personality altogether. In this sense, the breakdown of the shell shocked soldier may be understood as gesture of resistance, rejecting as it does not only this specific war, but social organisation and bodily discipline in its entirety. Elaine Showalter argues that '[i]f the essence of manliness was not to complain, then shell shock was the body language of masculine complaint, a disguised male protest not only against the war but

[106] Gilles Deleuze (trans. and ed. Seán Hand) Foucault London: Continuum 2006 p. 76
[107] See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet 'G as in Gauche'
[108] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 304

against the concept of 'manliness' itself'.[109] To truly protest the notion of masculinity, one must cease to be a man, cease to speak and act as one and become something other.

Again, this may seem suspect in ethical terms, as it is difficult to shake the residue of agency or intentionality from the idea of resistance. Moreover, the idea that shell shocked sufferers accrued any benefit from their 'resistance' seems highly problematic. But in Deleuzian terms resistance involves a flight from the strictures of autonomous subjectivity and the dominance of reason, so that the unknown possibilities of the body can begin to emerge. Moreover, 'resistance' conceived in this way is not an ends-based notion, since in whose interests could any activity possibly be undertaken once identity and personality have been discarded? 'Interests' are the consequence of a particular social organisation which regulates desires and persons in certain ways.[110] Once these constructions have been eroded, it does not really make sense to speak of 'interests' any more. The point is to think breakdown and breakthrough together, accepting that resisting the organised body might be fatal, and is certainly not the route to a comfortable life, greater privileges and so on. There is always the possibility that 'you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe'.[111] In this sense, we should not think that Deleuze's resistance is in our interests, or even necessarily in our conscious power to initiate. From this perspective the body of the shell shocked soldier comes to appear as a highly resistant one which refuses the power of society to organise bodies and order them to war.

The Outlier and the Anomaly

George L. Mosse suggests that shell shock was associated with the mental inadequacy thought to be characteristic of outsider groups. For example, 'Jews had been accused of being especially prone to hysteria', and Irishmen and lowland Scots were thought especially prone to malingering'.[112] This was partially because it was difficult to reconcile shell shock with ideas about the characteristics of men of the state. Shell shocked soldiers could therefore present a problem in terms of being positioned relative to the state and social ideals. In one sense, they were clearly 'of' the state. By virtue of their shell shock they demonstrated that they had fought and suffered for it. In another

[109] Elaine Showalter The Female Malady p. 172
[110] See the discussion in the previous chapter and Daniel W. Smith 'Deleuze and the Question of Desire' p. 74
[111] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p 178
[112] George L. Mosse 'Shell-shock as a Social Disease' p. 103

sense, however, they were an outlier category: difficult to classify, and of uncertain ethicality, their thoughts and capabilities mysterious. Shell shocked soldiers might be thought to have exhibited their anomalous character through suffering shell shock,[113] and thereby be retrospectively tainted with 'otherness'. However, I want to suggest that there is something productive in positioning the shell shocked soldier in an anomalous position. Eric Leed says that '[i]n Indo-European literature the character of the warrior is anomalous, and this anomalousness is rooted in the nature of his project'.[114] The suggestion is that the warrior always has a problematic status with respect to the state and society. I want to explore here the position of the shell shocked soldier as anomalous, and investigate the ways in which this is productive in terms of making sense of the body and war.

A soldier is the servant of the state, but he must betray the laws of the state in order to serve it. Once at war, the soldier must learn to ignore the ingrained injunctions against killing in order to be an effective instrument of war. Because of this, on entering service, 'the recruit must set aside for the duration his civilian life as a place of peace, women, and comfort, a time when killing people was forbidden and punished as criminal'.[115] Leed presents the problem as being one of a kind of 'double identity', whereby to be fully 'successful', the soldier must be able to shift between military and civilian identities and employ a protective amnesia about past deeds. He says that 'modern wars... are fought by men who must change their identities, from civilian to soldier and back again'.[116] Leed suggests that war neurotics, the shell shocked and the traumatised are those who have not succeeded in forgetting, or in shedding their old identity and the memories which are attached to it. I would suggest that there is difference between the concept of 'soldier' and that of 'warrior' which may be productively explored. The soldier is governed by the principle of identity; whether 'soldier' is an identity he is seeking to acquire or shed. This is because the soldier is a servant of the state, and just as the state is composed of a clear demarcation between inside and outside, organisation, order and clear decision making power, so the soldier

[113] This is not to exaggerate the extent to which shell shocked soldiers attracted social opprobrium or were regarded as 'unmanly'. See Fiona Reid 'Distinguishing between Shell-shocked Veterans and Pauper Lunatics'
[114] Eric J. Leed No Man's Land' p. 13
[115] Eric J. Leed 'Fateful Memories: Industrialized War and Traumatic Neuroses' pp. 85-100 in Journal of Contemporary History 2000 Vol. 35, No. 1 p. 88
[116] Ibid. p. 88

is an organised and disciplined body who is subordinated to the will of the subject, and more importantly, of the state.

Using Deleuze, I want to try to suggest that the warrior may be understood differently from this, and may be able to illuminate something of the outsider status of the shell shocked soldier. I have suggested above that Deleuze emphasises the body as undergoing a process of becoming, rather than being endowed with fixed properties and attributes. However, the state's regulatory powers tend to be orientated towards insisting that the body retains some formal order and represses or conceals its propensity towards fluidity and change. As the servant of the state, then, the soldier is an organised body bound to the principle of identity. However, it is possible to suggest that the warrior stands as an alternative body to this, one which is expressed through becoming rather than static being, because for Deleuze, the warrior does not belong to the state and therefore is not subject to discipline and organisation by it. Deleuze and Guattari refer to 'a veritable becoming-animal of the warrior',[117] and seek to indicate that the warrior does not have a stable human identity, or indeed a stable identity of any kind. It must be remembered that the concept of 'becoming animal' takes its significance not from the transformation into an animal, but from the movement away from any fixed or pre-given identity.

Reading Deleuze, it is possible to suggest that the form of subjectivity associated with the concept of becoming is the nomad-warrior, and this, rather than the soldier, is the authentic 'man of war'. Because he is not controlled by the state, the warrior is regarded with suspicion by it. Deleuze says that '[f]rom the standpoint of the state, the originality of the man of war, his eccentricity, necessarily appears in negative form: stupidity, deformity, madness, illegitimacy, usurpation, sin'.[118] Evading the discipline of the state, the warrior deforms its standards and appears to be deviant and flawed. While the body of the soldier-citizen is organised by the state and obeys standards of regularity and identity, that of the warrior is not and does not. Therefore the warrior is always undermining the state's claims to regulatory hegemony by expressing a different and disobedient style of life. Deleuze says that '[t]he warrior is in the position of betraying everything, including the function of the military, *or* of understanding nothing'.[119] At

[117] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p 388
[118] Ibid. p. 390
[119] Ibid. p. 390

essence the point of divergence between the warrior and the citizen-soldier is that of exteriority.[120] While the citizen-soldier is disciplined into constantly referring all desire and affect back to the centralising force of the ego and the body image, the warrior does not do this, and is therefore open to a continuous process of open-ended change. The citizen-soldier obeys interiority, the warrior exteriority: he is open to the world, unmediated by the interposing force of the personal or the body image.

The warrior figure is 'understood only through the categories of the negative'[121] from the perspective of the state, because it deviates from or evades all the frameworks of organisation which the state imposes on the body. I want to suggest that the warrior may be a productive, if seemingly anomalous figure through which to understand the shell shocked soldier. In some senses, one could say that the shell shocked soldier has somehow broken the covenant with the state, in the sense that he has failed to retain a properly organised body, and has been unable to switch between 'war' and 'peace' identities adequately. Constrained by the state and evaluated according to its standards, the shell shocked soldier thus placed may seem 'outmoded, condemned, without a future, reduced to his own fury, which he turns against himself'.[122] The point though, is to dramatise the lines of possible/impossible in terms of modes of bodily being, and to highlight the extent to which modes which do not accede to the demands of state/society for a certain kind of order must be judged (whether harshly or sympathetically) as deviant, defective, in need of repair.

There are some potentially problematic aspects of the relation that has been put into play here between the shell shocked soldier and the 'warrior' figure. It is important to clarify that neither the shell shocked soldier nor the warrior are being associated or identified with any individual. This must be the case, because the individual is constructed as such by the state, in accordance with the principles of identity and interiority. Rather, they are used here as concepts to think with which are more associated with multiplicity than individuality. This is to say that the various affects and desires are not restrained by and referred to an organised 'individual'. A second area for caution is the potentially misleading impression that the warrior is somehow more perfectly adapted for war than the state's soldier, therefore is incapable of readjusting to

[120] Ibid. pp. 392-393
[121] Ibid. p. 391
[122] Ibid. p. 391

civilian life. This is not the case, as for Deleuze, the idea of the warrior does not necessarily have any relation to war, it is simply something which is not of the state and defies organisation by it.[123] Moreover, the notion of the warrior does not carry with it any positive normative evaluation. Although for Deleuze this way of life is interesting because it rejects the life-limiting construction placed on the body by the state, this does not mean that it is going to be experienced positively by the body which undergoes it. In fact, it is important to emphasise that what is being talked about here is a kind of loss of self whereby the kind of circular self-referentiality associated with continuous identity is abandoned.

I referred above to the idea that the warrior's position is anomalous, because it is somehow at odds with society in general while at the same time belonging to it in some way: familiar yet unknown. For Deleuze and Guattari, the idea of the anomalous is 'a phenomenon of bordering'.[124] The problem becomes, bordering between what and what? For Deleuze and Guattari, the state is a particular form of organisation which makes certain demands on the body and requires that it is organised in a certain way. Thereafter, it becomes possible to refer to individual subjects. However, I suggested above that the notion that war is 'an other' space is a problematic one, since in many respects the space of war replicated and even intensified many of the organisational imperatives of the state, making even more rigorous demands on the body. In this case, how can the idea of the shell shocked body, seen through Deleuze's concept of the body, help to illuminate war, as war seems to be more statist business as usual according to this analysis? In other words, the demand seems to be for a different way of thinking the relationship between the body and war which does not simply involve the organised body relocating to a different space (the space of war), becoming disordered and then returning home to be the subject of re-organisation. I want to suggest that a productive way to think this may not be in terms of 'this space' or 'that space', but in terms of the border itself: between the disordered 'flow state' and 'playing the game of structure'.[125]

[123] See Ibid. p. 463; 469-470
[124] Ibid. p. 270
[125] Eric J. Leed No Man's Land p. 56

Histories of War, the Body, and Trauma

I have suggested that the shell shocked body may be seen as a vector through which the de- and re-territorialisation of the war and the body take place in relation to each other. The war appears both as a concrete geo-strategic event with certain temporal and spatial parameters *and* as a kind of affective haunting which disorders the body. Further, I have suggested that this disordering has tended to be seen in negative terms as some pathological malfunction grounded in biology or psychology and thoroughly explicable, and curable, in these terms. In this closing section I want to draw out the ways in which it is possible to read this as a de-politicising move which shuts down many of the possibilities opened up by the unknown and insurgent body, and its capacity to disturb the existing social order. In a sense, I want to suggest that, once it has been labelled as deviant, the body has been somehow divested of much of its political potential. Having done this, I would like to make some broader suggestive indications as to how it might be possible to think about the body and war in a political sense. Throughout this chapter I have tried to allude to my dissatisfaction with the notion that war might be restricted to a 'proper' place in history. This notion is pervasive in the sense that returning soldiers are expected to 'forget' the war and take up their civilian lives once more. Eric Leed says that '[b]ecause industrial societies define war as an abnormal state of emergency and presume that war and peace are distinct and separate realms of existence, those who adapt to these contexts are presumed to have changed identities, and are required to forget, again and again, or they end up in a psychiatric ward'.[126] I want to deploy Deleuze's insistence on the ethico-political importance of the body as unknown to indicate reasons why the process of inserting the body into an organisational system of diagnosis and 'cure' closes down political possibility.

I have suggested that Deleuze presents the body not in terms of being but of becoming, which is concerned with the affects the body undergoes, and the relations into which it enters. The process of becoming is not intended to refer to the passage from one identity to another, but the passage away from identity altogether. In this way, Deleuze aspires to disrupt the naturalness of bodily development. He says that for children, 'independent of the evolution carrying them toward adulthood, there [is] room in the child for other becomings, "other contemporaneous possibilities"... creative involutions

[126] Eric Leed 'Fateful Memories' p. 88

bearing witness to "*an inhumanity immediately experienced in the body as such*"... "outside the programmed body"'.[127] That is to say, inherent in the body is the potential capacity to become in a multiplicity of ways, and these are not determined by biology or grounded in nature. In other words, 'the inhuman' is immanent to the human in the sense that 'inhumanity' stands for the unknown of the body which is not understood in terms of the norms and categories of the human. The very significance of the body derives from the immanent and dynamic relation it has to the unknown, because it has the capacity to introduce us to that which is outside the organised structure of language and culture, and thereby raises the possibility for novelty.[128]

Deleuze's work calls for experimentation, but he offers no assurances as to what the consequences of this might be. In order to be truly 'experimental', we must not know what the outcome may be. John Rajchman says that '[w]e should judge political regimes (including democratic ones) in terms of the space they allow for "multiplicities" and their "individuations"…But to do this we need to rethink the space and time of politics in terms other than those of a prior or future republic or of an original contract—"another politics, another individuation, another time"'.[129] That is, he is calling for a politics which is open to the unknown, and which is not fixated on identity. This cannot be a question of representation, as who would one represent? Rather it is one of openness to the 'to come',[130] that is to say, to some future form of life whose form is, and must remain, unknown. This entails forbearing from identifying and organising emergent forms of life. It is possible to suggest that identifying bodies as shell shocked (or 'traumatised') is damaging not only because it disables a potentially powerful corporeal critique to the existing social order, in that it involves ascribing all defectiveness and dysfunction to the body, rather than implicating the social order. In addition, however, it closes down the horizon of possibility for other forms of political life. A potentially other or 'inhuman' form of life is rendered intelligible by identifying it in relation to the norms of humanity, thereby potentially limiting its capacity to deterritorialise this normative figure of the human. The anomaly is somehow domesticated.

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[127] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus pp. 301-302 italics in original
[128] See Gilles Deleuze (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta) Cinema 2: The Time Image London: Athlone Press 1989 p. 189
[129] John Rajchman The Deleuze Connections Cambridge: MA: MIT Press 2000 p. 82
[130] Gilles Deleuze Cinema 2: The Time Image p 216

In the first instance, then, it is possible to suggest that the attempts made to reterritorialise the shell shocked body in accordance with certain diagnostic and bio-medical criteria acts as a barrier to the potentially deterritorialising effect that this body could have. I want now to turn to the way in which we might understand this deterritorialisation in terms of the body and war. In calling into question apparently settled norms about the body and its proper functions, the shell shocked body also 'deterritorialises' war by dislocating it from its seemingly settled place in space and time. Eric Leed suggests that forgetting is vital not only for the regularisation of time, but also for the impression of our independence of it. He says that 'it is precisely forgetting that liberates us from the immediately preceding event, allows us to escape from the lock-step of the chronological series... The repression of our immediate past liberates us from over-determination by it'.[131] But what happens if the body that is to undertake the work of forgetting is fractured and dissipated? To what extent does this undermine the independence between body and war? Here I would like to start to expand on these themes and suggest some possible perspectives for their exploration.

I have suggested that, for Deleuze, it is more productive to think the body in terms of becoming rather than being. That is to say, if we concentrate solely on what the body 'is', we remain bound by the perspective of the disciplinary social order which constructed and maintains the body in this way. By focusing on becoming, it becomes possible to take account of the multiple micro-deviations from this prescribed way of being, as well as the capacity that the body has to make connections far beyond those which are socially permissible. Becoming always takes place in the direction away from the socially esteemed identities, so there is no becoming-man, because 'man' is at the top of the hierarchy which organises identities.[132] And the distinction that Deleuze makes between being and becoming also produces a distinction between becoming and history. History is the concern of majority beings. He says that 'Man constitutes himself as a gigantic memory... Of course, the child, the woman, the black have memories; but the Memory that collects these memories is still a virile majoritarian agency'.[133] In other words, just as 'man' organises bodies in inferior relation to it, so the memory of man subjugates all other memories, arranging them in relation to it. History is concerned with majority—with major terms such as 'man' and with organisations such

[131] Eric Leed 'Fateful Memories' p. 88
[132] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p 322
[133] Ibid. p. 323

as the state, and all historical deviations are still deviations relative to this. History 'is a question of knowing how to win or obtain a majority'.[134]

There is nothing particularly novel about suggesting that history is associated with the memory of the state and with the identities it nurtures.[135] However, Deleuze is concerned to expand upon the alternative to a history and memory which demand the coherence of identities through the concept of becoming. '*Becoming is antimemory.*'[136] While history orders entities in relation to each other, so one might refer to the body *and* war, for example, becoming is always *with* something, so that both identities (the body, war) degrade in their relation. Deleuze says that '[u]nlike history, becoming cannot be conceptualized in terms of past or future. Becoming-revolutionary remains indifferent to the questions of a future and a past of the revolution; it passes between the two. Every becoming is a block of coexistence'.[137] He expands on this by arguing that '[i]f becoming is a block... it is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man's land'.[138] This is to say, to return to our previous terminology, that the body and war deterritorialise each other, that through the other they themselves become 'other'. I have shown that shell shock may be analysed in terms of the failure of a divided ego to become whole, the failure of the soldier to forget the war, or a kind of fracture or disruption in the workings of the body. But these are all histories in the war in the sense that they measure the body according to a given body image, and insist on its separation from the war. However, it is possible to suggest that to understand the body and war from the perspective of becoming, it may be necessary to give up on 'the body' and 'war' and to think instead in terms of blocks of affective coexistence.

Deleuze distinguishes between two forms of time: *chronos* and *aion.* The first refers to 'the living present in which bodies act and are acted upon'.[139] The second relates to 'the incorporeal effects which result from bodies, their actions and their passions',[140] in

[134] Ibid. p. 322 Historians might object that this is an excessively simplistic vision of history in which they do not recognise themselves. However, theories of history such as that of Hegel are implicitly and directly associated with the state which is the condition of possibility for established identities and organised bodies.
[135] See Joseph McCarney Hegel on History London: Routledge 2000 Chapter 10
[136] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p 324
[137] Ibid. p. 322
[138] Ibid. p. 323
[139] Gilles Deleuze The Logic of Sense p. 8
[140] Ibid. p. 8

other words, it relates not to a being, but to a *way* of being. In this sense, time is somehow doubled, so that it may work at the level of bodies and identities, and at the surface of these, dissolving and contorting them in affect. In one sense, therefore, one can tell a story of the shell shocked soldier in which a man goes to war, is traumatised, comes home and fails immediately to forget: to become normal. In this tale there is a coherent body which undergoes a coherent set of events and then must be returned to 'normal' by encouraging him to forget the war and remember his civilian self. This story is told from the perspective of the state, in which there are coherent organised spaces ('war', 'home') between which coherent identifiable bodies move. However, there are different stories to be told, in which the body is itself a cause[141], and in which there is no body image and war-image, and in which the war is never 'past' because it is always also in the future, caused and expressed by the body.

Noting the way in which Erich Maria Remarque decided to write his celebrated account of the First World War, Eric Leed says that '[f]irst a pathology was felt, then a need to explain it'.[142] In other words, it was not the case that Remarque remembered the war and therefore felt the need to write about it, but that he underwent certain affects which led him to start thinking about and investigating the war. While in one sense the body can be treated as a coherent object which returns from the war and can in time be made to recover from it, in another sense the body and the war may not stand as discreet and independent entities which move away from each other in time, but rather are taken up in a block of co-becoming, of co-existence, as Deleuze says. From this perspective, it becomes problematic to assert that the war is over, as it continues to repeat and resonate in its bodily affects. Much of the treatment of shell shocked soldiers seems to have involved the re-assertion of the body-image, so that the patient is encouraged to see that while he may *think* that he suffers from paralysis, actually he is able-bodied; while he may *feel* in his nightmares that the war is ongoing, actually it is over. In this way, the body is 'always swinging between the surfaces which stratify it and the plane that sets it free'.[143] The war is both a historical geo-political event and an immanent corporeal one.

[141] Ibid. p. 7
[142] Eric Leed 'Fateful Memories' p. 94
[143] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus 2004 p. 178

Conclusion: Deterritorialising War, Bodies and History

Deleuze uses the figure of the schizophrenic to signify a way of being which does not obey the injunction to be an organised body and a coherent identity, but which rather follows the lines of becoming. However, he says that '[w]e make a distinction between schizophrenia as a process and the way schizophrenics are produced as clinical cases that need hospitalizing'.[144] In the latter instance, schizophrenics have been diagnosed and positioned on the social spectrum of normality. Their free-ranging desire is disciplined to refer back to their bodies, with the consequence that they may start to appear deficient and are defined in terms such as '"[d]issociation", "autism", and "loss of reality"'.[145] In this sense, the schizophrenic figure serves a dual purpose, that of affirming a possible way of life different to that of the normal, ordered body, and of standing as a critique of the way in which the schizophrenic is usually arranged and treated within the social order which values norms and identities and obedient bodies.

In a sense my intention has been similar in this chapter, as in a modest way I have aimed to show that the shell shocked body is constructed and positioned relative to other bodies in terms of the social esteem or opprobrium it attracts. But the 'therapeutic treatment' of the shell shocked body also involves the (re-)construction of the body itself, so that it is taken to be 'essentially' a matter of ego, or biology, or the body image itself. In the case of psychoanalytic approaches and of the 'faradic therapy' of L.R. Yealland, the objective is to return to the body an image of itself, and to insist upon its independence from the past, spatially separate war. However, I have also tried to indicate that the shell shocked body may be thought in more positive terms as a flight from identity and the strictures of the organised body. It is not a question of shell shock being a route to happiness, or understood in terms of the psychoanalytic notion of 'wish fulfilment'. For Deleuze, 'happiness' and pleasure are associated with the coherent ego that schizophrenia flees from. This flight is itself potentially very dangerous. And the shell shocked soldier's lot was often a very miserable one as a consequence of the prevailing social norms which militated towards a certain kind of self-understanding. This said, any breakdown of the 'normal' body gives a fleeting glimpse of the possibilities of other ways of being/becoming. And thought in a more positive sense,

[144] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 'On Anti-Oedipus' p. 23
[145] Gilles Deleuze 'Schizophrenia and Society' pp. 17-28 in Gilles Deleuze (ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina) Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995 New York: Semiotext(e) 2007 p. 26

the shell shocked soldier may be seen as putting the solidity of social structures such as 'war' into flight.

I have sought to indicate that the degree to which the First World War (or any such event) can pass into history (can be consigned to the past) may be considered to be highly limited, and the fixity of the war's location in space and time can be unsettled through references to its profound and unpredictable bodily affects. In closing, I would like to offer some suggestive remarks about the deterritorialisation of body and war, and the possible implications that this holds for us as scholars of past or spatially distant wars. These suggestions may be animated through reference to the idea of *nostalgia*, which predated shell shock as the endemic psycho-somatic disorder which affected soldiers in large numbers. In 1678, the Swiss physician Johannes Hofer published an article suggesting that soldiers in the Thirty Years War were debilitated by nostalgia, defined as the painful longing for home.[146] By the second half of the eighteen century, this debilitating disease, whose symptoms were both bodily and psychological, was regarded as being endemic in armies. Lost in fantasises about the idyllic nature of their home, affected soldiers would simply close down and give up on life. A military surgeon in Napoleon's army, Dominique Larrey, observed that '[a]t last life becomes a burden; sometimes the patient commits suicide, but more often the victim surrenders to death without resistance'.[147] In the first year of the American Civil War, the Union Army diagnosed 5,213 cases of nostalgia.[148]

The nostalgia of the expeditionary soldier derives from the fact that he is not at home. Peter Fritzsche suggests that a general feeling of nostalgia may arise from the recognition that the 'home' no longer exists, that some revolutionary change has forever temporally shattered the sufferers relation with their past.[149] Moreover, the nostalgic also in some sense loses his/her sense of him/herself as a fictive whole, and must forever make do with a 'fugitive identity' constructed on the shifting and unknown terrain of the present.[150] In the case of nostalgia, the sufferer is never firmly present but is always yearning after a lost past. While at war, soldiers idealised their home and sickened for want of it. Similarly in the case of shell shock, the supposition is that the

[146] Anthony Babington Shell-Shock pp. 7-8
[147] Ibid. p. 9
[148] Cathryn Corns and John Hughes-Wilson Blindfold and Alone p. 69
[149] Peter Fritzsche 'Specters of History: On Nostalgia, Exile, and Modernity' pp. 1587-1618 in American Historical Review 2001 Vol. 106, No. 5
[150] Ibid. p. 1606

soldier has failed to really depart from the theatre of war, and still somehow remains entrenched there, prey to its affective shocks. All of this makes perfect sense if we take the discreetness and temporal linearity of events for granted. If the war is over in the geo-political sense, then one who remains convinced that he is 'at war' is clearly shell shocked. Similarly, the nostalgic has invented a halcyon past which stands in the way of a full participation in the present.[151]

These very 'disorders', however, also serve to dramatise the limitations of the coherent body and the degree to which it is entirely present. In both cases, the affective responses and libidinal investments of the body go beyond what is mandated by reason, and demanded by the discipline and organisation to which the body is subject. Adrian Parr suggests that 'our problem here becomes one of how history can experiment with time and events without monumentalising the past, for instance, in the way that Freud tended to do when he privileged Oedipalised remembrance of the unconscious'.[152] This is to say, the task is to avoid seeing history relative to some coherent body in the present which has a fixed identity and which is the arbiter of time and events. Rather, from the perspective of desire, it is a matter of 'hallucinating all history, reproducing in delirium entire civilisations, races and continents, and intensely 'feeling' the becoming of the world'.[153] The fortunes of the shell shocked soldier express the boundary quality of the body caught between the organising forces of state and history, which discipline and identify it, and the perpetual journeys in intensity which it undertakes which mean that all history is in becoming with it.

Deleuze aims to 'demonstrate the existence of an unconscious libidinal investment of sociohistorical production, distinct from the conscious investments coexisting with it'.[154] The becoming of the 'subject' and the becoming of history take place in the same moment, because desire has invested the social and political world directly. There is no barrier between these 'events' and affective responses to them. What this indicates is that although in one sense we can apprehend the First World War (in this example) as a historicised event which is separated in time from us by what came next (the events of

[151] This may also occur with so-called 'negative nostalgia', in which the country of origin is hated to a degree which prevents assimilation to the present. See Salman Akhtar 'The Immigrant, the Exile, and the Experience of Nostalgia' pp. 123-130 in Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies 1999 Vol. 1, No. 2
[152] Adrian Parr 'Deterritorializing the Holocaust' pp. 125-145 in Ian Buchanan and Adrian Parr (eds) Deleuze and the Contemporary World Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2006 p. 127
[153] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 108
[154] Ibid. p. 108

the twentieth century organised in linear time), in another sense, affective responses to and investments in the images, ideas and intensities of the First World War are actually productive of it. As scholars we produce the First World War, in images and articles, and these circulate according to the degree to which they are held in relation to 'state history', and the extent to which they 'function as part of the capitalist machinery'.[155] But there is also the possibility of entering into an affective relationship with the First World War, so that 'one's own body is hardly one's own, since the zones on the body are liable to become somebody else; the body without a self is the body on which all subjects circulate'.[156] What this indicates is that it is not possible to historicise the fluidity of the body, nor the deterritorialising effect that the war can have. Rather than thinking in terms of historical and bodily depth, where 'majoritarian history' and 'the ego' are essential anchoring and explanatory phenomena, it becomes possible to think only of the surface upon which becomings take place.

[155] Adrian Parr 'Deterritorializing the Holocaust' p. 137
[156] Jay Lampert Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of History London: Continuum 2006 p. 2

Conclusion

I began the thesis by seeking to trace the ways in which the body was effaced or immobilised in certain discourses about war. I started with the strategic studies literature, which I argued was concerned to present an instrumental understanding of war which tended to exclude the body from consideration. Where it was included, it was understood as the passive object of an external political will; an object with which it is possible to do or achieve a number of things. I developed this reading in chapter two, in which I sought to trace the ways in which the body has been intended to stage an intervention into these instrumental discourses about war: body counts, and appeals to the dead body seek to expose the 'truth' about war, which is often concealed in the lofty discourses of statehood. For Elaine Scarry, war cannot be a means to an end, because the human life lost in war is an end in itself. However, my aim was to expose the assumptions being made about the body in these discourses. Although they do so with very different ethico-political priorities and agendas, I sought to show that both the strategic studies literature and the literature concerned with the dead body at war tend to make common sets of decisions about what 'the body' is, and what political status it has.

In chapter three I developed this concern through a discussion about the interaction between military technology and the body. I suggested that modern military technologies have generally been greeted with dismay in terms of their effects on the integrity of the human body. Conversely, authors such as Donna Haraway welcome the potentially emancipating effects of modern technologies which they suggest have the potential to liberate 'humanity' from the claustrophobic confines of the human and its attendant disciplinary social norms. I argue that both of these perspectives tend to occlude the extent to which the body is active in determining its own relationship with technology: in determining what functions and potentials technology has. In this sense I tried to show that we should move towards thinking about technology in a non-technological way. Rather than being something with autonomous status and capacities, technology must be invested with desire in a certain way in order to be imbued with certain properties. Following on from this position, in chapter four I used Deleuze and Guattari to develop an understanding of the body as an active and undetermined

potentiality which could be regarded in positive terms as a dynamic participant in the constitution of social reality, rather than being its passive object.

Finally, in chapter five I deployed this new understanding of the body to illuminate some new avenues of insight in the case of the shell shocked soldier of the First World War. Throughout the thesis, I tried to gesture towards a space in various literatures where the body should be, or was being constructed or taken for granted in certain ways. Even where the body was taken into account, I sought to show that this was in an impoverished and devivified form. Moreover, I have tried to suggest that this limited understanding of the body was necessary for the sustenance of certain visions of war. In other words, the clarity and coherence of our understanding of 'war', whether as an instrument of inter-state policy, or as a murderous mistake in international politics, was predicated upon the construction and expression of the body in a certain kind of limited way: the body as an object for decision, as a non-political materiality or as a bounded and regularised reservoir for humanity conduced to a certain mode of thinking about war. Further, it produced certain expectations concerning the level of certainty and authority that 'thinking' itself could achieve. Contrary to this, I employed the insights gained from Deleuze and Guattari to chart a different mode of thinking about war, the body, and thought itself which was sensitive to the impulses of becoming, affect, and deterritorialisation as well as regularity and identity.

My enquiry was catalysed by the impression that it was possible to identify two competing, and indeed contradictory, discourses about war. The first insists that war is an activity carried out between states for the advancement of certain goals, which are determined by politics. The idea of war as an instrument has produced a field of scholarly endeavour concerned with discovering the 'laws of war', or the more or less immutable scientific principles which govern the conduct and nature of war. Although this summary is a generalisation of the position found in much strategic studies literature, its intention is to identify a branch of thinking about war for which war is a knowable, governable phenomenon which can be deployed in the service of rational political goals. The second tendency in thinking about war held that war was a destabilising event which produced confusion and which was very difficult to make sense of. Discussing the Second World War, Paul Fussell says that '[f]aced with events so unprecedented and so inaccessible to normal models of humane understanding,

literature spent a lot of time standing silent and aghast'.[1] An additional problem, he says, was the 'difficulty of making moral sense out of circumstances and behaviour so destructive of normal moral assumptions'.[2] In this sense, war so disrupts our social and mental frameworks for making sense of the world, that it presents a serious challenge to thought.

I wanted to use the apparent tension between ways of thinking about war to explore the parameters of various ways of thinking about the body. I began from the position that 'the body' cannot be accounted for through reference to nature, or by gesturing to some immutable material fact. This insight was reinforced by the work of Judith Butler, in which she illustrates that it is incoherent to posit an extra-discursive entity, when the very move through which this supposition is made is a discursive one.[3] She says that '[t]he being of life is itself constituted through selective means; as a result, we cannot refer to this "being" outside of the operations of power, and we must make more precise the specific mechanisms of power through which life is produced'.[4]I suggested that neither identity nor the body could serve as a fixed object for political analysis due to the contestability and malleability of these terms. However, I suggested that the body tends to occupy a kind of blind spot in many political discourses, whereby it is either excluded from consideration, or is included as bringing certain known qualities to the analysis. In either case, the body is being thought, but the practices through which it comes to emerge as a certain kind of entity are not being thought through.

If we contest the notion that the body can be known in advance, and assumes the properties of an object, then this seems to have certain implications for practices of security and war. Pre-given identities and stable bodies can no longer be supposed to be independent from the practices that are intended to secure them. I explored this through a discussion of biopolitics, which is framed not as a politics of identity or of the body, but of life itself. Biopolitics emphasises the changing properties of life and the perpetual emergence of new forms of life. Rather than attempt to police borders, biopolitics seeks to regulate flow. In this sense, it seems that practices of security and war come to accept the impossibility of determining *a priori* and for all time what the body is. The referent

[1] Paul Fussell 'Almost Beyond Human Conception' pp. 308-314 in Paul Fussell (ed.) The Norton Book of Modern War New York: Norton 1991 p. 311
[2] Ibid. p. 311
[3] Judith Butler Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' London: Routledge 1993 p. 11
[4] Judith Butler Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London: Verso 2009 p. 1

object of security is not a fixed object but an emerging one. According to the way that I set this discussion up in the introduction, this presents something of a problem. My discussion of the body began from a position of opposition to discourses which took either identity or the body as fixed and stable points, because I argued that these ways of thinking about the body effaced the moment at which the body was constructed as a certain kind of body: they concealed the political practices behind the appearance of the body. However, if new practices of security and war avoid this fallacy and concern themselves directly with this political point of emergence, then this begs the question of what is at stake with my project as I set it up in the introduction.

In other words, there seems to be little to be gained in discussing the modes of organisation (territorialisation) of the body, and its vectors of deterritorialisation if this move has already been made by the logic of war and security. However, this conclusion is avoided in two ways. Firstly, I suggested that the biopolitical approach presented only half the picture. For Foucault, 'biopolitics' was coupled with the 'anamato-politics of the human body'. Consequently, I suggested that the biopolitical approach would benefit from a more thoroughgoing consideration of the fate of the human body. Secondly, I suggested that there was something problematic associated with the way in which biopolitics took account of the unknown, or 'contingency'. In my discussion of the body, I suggested that there was something important about the political practices which determined the emergence of a space of perception within which the work of politics could take place. These practices were often obscured by discourses which took for granted the political work that they carried out. However, this has implications for the way in which we think about the body which takes on a kind of dual consistency. On the one hand, the body is governed by certain regulatory social practices. On the other hand, ultimately we do not know what the body is independently of these. I developed this notion throughout the thesis, especially in chapters 5 and 6, and expanded on the idea that there was an ethical importance to this unknown, and unknowable character of the body.

In this sense, the problem with biopolitics is twofold. It accounts too fully for the unknown or 'contingent' character of life, and it does not account fully enough for the specific ways in which bodies are disciplined and created in certain ways. These perceived deficiencies are troubling because incorporating the unknown into discourses of security seems to threaten to divest it of its ethical and critical import. This is to say,

the unknown no longer appears from outside dominant paradigms of security and possesses the ability to destabilise them. Secondly, the fact that bodies are not considered referent objects for analysis is interesting, as I have suggested that the image of 'the body' as object is a very partial and a-political one. However, the fact that they do not feature in the analysis at all means that it is very difficult to account for the subjective impressions, fleeting emotions and sensations which make up our political lives. In other words, although I am suspicious of the notion of 'personhood' as being too totalising and itself a form of discipline, I want to suggest that we must pay attention to the practices through which persons and subjects emerge if we are to see ourselves in our theories.

My conclusions are concerned with both the organised and the disorganised body. In one sense, war may be considered to be a social institution through which we make sense. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is social[5] and 'produces reality',[6] and institutions are the way in which we make sense of our desires, the way in which they are given a particular form.[7] From this I conclude firstly that when we are talking about images or understandings of war we are always talking about an investment of desire which animates these images. Even the most depopulated images of war are images that have been constructed and sustained by the investment of desire. In this respect, it is not so much the case that it is difficult to make sense of war, since war is part of the apparatus through which we, as individual subjects with organised bodies, make sense. It is present in the formation of interests and preferences. This creates a problem for thinking *critically* about war, because it forms such a part of the world in which we live that we cannot easily think about its conditions of possibility. Just as the investment of desire somehow brings war into being, so it brings us into being, and this complicit co-emergence makes it difficult to bring to light the political conditions enabling war, and to mount an effective critique.

Just war as a social institution of war organises the body, however, so the body sustains and supports the integrity of this institution. I suggest that this means that reactions to war which take the form of confusion, a sense of dislocation, identity loss, and

[5] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (trans Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p. 35
[6] Ibid. p. 32
[7] Gilles Deleuze 'Instincts and Institutions' pp. 19-21 in Gilles Deleuze (ed. David Lapoujade, trans Michael Taormina) Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974 New York: Semiotext(e) 2004 p. 20

'disembodiment' or 'war neuroses' have to be taken seriously as vectors for understanding war. In other words, these bodily responses to war are not an issue for clinical medicine or psychiatry alone, but rather they are of the utmost social and political importance. Because the body is both socially produced and productive of society, bodily disorder both indicates something about that society, and has an effect on it. Deleuze says that '[d]esire never resists oppression, however local and tiny the resistance, without the challenge being communicated to the capitalist system as a whole, and playing its part in bursting it open'.[8] So war neuroses and the bodily affective responses associated with war have to be understood as being 'revolutionary' in that they challenge the purported ability of the social system to regulate desire and to organise the body in a certain way. The dualism at work here suggests that the body is being socially constructed as something that we can know, but that it is always evading and escaping this organisation: part of it always remains stubbornly unknown.

The unknown nature of the body means that we have to take account of what we might call the double-structure of knowledge. On the one hand, the body is organised and disciplined in conformity with certain general principles of knowledge we have about it. This is to say, my argument has not been that categories for the description of bodies such as man, woman, soldier, and so on, are illusory or chimerical. On the contrary, I have argued for their potency in constructing a certain kind of body. However, I have tried to show that these foundations for knowledge do not exhaust the dimension of the body which is unknown, and therefore that they are provisional knowledges based on particular sets of circumstances. I would argue that the central distinction made in Deleuze and Guattari's work is between different modes of knowledge, which are reflected in the difference between 'being' and 'becoming'. This distinction is reflected in a variety of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts. For example, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the 'order-word', which is an instruction which demarcates the parameters of social reality[9]. For example, Moira Gatens says that '[t]he order-word expresses a possible world as if it were the only and inevitable world'.[10] In this sense the order

[8] 'Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 'On Anti-Oedipus' pp. 13-24 in Gilles Deleuze (trans Martin Joughin) Negotiations 1972-1990 New York: Columbia University Press 1995 p. 19
[9] Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (trans. and foreword Brian Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia London: Continuum 2004 p. 84
[10] Moira Gatens: 'Through a Spinozist Lens: Ethology, Difference, Power' pp. 162-188 in Paul Patton (ed.) Deleuze: A Critical Reader Oxford: Blackwell 1996 p. 181 in italics in original

word imposes a certain regulatory understanding on the world, and acts as a kind of 'prohibition of transformation'[11] or a 'social prohibition... against metamorphosis'.[12]

However, Deleuze and Guattari say that '*the order word is also something else*, inseparably connected: it is like a warning cry or a message to flee. It would be over-simplifying to say that flight is a reaction against the order-word; rather, it is included in it, as its other face in a complex assemblage, its other component'.[13] This is to say that the process of regulation or determination produces at the same time the conditions for escape and becoming. This double-structure exists throughout Deleuze and Guattari's work. For example, the organised body is always accompanied by the body-in-becoming. They say that '[w]e are oedipalized, we are castrated...[and] We are all schizos! We are all perverts! We are all libidos that are too viscous and too fluid'.[14] What this means for the body is that the known aspects, the regularised features of social organisation, and the unknown aspects are co-present. Therefore it does not really make sense that we should choose between being or becoming, since both are aspects of reality. In this sense, my purpose in the thesis has been to argue that what we know about the body is not everything that we could know, and that is not because our scientific apparatuses are too primitive, but rather it is because *the unknown is the eternal companion of the known*.

In this sense, it is not a simple matter of choosing between two structures of knowledge which we might classify as being concerned with being and becoming, or the singular or the general, since both are co-features of a certain moment. Rather, it is a case of making an ethical decision as to which we choose to emphasise or develop. Michel Foucault alludes to this in his introduction to *Anti-Oedipus,* in which he says that *Anti-Oedipus* is a book of ethics[15] whose 'strategic adversary is fascism... not only historical fascism... but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour'.[16] He also lists as the book's 'enemy number one' 'the sad militants, the terrorists of theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse. Bureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth'.[17] I understand this to mean

[11] Ibid. p. 181
[12] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 119
[13] Ibid. p. 118
[14] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 75
[15] Michel Foucault 'Preface' pp. xiii-xxvii in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus 2004 p. xv
[16] Ibid. p.xiv
[17] Ibid. p.xiv

that any theory or mode of understanding which aspires to general applicability is to be objected to on the grounds that it must be to a degree hostile to difference and becoming. This is the case in the sense that generality must rely on stable concepts and identities, and the preservation of these must dismiss or repress flights or becomings, or classify them under the sign of deviance. This relates to the distinction I made in chapter 5 between history and becoming, and between *chronos* and *aion*, whereby the former refers to the relationships between bodies and the latter to the becoming of bodies.[18] I want to argue that there is something at stake here beyond a semantic or discursive (in the limited senses of the words) point.

In my introduction I suggested that thinking from the perspective of the body might militate towards thinking in singular terms, rather than in general or systematic ones. I want here to clarify what is might be meant by 'singular thought' in the context of the ground covered by the thesis. What it does not mean is thinking in a particular context, rather than having some abstract notion of how things are, because context may be thought of as a framework of familiarising markers or signs. On the contrary, the kind of thinking that I have been trying to propose is if anything an exercise in *de*familiarisation. Massumi says that '[p]hilosophy is a labor of decontextualization'.[19] Thus involves a heightened attention to the unusual, non-generic and disorientating in any situation. Discussing the work of performance artist Stelarc, Massumi says that his 'project is to invent an indeterminate bodily future, in an uncommon intensity of sensation packing more multiplicity into bodily singularity'.[20] What this means is that the performance involves expressing and experiencing the body as a non-generic thing. Stelarc may dramatise this through the hung or suspended body.[21] I have tried to do it through the body at war to sharpen our attention to the war that is always already taking place over bodies between the singular and the general.

I have suggested that the body is a privileged site from which to argue for a singular mode of thought, because of the extent to which the body is unknown, or rather, plunges us into the unknown. I have suggested that this exploration in the unknown, or this openness to the future, is what constitutes ethics in Deleuze's Spinozist reading.

[18] Gilles Deleuze (trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale) The Logic of Sense London: Continuum 2004 p. 8
[19] Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2002 p. 239
[20] Ibid. p. 103
[21] Ibid. p. 109

Deleuze refers to the work of 'bearing witness to *"an inhumanity immediately experienced in the body as such"*'.[22] This is because the idea of 'humanity' involves a given (general) system of knowledge about what a body is and can do. The 'inhuman', on the other hand, suffers no such constraint. But to argue for the centrality of the body is problematic in the sense that it is not immediately clear the body is being distinguished from, in other words, what is not the body. To give any positive answer seems to endanger the commitment to openness on the question of what the capabilities and limitations of the body are. In the thesis I have referred to the body relatively unproblematically as standing for this unknown which intrudes onto, and disrupts systems of knowledge: it is in this way that I have sought to use the body at war to call into question what we know about the body, and what and how we know more generally. Rather than subscribe to generalised modes of thought, I have argued for a more incremental, singular mode of knowledge that takes the unknown as a provocation for thought, rather than as something in need of calculation and domestication.

I have argued for an understanding of the body as a politically constructed and contested entity which at the same time actively participates in the social conditions of its organisation through the investment of desire. This does not mean that we can 'know' the degree to which desire is invested, because this takes place on an unconscious level,[23] but it does mean that desire can alter the conditions of knowing through escaping from these investments. It is this simultaneous movement of capture/escape which means that the body is both socially organised and in a constant state of becoming which is essentially unknown. This journey that the body makes through the unknown, through affect and sensation, disturbs our settled patterns of knowing so that the principles of identity, which might be thought of as units of knowledge, are unsettled. John Mullarkey suggests that we should 'not ask how the subject gains its experience but how experience gives us a subject'.[24] I have argued for a repositioning of the body at the heart of politics through Deleuze and Guattari's insistence on the sociality of desire. According to this position, desire directly invests the social world, and the impression that it does not is the consequence of certain disciplinary measures exemplified by Oedipus. But what this means is that the

[22] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus pp. 301-302
[23] See Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault 'Intellectuals and Power' pp. 206-213 in Gilles Deleuze Desert Islands p. 212
[24] John Mullarkey Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline London: Continuum 2006 p. 14

organised, private body identified as *mine* is itself the result of a political intervention which cauterises desire at the level of the 'personal'.

In this way, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature which seeks to assert the importance of the body for thinking about politics and society. This has often taken place in the light of a perceived alignment between 'reason' and 'masculinity' and between 'body' and 'femininity',[25] and this has meant that the impetus for the inclusion of the body has frequently come from feminist thinkers. Claire Colebrook argues that there is a distinction between positions such as those of Moira Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd and Elizabeth Grosz, who try to think through the body in its materiality, and that of Judith Butler, who Colebrook suggests sustains the distinction between discourse and the body and thereby reinforces the ultimately inaccessible nature of the material.[26] In the thesis I have avoided a direct engagement with these debates, and have used Butler's insights concerning the essentially political and discursive nature of our knowledge of the body. However, one contribution made by the thesis is the implicit refusal of the distinction between modes of knowledge and objects of knowledge, or 'discourse' and 'materiality'. Indeed, I have sought to show that the positing of such a distinction is itself political.

This is not to say that the appearance of a distinction does not exist. As Eugene Holland says, 'the two spheres [of representation: psychoanalysis and political economy] don't just appear separate; under capitalism, they are in fact separate… [however] [e]ven though capitalism segregates reproduction from social life, it nevertheless delegates to the nuclear family the task of forming subjectivity in its own image'.[27] However, it is to insist, with Maja Zehfuss, that the demarcation of the material from the social is itself a political act which is effaced in the supposition that this distinction 'naturally' exists.[28] I have sought to focus on the distinction between being and becoming (or territorialisation and deterritorialisation) whether these tendencies are found in bodies, literature, or forms of social organisation. Therefore I have focused on the distinction between forms of organisation rather than the substance that is organised. In this sense,

[25] See Elizabeth V. Spelman 'Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views' pp. 109-131 in Feminist Studies Spring 1982 Vol. 8, No. 1
[26] Claire Colebrook 'From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings: The Feminist Philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz and Gatens' pp. 76-93 in Hypatia 2000 Vol. 15, No. 2.
[27] Eugene W. Holland 'Desire' pp. 53-62 in Charles J. Stivale (ed.) Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts Chesham: Acumen 2005 p. 56
[28] Maja Zehfuss Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002 pp. 236-244

the anxiety about how we are to access the material world falls away. Despite not engaging directly with these debates, and notwithstanding my acceptance of Butler's work, this thesis contributes to these literatures most importantly by refusing the discourse/materiality distinction and by repositioning the body as a focus for attention.

In the thesis I situate the body as being something undetermined which does not have fixed boundaries or a 'natural' set of characteristics. For Deleuze and Guattari, this mutability is as far as they will go in permitting a definition of 'humanity'. They say that the way to think 'man' is '[n]ot man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of being'.[29] I sought to expose the limitations of labels such as 'humanity', 'man', 'soldier' and so on, as I argued that all such categories represented attempts to define and thus limit the capacities of the body. Moreover, I argued that it is erroneous to be fearful of the effects of technology on the body, as technology is always being constituted in certain ways by the body, and because the body has no natural form or stable boundary that could be imperilled by the arrival of technology. In this sense, the thesis is a contribution to, and a critique of, those literatures which see something intensely and intrinsically threatening in the increasing sophistication of technology.[30] In addition, the thesis is intended as a contribution to those who have seen something emancipating in the arrival of the greater intimacy between man and machine.[31] The thesis tempers predictions that new hybrid forms of subjectivity may produce a new and more inclusive politics, in that it refuses the notion that technology can have any inevitable effect. Deleuze and Guattari argue that 'a schizophrenic taste for the tool moves it away from work and toward free action, a schizophrenic taste for the weapon turns it into a means for peace'.[32] Results are never given in advance, and the categories 'humanity' and 'technology' cannot determine the outcome of encounters between bodies. One cannot 'technologise' oneself out of an ethical dilemma.

I have argued that the body is an important focus for ethics by virtue of the impossibility of determining in advance what it is capable of. In other words, it is the

[29] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 5
[30] John Armitage 'Militarized Bodies: An Introduction' pp. 1-12 in Body and Society 2003 Vol. 9, No. 3; Tim Blackmore War X—Human Extensions in Battlespace Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2005
[31] Donna Haraway Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature London: Free Association Press 1991; Richard Doyle Wetwares: Experiments in Postvital Living Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2003; Rosi Braidotti Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics Cambridge: Polity Press 2007
[32] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 444

unknown, and unknowable dimension of the body which accounts for its ethical centrality. This insistence is in part intended to counter the violent effects of strategies of knowing which tends to produce a marginalisation or suppression of that which cannot be assimilated into a certain framework of knowledge. This includes not only bodies of a certain type, but also the impulses, affects and tendencies within bodies which elude control. Contrary to this, I have highlighted the way in which Deleuze and Guattari focus on a politics of becoming, which emphasises risky and open-ended experimentation over certainty.[33] Deleuze and Guattari define a body by its affects,[34] and affects are never given in advance but are the consequences of the encounters that the body has and the journey that it makes. I have shown that their 'revolutionary' politics entails making space for the unknown within society, so that a properly 'democratic' politics is not understood as one that reifies particular identities through a politics of representation, but rather is one which is open to a politics of the 'to come'.[35] This entails a receptivity to emergent forms of life, which are not organised through identification or representation. Nor are they the objects for calculation or apprehended as a coming security risk, as appears to be the case with the biopolitical imaginary. Rather, they are encountered on their own terms and apprehended as having the capacity to transform existing social relations and political boundaries. I have sought to show, through my discussion on shell shock, for example, that there are multiple moments of opportunity for this politics of the to-come brought about by the immanent instability and unpredictability of the body.

This argument has some affinity with that made by Brian Massumi who argues from a Deleuzian perspective for 'a radical politics equal to the "radicality" of the expanded empirical field itself. Radical politics is an inherently risky undertaking because it cannot predict the outcome of its actions with certainty'.[36] This argument comes through an exploration of the undetermined and excessive nature of the body from a Deleuzian-Spinozist perspective.[37] William Connolly has also described a 'politics of becoming'[38] which 'emerges out of the energies, suffering, and lines of flight available

[33] Ibid. p. 167
[34] Ibid. p. 283
[35] Gilles Deleuze (trans Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta) Cinema 2: The Time Image London: Athlone Press 1989 p. 216
[36] Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual p. 243
[37] See Ibid. Chapter 9
[38] William E. Connolly Why I Am Not a Secularist Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999 p. 57

to culturally defined differences'.[39] Jean-Luc Nancy has argued for a privileging of becoming (or the to-come) over being in conceptions of community, and for the ungrounded, undetermined 'foundation' for all being,[40] and Giorgio Agamben writes of the coming community and of singularity as a focus for ethical encounter.[41] The brevity of these sketched postures suffice only to allude to the existence of a 'body' of literature concerned to rescue the unknown from denigration and to position it as a positive ethico-political principle which can effectively critique the violence done by forms of knowledge/power which seek to control the parameters of social change and to 'secure' identities, albeit sometimes under the guise of 'representative democracy'.

I align myself with this project (if it can be classified thus) in the sense that I too have sought to emphasise the unknown character of the body whose 'identity' may be understood as being a retroactive attempt to make sense of this unknowability. Moreover, I have ethically privileged the unknown body over the organised social body which has attributed to it a certain identity and set of functions. When Deleuze says that Spinoza's conviction that '*We do not even know what a body can do*' is the most ethical statement possible ,[42] this is because it refrains from foreclosing the possibilities of the body by determining in advance what the body can do and therefore seeks to avoid any life-limiting restrictions on what the body can be, become and encounter. But it is arguably also because ethics, in this understanding, is immanent to the process of encounter and change itself. In other words, ethics is not a thing, or a set of criteria for the judgement of certain actions according to which they may be determined as being ethically sound or not. Rather, ethics is a process.[43]

September 11th 2001 saw a surge of interest in the 'unknown' as a problem for security. Donald Rumsfeld said in 2002 that '[o]ur challenge in this new century is a difficult one: to defend our nation against the unknown, the unseen, and unexpected… [to] deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us'.[44] He has also insisted

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[39] Ibid. p. 57
[40] Jean-Luc Nancy (trans. Bridget McDonald) The Experience of Freedom Stanford: Stanford University Press 1993
[41] Giorgio Agamben (trans. Michael Hardt) The Coming Community Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1993
[42] Gilles Deleuze (trans. Robert Hurley) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy San Francisco: City Lights Books 1988 p. 17
[43] See Gilles Deleuze (trans. Martin Joughin) Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza New York: Zone 1992 p. 268
[44] Donald H. Rumsfeld 'Transforming the Military' pp. 20-32 Foreign Affairs May/June 2002 Vol. 81, No. 3 p. 23

that 'one cannot 'wait for threats to emerge and be validated'[45] before taking action against them, given the demonstrably devastating results of doing so. What this signals is a shift in perceptions of the role of the military and security forces from protecting against entities which are known to be threatening to pre-empting, preventing or precluding[46] the emergence of those which *may become* threatening. This leads Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, following Ulrich Beck, to diagnose the 'colonisation of the future'.[47] US security priorities after September 11th seem to indicate that the military and security establishments have begun to take seriously the importance of the unknown to the extent that they have introduced it as a central platform for contemporary security doctrine.[48] This is problematic because I have sought to argue for the ethical significance of the unknown and its potential capacity to unsettle or subvert established social norms.

This is a vexing issue which I do not claim the ability to be able to satisfactorily settle. However, there are two possible responses arising from the thesis which constitute a contribution to the literature on the 'security' of the unknown, as well as the 'poststructuralist' work which seeks to claim for it a special ethico-political significance. Firstly, in my introduction I suggested that the approach taken in this thesis with respect to the unknown could be distinguished from that taken by the literature on 'biopolitics'. I suggested that this difference lay in determining the calculability of the unknown in the form of contingency. In this sense, knowledge regulates the mutability of life through the advancing powers of scientific calculation: our knowledge of the unknown frames the unknown, *qua* contingency. I quoted Nikolas Rose: 'Biopolitics was inextricably bound up with the rise of the life sciences, the human sciences, clinical medicine'.[49] According to the biopolitical accounts, the new sciences of complexity are active in determining our understanding of the unknown and its function within the social world. In this way, new frameworks for knowledge create new objects for securitisation. This is the inverse of the way in which I conceived of the

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[45] Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in 'Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach' Available at: www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf Accessed 12/02/07, p. 29

[46] See Philip Bobbitt Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century London: Allen Lane 2008

[47] Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008 p. 38

[48] See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html p. 5

[49] Nikolas Rose 'The Politics of Life Itself' pp. 1-30 in Theory Culture Society 2001 Vol. 18, No. 6 p. 1

political function of the unknown, which I saw as impacting on frameworks of knowledge and possibly interrupting or unsettling their operation. In this sense, I drew a tentative distinction between contingency and unknown, whereby I presented the former as a field for calculability and the latter as an event which defied calculation.

Secondly, I wish to qualify this claim and to suggest that ethics is not inherent to any particular theoretical framework. In other words, I want to suggest that it is not possible to conceive of two distinct concepts (call them 'the unknown' and 'contingency') to ascribe to the former an ethical function and to the latter a security one, and then to take comfort in the fact that we have 'sorted out' these troubling questions of ethical action, and have reclaimed a liberating concept from the jaws of militarisation. This would be to misunderstand the function of theory, in Deleuze's sense. Deleuze says that theory is 'exactly like a tool box',[50] and the tool in itself does not lend itself to a particular task: 'a schizophrenic taste for the tool moves it away from work and toward free action, a schizophrenic taste for the weapon turns it into a means for peace'.[51] What this means it that we should not be dismayed that the Israeli Defence Force can find much of use in *A Thousand Plateaus*,[52] and nor should we expect to be able to determine *a priori* between contingency and the unknown. To do so would be a question of judgement. However, I have tried to argue that we are in fact committed to a work of ethics according to which we cannot make such distinctions in advance or once and for all. Rather, ethical work is a matter of the risky, incremental experimentation in which we must determine on a case-by-case basis the possibilities for becoming and the ethical possibilities of the unknown. In this sense, my contribution is to suggest that we limit our expectation when it comes to theory and politics, and to insist that the ethical work immanent to reading, thinking, writing and acting our way through these can never be deferred or evaded.

Against Objections

I argued at the start that certain discourses on war exclude the body from consideration. However, the restricted scope of strategic studies literature on war is acknowledged in the literature itself, which occasionally laments its inability to account satisfactorily for

[50] Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault 'Intellectuals and Power' p. 208
[51] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 444
[52] Eyal Weizman 'The Art of War: Deleuze, Guattari, Debord, and the Israeli Defence Force' at http://info.interactivist.net/node/5324 Accessed 09/07/09

the lives lived and lost in war, but presents this as being an evil necessary to allow the clear-headed analysis of war.[53] In addition, the boundaries of 'strategic studies' bleed into military history and other forms of writing about war which are more concerned with the experiences of those who fight it. Therefore, it would be possible to object firstly that I take to task strategic studies for not doing something which it never purports to be able to do—indeed, which it expressly denies being able to do. The same objection could be made to my argument with respect to other branches of writing about war, for example, those which strive to challenge the callous logic of strategy,[54] and those which seek to oppose the utility of war on the grounds that it disregards the death and destruction intrinsic to war.[55] These positions are crafted with a certain strategic enemy in mind, and therefore to lambast them on the grounds that they stage their assault on the clearest grounds they can find seems to miss the point.

At this stage my defence would be quite straightforward: my use of these discourses did not take the form of a critique. My purpose was to expose the way in which the body may be understood as a passive object of political will, or as an immutably material thing outside of political construction. However, I did not mean to suggest that these discourses were uniquely culpable in constructing the body thus. Nor was it particularly to condemn these modes of engaging (or not) with the body. I aimed simply to draw attention to them and, in so doing, amplify the extent to which they are political and contestable even when they purport to be otherwise. However, it is possible to level a more serious criticism of the thesis on the grounds that the argument that I make is not a logical one. In other words, the various discourses of war which I analyse are not shown to *require* the reading of the body that I go on to provide in order to be internally coherent. I do not demonstrate some contradiction in the purpose or position of a discourse and then furnish a solution in the form of a new mode of conceiving of the problem. On the contrary, I start out with an understanding of the body (as political and non-natural) which is clearly incompatible with that presented in a number of discourses I subsequently address.

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[53] Bernard Brodie War and Politics New York: Macmillan 1973; John Keegan 'Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation' pp. 3-12 in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds) Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939-1945 London: Pimlico 1997

[54] Martin Shaw The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq Cambridge: Polity Press 2006

[55] Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985

However, my purpose was slightly different. I aimed to read this 'non-natural' body through these discourses of war in order to create the space within them for the destabilising of their position on the body. I then wanted to read the Deleuzo-Guattarian body back into understandings of war in order to suggest possible alternative modes of engagement with the problem of war and the body. In this sense, my project was an ethical one from the start concerned with widening and dramatising this space of the unknown which was concealed in many of these ways of writing about war. It was for this reason that I was so taken with the apparent tension between literatures on war which claimed that everything could be known, and those which focused on the extent to which war presented a challenge to knowledge. From here I sought to show that all knowledge is provisional to the extent that it cannot secure itself in some irreducible material ground. In this sense, my rejoinder to the above criticism would be that it is not legitimate for any mode of knowledge to absent itself of the need to take account of the contestability of the body on the practical grounds that it needs to focus on other things. This would serve to reinforce the impression that the body is a natural object that one can either discuss or omit depending on the methodological focus of the enquiry in question. On the contrary, I have tried to show that this is not possible; that the body is always in play, both in the way in which desire invests the image of war in question, and in the way that its construction-as-excludable is always contained within the discourse as a concealed political gesture.

A further potential criticism is the way in which the thesis made use of a variety of different bodies at war to illuminate the discussion. I ranged across a number of wars spanning the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and took account of a variety of different experiences from soldiers and civilians of many different kinds. It would be possible to suggest, therefore, that the thesis is not sufficiently systematic and that it takes a broad and unrepresentative survey of experience from across the historical spectrum which fails to add up to anything substantive. These criticisms would be appropriate if this were a thesis with ambitions to be representative or to present a survey of experience or a generalised way of thinking about bodies and war. However, I aim to interact with and respond to writing about bodies and war in a way which emphasises the singular moments of becoming, and the way in which these were effaced or 'reorganised' in accordance with the needs of instrumentalism and clarity. The use of multiple 'examples' would be problematic if they were intended to serve as

examples of some general principle. This was not the case, however. Rather, I sought to expose the ways in which 'general principles' could be constructed out of the fluid and the irregular. I used multiple expressions of bodies at war, rather than focusing on a single example, because I did not intend my expositions of bodies at war to serve as *examples* of anything, but as provocations for a different way of thinking.

The thesis marshalled a variety of different genres of literature in order to illuminate my thinking about the body and war. Though I hesitate to make the comparison, this eclecticism mirrors Deleuze and Guattari's own method, whereby they 'steal from other disciplines'[56] and use a wide variety of sources from mathematics to literature to ethnology to fiction to psychoanalysis. In part, the intention behind this is to set up a kind of equivalence between forms of literature. For example, Deleuze and Guattari would deny that Karl Marx is a political thinker, but Franz Kafka is not, or that Immanuel Kant is a philosopher but William Burroughs is not.[57] In other words, the use of different genres of literature is intended to unsettle the claim to authority made by any particular hegemonic mode of discourse, and thereby to create the space for different forms of 'truth telling' in order ultimately to challenge the possibility of there being a truth about the body and war. For example, in the thesis I used strategic studies, history, psychoanalysis, fiction (novels and poetry), and a variety of other literatures. I did so in the hope that this would undermine the claims to be the authoritative voice on 'war' implied by certain discourses. In his introduction to *Anti-Oedipus* Foucault writes that 'Deleuze and Guattari care so little for power that they have tried to neutralize the effects of power linked to their own discourse'.[58] Therefore surely writing in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari ought to strive to do the same.

Finally, there are a number of potential ethical criticisms that could be made of the thesis. The first arises in the context of the suspicion that bringing the body to bear on politics is a dangerous move which can all too easily act to expose the body to the violence of sovereign power. This seems to have been Hannah Arendt's concern when she says that 'a whole host of modern scientific experiments in social engineering, biochemistry, brain surgery, etc... [may act so as to] kill man, not necessarily as a living

[56] Brian Massumi 'Translator's Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy' pp. ix-xvi in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. xv
[57] See Mark Seem 'Introduction' pp. xvii-xxvii in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. xxi
[58] Michel Foucault 'Preface' in Ibid. p. xvi

organism, but *qua* man'.[59] Concerns about the possible implications of sovereign power taking bodily life itself as its object[60] may tend to produce the conclusion that the exclusion of the body from politics is a necessary condition for the existence of a meaningful politics at all. However, I have tried to suggest that excluding the body from politics and conjuring the vision of a rational, cerebral political space itself does harm. I have argued that the body is not simply 'excluded' from politics, as though it were an object which could be placed inside or outside a zone of concern, but that it must first be construed as an object which can be thus manipulated. It is this imaginary of the body as the passive object of will which is the potential adjunct to violence, and it is this which I have attempted to counter in my insistence on the body's dynamism and vitality.

The second potential point of objection is the way in which I have sometimes tended to portray bodies in pain in what might be regarded as positive light. It could be argued that this indicates a disregard for the suffering of the bodies in question, and that I am enacting my own instrumentalisation by tethering these suffering bodies to my own purpose in illustrating the malleability and fluidity of the body. In this sense, it could be argued that the body at war serves as a useful point at which to bring to bear a Deleuzian approach precisely because it stands as the exemplar of the damaged body, and that in this sense the enterprise is an unethical exploitation of historic pain. Although this is a difficult area, I would defend myself on two counts. Firstly, the bodies at war which I have sought to give expression to have not been confined to suffering bodies, or bodies in pain. Indeed, I have sought to challenge the impression that the body at war can be understood primarily through the framework of suffering and abjection, instead insisting upon active bodily engagement with war, and the possibility of feelings of euphoria, purpose and pleasure. Secondly, when I have considered the distressed body, I have not primarily done so in terms of its subjective impact on the sufferer, but rather in order to indicate the ways in which certain bodily affects can undermine the hold of personhood, identity and ego. Deleuze frequently refers to masochism, for example, as something which is less to do with the infliction of

[59] Hannah Arendt (intro. Margaret Canovan) The Human Condition Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999 p. 188n
[60] See also Giorgio Agamben (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998

suffering, and more associated with the desire to break the bonds of personhood.[61] In this thesis, I have sought to take the suffering body seriously as a political entity which has implications for social organisation and is not merely a matter for personal negotiation.

Implications for International Relations

Julian Reid points out that Deleuze and Guattari have not been much used within the field of International Relations (IR).[62] One of the exceptions to this has been his own work, which has tended to focus on the concept of the 'war machine'.[63] Reid uses the concept of the war machine to speak to a preoccupation within IR concerning the relationship between politics, war and forms of governance. He argues that Deleuze and Guattari can provide a useful supplement, or corrective, to Foucault's thinking about war and politics. Foucault is concerned with the 'genealogy of military-strategic theory and liberal forms of power'.[64] But he never calls into question the relationship between the state and war. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, the war machine is exterior and irreducible to the state. So while the war machine may be captured by the state and used as a tool by it, this relationship is never stable as the war machine remains outside the state and excessive of it. Reid says that this enables the concept to 'offer...an account of state power as conditioned by its appropriation of war and its institutionalisation of war in the form of military force and violence... [and also] an account of resistance to the state through the invocation of the power of war against its capture and appropriation by the state'.[65] This enables us to rethink Clausewitz and Foucault on the relationship between war and power. Whereas for them strategy enables a new mode of the application of power, following Deleuze and Guattari this mode of power may be driving and usurping the state rather than serving it.

Reid says that the war machine is 'one of the most generally under-researched aspects of Deleuze's thought'.[66] This may be in part because of the difficulty of the concept, to the extent that Paul Patton suggests that 'there are reasons to doubt that the war

[61] See Gilles Deleuze and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (trans. Jean McNeil) Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty and Venus in Furs New York: Zone 1991
[62] Julian Reid 'Deleuze's War Machine: Nomadism Against the State' pp. 57-85 in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 2003 Vol. 32, No. 1 pp. 58-59
[63] See Julian Reid The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life struggles, Liberal Modernity, and the Defence of Logistical Societies Manchester: Manchester University Press 2006
[64] Julian Reid 'Deleuze's War Machine' p. 61
[65] Ibid. p. 58
[66] Ibid. p. 59

machine concept is likely to be effective in the form in which it is presented, [although] the idea of a type of assemblage which has an affinity with processes of deterritorialisation may still turn out to be useful'.[67] One reason why the war machine is such a problematic concept is the complex relation it has to war. The war machine is not reducible to the military industrial complex,[68] and nor does it refer simply to system of governance or a framework of regulatory power: it also refers to the possibilities for subverting or escaping from this system. Deleuze and Guattari say with respect to the war machine that 'the very conditions that make the State or World war machine possible... continually recreate unexpected possibilities for counterattack, unforeseen initiatives determining revolutionary, popular, minority, mutant machines'.[69] So as with many of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts, the 'war machine' is immanently doubled in a way which seems to promise much but which acts to inhibit appropriations for IR.

I have been interested in trying to make the concept of the war machine speak to IR, but with certain reservations which can be set out in the context of this thesis. In the first place, it seems to me essential that we do not become so enamoured of the possibility of setting Deleuze and Guattari into conversation with the field of IR that we give everything away to the terms established by that field. Of course, it is always problematic to speak of a scholarly field in such general terms, and never more so as with a field as unwieldy and ill-defined as IR. But there is a danger that in order to be taken seriously in a discourse in which states, war and the international/global system are crucial units for analysis and objects for consideration we take from Deleuze and Guattari what they have to say on these matters alone, and leave the rest. This would be a mistake, because it is the dual nature of these concepts which gives them their ethical import. This is to say, we are never determined by systems of power, we always have a choice in the application of theory. Where one 'pole' of the concept of the war machine concerns global norms of power and war, the other is associated with 'the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space'.[70] Power and counter-power are co-emergent.

I want to suggest that the concept of the war machine has the potential to offer something to contemporary anxieties about war and security. As I have mentioned, in

[67] Paul Patton Deleuze and the Political London: Routledge 2000 p. 109
[68] See Julian Reid 'Deleuze's War Machine' pp. 63-64
[69] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 465
[70] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 466

the aftermath of September 11th 2001, a range of security practices were introduced which seemed to involve an internalisation of the problem of the unknown into the security discourse itself. This move was also seen in the biopolitics literature which took contingency as an object for calculability for the new strategies of securitisation. I suggested that this was problematic because I wanted to conceive of the unknown as something which came from outside the prevailing frameworks of political power and had the potential to challenge or unsettle them, thus creating the space for new forms of emergence which were unsecured and incalculable. In other words, the internalisation of the unknown seems to undermine any faith we might have in the critical or insurrectionary potential it has. However, through the concept of the war machine it may be possible to see our way through these issues, albeit in ways I have yet to fully think through. As I have suggested, the war machine is irreducible to the state: it is fundamentally exterior to it, although they may serve the same purpose for a time. What this means is that the war machine is not amenable to the forms of knowing that the state enforces, which attend to principles of identity and the stability of being. In other words, the strategies of power of the war machine might look very much like those described by the US National Security Strategy 2002.

However, this does not mean that we should merely use the war machine concept to augment the impression that there has been a change in practices of security/war with respect to the unknown. As I have suggested, Deleuze and Guattari's concepts tend to be doubled and bipolar, and the same goes for the war machine. The war machine is used to refer to literature,[71] modes of thought and forms of subjectivity. It has 'many varied meanings'.[72] Ultimately what it refers to is a vector of deterritorialisation: it is the 'deterritorialized par excellence'.[73] It is precisely because it is 'not uniformly defined'[74] which means that the apparent identity of contemporary security practices with the deterritorialised strategy of power associated with the war machine should not cause despair. It is not the case that the unknown emerges from without and counters established power relations, though Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this was once the case, when the war machine stood for an 'outside' and was not yet global. It is rather the case that mutation and change are immanent to the war machine itself and can come

[71] See Gilles Deleuze 'Nomadic Thought' pp. 252-261 in Gilles Deleuze (ed. David Lapoujade, trans Michael Taormina) Desert Islands
[72] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus p. 465
[73] Ibid. p. 421
[74] Ibid. p. 466

from anywhere: 'an "ideological", scientific, or artistic movement can be a potential war machine'.[75]

Deleuze and Guattari refer to 'two kinds of war machine' that confront each other.[76] I would suggest that this way of thinking about the war machine has something to offer the current concern that modes of security are becoming immanent to modes of life, and therefore that the emergence of the unknown no longer has the political impact it once did. Rather, this challenge is being waged immanently to the war machine. How exactly this might work in terms of an engagement with developments in war and security has yet to be fully worked out, but it must depend absolutely on a commitment to what Deleuze and Guattari call 'revolutionary politics'. This is to say, the relevance of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the war machine, and their work more generally, has the potential to bring to IR an insistence on the ethical unknown that exists at the heart of every theory, and which feeds directly into the practice of international relations itself. In other words, no concept developed here can on its own critique, diagnose or support any development in the international system. Not only does this notion suspend the ethical obligation of the scholar/activist to determine the work done by the theoretical tool, but it imposes an artificial distinction between scholar and activist, between theory and world. Rather, as Deleuze says, '[t]here is only action, the action of theory, the action of praxis, in the relation of relays and networks'.[77]

I have suggested that the body may be able to offer us an alternative mode of knowing and thinking which does not depend on categorical judgements or general claims to truth: that rather than being an object for thought, the body may productively be considered as a cipher for it. This is a kind of knowing that does not depend on identity but rather exists alongside it, attentive to the slippages and the sensations which do not 'add up' to a coherent or organised whole. I referred to the indefinable sense of unease or horror which may be generative of a variety of political affects. For example, in Brian Massumi's essay on the US Homeland Security colour-coding threat system, he says that '[t]he whole populations became a networked jumpiness...Jacked into the same modulation of feeling, bodies acted in unison without necessarily acting alike'.[78] Tim O'Brien's fictional account of the way in which a sense of displaced unease

[75] Ibid. p. 466
[76] Ibid. p. 467
[77] Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault 'Intellectuals and Power' p. 207
[78] Brian Massumi 'Fear (The Spectrum Said)' pp. 31- 48 in Positions 2005 Vol. 13, No. 1 p. 1

affected US soldiers in Vietnam differs in the sense that this unease had not been tethered to a meta-political cause and seemed to have no political import, or be amenable to being incorporated into existing frameworks for interpretation of the Vietnam War. But this, for me, is precisely the point. Rather than contributing to the vast assembled knowledge on 'the Vietnam War' as a geo-political event, bodily sensations such as those described by O'Brien serve to challenge the completeness of this mode of understanding the war, and to suggest multiple singular affective responses to the war which do not add up to a new understanding but rather insist upon the impossibility of 'adding up'. In this sense the way in which knowledge gestures towards completion is always being deferred by the bodily unknown.

While this form of 'knowing' may appear to be frustratingly contrary and insubstantial, I would insist that the point is precisely *not* to devise a system of knowledge which can complete with or stand alongside already existing systems. Rather, the point is to highlight the continual residuum of the unknown which exists alongside the most totalising systems of knowledge, and, indeed, is produced by them at the boundary of what they capture and define. The body is important for this task due to its ethical significance as something which cannot be foreclosed or predetermined. Referring to 'the body' aims to capture the doubled emergence of the body as organised social organism, and the body as unknown: these bodies are always co-emergent. Elizabeth Grosz says that '[t]his capacity for becoming other, or simply becoming, is not something that culture simply imposes on an otherwise inert nature but is part of the nature of nature itself'.[79] One does not have to place the 'unknown' aspects of the body on the side of nature and the organised and known dimensions on the side of society or culture. Instead of such a division, it is more productive to think of a line of becoming, of emergence, which is co-productive of the socially organised body and the unknown body. Therefore, situating the unknown body at the heart of the ethico-political project of rethinking thinking does not involve the anticipation of some distant political horizon. Rather, the'unknown body' is not an identifiable being-apart, but is the eternal companion of the organised, subjectified, identified body: it is immanent to us.

The contention that the unknown is an important companion to the known, the exploration of which is an ethically significant task, has implications for how we

[79] Elizabeth Grosz 'Naked' pp. 187-202 in Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra (eds) The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural Future Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2006 p. 192

practice IR. One way in which this is the case is in terms of how we think about the events which tend to be the subjects of IR. Generally, events are used as material for the development and sustenance of certain theories from which they are formally distinct. Contestation emerges around the types of causes which are believed to be efficient in producing a particular outcome. James Der Derian says that '[i]n the current study... of international relations, events are neatly broken down into narrative accounts of cause/effect or rational models of independent/dependent variables'.[80] Moreover, as a discipline, IR has tended to be preoccupied with striving to predict future occurrences based on a specific analysis of the past. John Lewis Gaddis says that '[t]heories provide a way of packaging patterns from the past in such a way as to make them usable in the present as guides to the future'.[81] Hans Morgenthau claimed to have devised in *Politics Among Nations* a 'science of international politics'.[82] Generally, the focus for critique in such approaches is the ability of the theory to appropriately analyse and make sense of events in the world in order that it may predict future events.

Generally left unexamined is the status of the empirical events themselves and the relationship they bear to a certain mode of reasoning. Nor, I would suggest, is the type of event we ought to be interested in called into question. It is assumed to be self-evident that what should be of interest to IR are the relationships between states, exemplified by war, and that wars exist for analysis by various theoretical perspectives which are brought to bear on them. In this thesis, I discussed war as a general occurrence (I was not concerned with any one particular war) and as a singular one, in the sense that I was concerned to explore the non-generalisable aspects of war which were expressed through certain bodily affects. In the latter discussion, I deployed Deleuze's concept of the event, which refers to something which cannot be accommodated by patterns of empirical causation or firmly located in time. Rather, Deleuze's concept of the event unsettles the frameworks for conceptualising causation in the material world. This material causation does not unproblematically exist, for Deleuze, but it exists as the consequence of a particular mode of social and epistemic organisation which categorises objects or occurrences in specific ways, and regulates

[80] James Der Derian 'Global Events, National Security, and Virtual Theory' pp. 669-690 in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 2001 No. 30, Vol. 3 p. 672
[81] John Lewis Gaddis 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War' pp. 5-58 in International Security 1992 Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 6
[82] See Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace New York: Knopf 1967 Chapter 2,

the relationships between them. In other words, while it may look as though IR is merely reporting on events in the world, it was actually simultaneously constructing them, together with the particular understanding of the world in which they take place.

The function of the concept of the event in Deleuze's sense is precisely to call into question the naturalness and inevitablility of these social and empirical rules upon which IR (and other disciplines) seem only to be reporting. The problem with the way in which we in IR habitually think about events is that they presuppose continuity in the person who is doing the thinking. In other words, if I am theorising about the world, I am somehow placed outside it, and able to survey various occurrences and chart their impact without myself being transformed by them. This view depends on a radical faith in the identity of the thinking subject. For Deleuze, on the other hand, the event is something like a becoming: it is transformative, and it transforms the objects with which we thought we were dealing, as well as the causal relations between them. He says that '[i]t is not easy to think in terms of the event. All the harder since thought itself then becomes an event'.[83] There is no *a priori* distinction between material events in the world and events of thought, since it is in the nature of the event to degrade such differences, which are themselves the consequence of a particular mode of contingent organisation.

I would suggest that this indicates that IR should be attentive to different types of event in the world, and different modes of transformation. It might be suggested that I have written very much in conformity with IR orthodoxy in choosing to write about war. However, my intention has been to illustrate the double structure of events such as war. I have argued that the body is on the one hand an unknown, and on the other hand is socially organised in accordance with a certain framework of knowledge. Similarly, on the one hand war is an object of quasi-scientific knowledge with certain rules and principles, and on the other it destabilises and unsettles frameworks for knowing and transforms the parameters for thinking. In this sense, both war and the body are vectors of becoming as well as being objects for analysis. While it may be tempting to consider 'transformation' in terms of a change from one identity to another, the types of transformation a Deleuzian approach foregrounds is a becoming: imperceptible, immanent, and founded on the extent to which we are always unknown to ourselves. In

[83] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (trans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam) Dialogues II London: Continuum 2006 p. 50

this sense, it may be erroneous to suggest a ‘Deleuzian IR’, as this is too restrictive in terms of the type of insights that a Deleuzian approach potentially allows us to have. Rather than systematise a new way of thinking the world, a Deleuzian approach highlights the immanent materiality of thinking itself, and the extent that thinking may not just be something that I do, but something that happens to me.

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